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“The Construal and Predication of Self Awareness in English  
by way of the Reflexive Construction” 
 
Barry Grossman 
Aug 2014 
Part 1 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Dave Dahl, the owner and creator of Dave’s Killer Bread, spent some time in 
prison where he did a fair amount of self-contemplation. In the quotation below, 
taken from the bread package label, Dave uses reflexive pronouns to convey his 
introspection and the insights he’s gained from it. 
 
 “…15 years in prison is a pretty tough way to find oneself, but I have no regrets. 
This time around, I took advantage of all those long and lonely days by practicing 
my guitar, exercising, and getting to know myself - without drugs... It’s been said 
adversity introduces a man to himself and I found this to be true... A whole lot of 
suffering has transformed an ex-con into an honest man who is doing his best to 
make the world a better place… One loaf of bread at a time.”   
(Dave Dahl, label of “Dave’s Killer Bread” (my italics))  
 
What does the phrase find oneself mean and how do we know this? Does a person 
find oneself in the same way one finds a wallet in the street? Why is the 
metaphorical extension of find used and not some other verb, as in the next 
sentence, know myself, an expression famously used by Socrates for introspection, 
“Oh man, know thyself and thou shall know the Universe of the Gods!” 
Furthermore, the abstract noun adversity in the final example takes the place of 
a human agent that can perform introductions, i.e., introduce a man to himself. 
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The phrase introduces a man to himself is used metaphorically, but how do the 
individual components of the phrase allow for a Self-Aware1 meaning? Does the 
meaning of find in the conjoined clause in line four have the same meaning as 
find in line one?  
In the discussion that follows it will be seen that the underlying conceptual 
commonality of these instances is Self-Awareness, not simply in reference to a 
speaker’s self-knowledge, but an acute meta-awareness of that knowledge. 
Although phrases such as know myself have been around for a long time, there 
are other verbs which, when used metaphorically within in a reflexive 
construction, also refer to this type of Self-Awareness. Previous syntactic and 
semantic descriptions of English reflexivity have failed to adequately account for 
this conception, predicated by way of a metaphorically extended verb + reflexive 
'x-self'2.  
The following discussion focuses on examples such as: 
1. I found myself missing her more every day. 
2. They lost themselves in the music. 
3. Tom caught himself giggling during the meeting. 
 
Particularly conspicuous are the metaphorical senses of the verbs. This 
metaphoricity will be shown to be the result of an underlying conception of the 
gain or loss of Self-Awareness (SA). Examples such as those above are marked 
reflexive and contain transitive verbs, but will be shown to differ in fundamental 
ways from prototypical transitive and reflexive event. Furthermore, these 
examples differ from other metaphorical senses of reflexives such as:  
 
                                            
1 I will be using the capitals ‘S, A’ in Self-Awareness to refer to the deeper, usually subconscious aspect of the 
human psyche. 
2 x-self refers generically to the English reflexive pronouns; myself, yourself, herself, etc. used specifically 
with reflexive meaning. 
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4. He asked himself a question. 
5. Jenny made herself finish the workout. 
6. Jack baked himself on the beach. 
In the above examples, there are salient, identifiable Objects (differing in their 
semantic roles, see Part 2). In (4), one part of the mind asks another part of the 
mind a question (and this may also be literally acceptable, as one may actually 
hear a question formed in the mind), in (5), one part of the mind forces or assumes 
control (Comrie, 1989; Gilquin, 2010; König & Gast, 2002, 2008); Talmy (2000)) 
over another part, and in (6), the reflexive event refers to a meronymous 
relationship, understood as part of Jack’s body (the part of skin that was exposed 
to the sun) undergoing sunburn. Compared to examples (4-6), the concreteness of 
the Objects in SA events in (1-3) seem ambiguous. An attempt is made below to 
show that these events refer to the realization of some mental or physical 
perception that can be uniquely identified, i.e., Self-Awareness. Specifically, this 
paper addresses the following questions: 1) How is Self-Awareness expressed 
through the reflexive-metaphorical constructions? And 2) Can the construal and 
predication of SA events be semantically delineated and categorized?  
Discussion of these questions will bring to light a previously neglected 
phenomenon and show that SA events are a nontrivial semantic subcategory of 
reflexive events in English. The following discussion proceeds in Section 1.2 by 
investigating lexical issues related to defining the meaning of three verbs 
appearing in SA events. In Section 1.3, various definitions of reflexivity will be 
discussed. It will be shown that in addition to a syntactic interpretation, a 
semantic component is necessary to account for SA events.  
Dealing specifically with the semantic representation of the reflexive event, 
Part 2 explores the notions of expectation, valency and transitivity. In section 2.1, 
a semantic description of reflexivity in terms of expectation of a distinct Object 
Participant will be seen beneficial when delineating the general function of the 
reflexive event. Verbs that license two separate and unique participants are 
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prototypical and expected. When two participants are the same entity however 
(contrary to expectation), the need for clarification arises. The reflexive pronoun 
functions as such a clarification marker. 
In section 2.2 the concept of valency will be discussed and shown to have 
explanatory value for SA events. Viewing reflexive events from a valency 
perspective provides explanatory leeway for semantic idiosyncracies of reflexive 
events, SA events being one example of this. Section 2.3 explores the notion of 
transitivity as a non-binary phenomenon. Although structurally transitive, SA 
events will be shown to be conceived and construed as less transitive than 
prototypical reflexive predications but more transitive than prototypical middle 
and intransitive events, based on the inherent components of emergence of event 
action and the degree of participant distinction. 
Part 3 summarizes the present discussion of SA events and charts future 
steps in the research.  
1.2  Lexical and Grammatical Definitions 
It is common knowledge that meanings of individual lexical items vary and may 
function differently in different environments, “…we need only to glance at a good 
grammar or dictionary of a language or think about the languages we know to see 
that this is the way languages operate. Polysemy is a pervasive property of 
human language, not just in the lexical domain but also in grammar.” (Kemmer, 
1993:5) In this section, the verbs occurring in SA events will be delineated and 
shown to vary greatly in their description and meaning. It is only when SA is 
proposed as a unifying conception that semantic anomalies can be explained. 
1.2.1 Find oneself 
The present discussion begins with the verb find in the corpus-based Longman 
Dictionary of Contemporary English Online3. Twenty-one different instances 
                                            
3 A corpus-based dictionary was employed to exemplify language usage in society.  
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were listed. The verb find is categorized as a transitive verb (see Part 2 for a 
discussion of transitivity). The first definition is: get by searching - to discover, 
see, or get something that you have been searching for. The first two examples for 
this definition are:  
 
7. I can't find the car keys. 
8. Hold on while I find a pen.  
   ("Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English," 2014) 
 
Particularly noticeable is the semantic incongruence between the definition and 
the examples. In both (7) and (8), the car keys and a pen have not yet been 
obtained by the act of searching, and therefore the definition, "get something by 
searching" does not accurately describe this conception. The definition could be 
changed to fit the examples, i.e. to search for something, or vice-versa, i.e. 
choosing more appropriate examples to fit the definition, i.e., I found the car keys 
or I found a pen. Two further examples in the LDOCE are listed under this 
definition and properly account for the conception of ‘get by searching’:  
 
9. Her body was later found hidden in the bushes. 
10. She had almost given up hope of finding a husband. (ibid.) 
 
In (9-10), the sought after items had been obtained, and therefore the definition 
supported. It also might be noticed that there is a tense/aspect difference in the 
two sets of examples. Because variation in meaning is here based on a predictable 
grammatical pattern, it is plausible that this definition be distinguished from the 
first; 1) the atelic (uncompleted) sense of searching for, i.e., the present tense in 
examples (7-8) or future (i.e., I’ll find it later), and 2) the sense of get by searching 
for telic (completed) events, as in (9-10). The motivation here is not to make a 
decision either way, but to direct attention to the complexity involved when such 
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decisions need to be made.   
The second definition in the LDOCE states: see by chance - to discover 
something by chance, especially something useful or interesting. Two example 
sentences are given:  
 
11. I found a purse in the street. 
12. We found a nice pub near the hotel. (ibid.) 
 
Example (11) supports the definition, but (12) may not, depending on whether the 
people who had found the pub were searching for a pub or just happened upon the 
pub as they strolled through the streets. This is conceptually ambiguous. The key 
concept discerning these two possibilities is intent. In (11), finding a purse in the 
street is prototypically a happenstance event, not something that one exerts effort 
to make occur, thus there is no intent on the part of the Agent/Experiencer. This 
same lack of intent accounts for the sense of accidentally finding a pub in example 
(12), but not if the Agents/Experiencers went searching for a pub and 
subsequently arrived at one, the conception from the first description of ‘get by 
searching’.   
Definition number four of the LDOCE is given as: do something without 
meaning to - to be in a particular state or do a particular thing, or to realize that 
this is happening, especially when you did not expect or intend it. The example 
provided is:  
 
    13. After wandering around, we found ourselves back at the hotel. (ibid.)  
 
In definition two above, it was shown that the ambiguity of find was based on 
the concept of lack of intent. Examining the sub-category listed under definition 
four here may help clarify this issue: find yourself/your mind etc. doing 
something. Two examples are provided:  
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    14. When he left, Karen found herself heaving a huge sigh of relief. 
    15. She tried to concentrate, but found her mind drifting back to Alex. (ibid.) 
 
We see again lack of intent semantically motivating the definition. In (14-15), 
something that was not intended or expected had occurred, i.e., sighing in relief 
and thinking of Alex, respectively. The conception of intent/expectation can be 
seen more clearly when compared with a minimal pair that does not include find, 
but other sensory perception verbs, such as: 
 
   16.  When he left, Karen felt (saw, heard) herself heaving a huge sigh of relief. 
 
Comparing the above, example (16) expresses no conceived intent or expectation. 
There is a complete absence of this conception (even if metaphorically extending 
the senses of see and hear.) In other words, Karen was simply aware of her 
physical or mental sensations in response to the stimulus of his leaving. In 
example (14), however, lack of intent or expectation seems to motivate the 
construal and the choice of the verb find, which includes these qualities in its 
semantic lexicon. In other words, Karen was not only aware of the physical 
sensations brought about by the stimulus of his leaving, but was surprised by 
her response (a huge sigh of relief) to that sensation, an arising of 
Self-Awareness. 
 There is one more SA-related definition of find in the LDOCE that 
requires consideration. This is description number 16: find yourself, ‘informal’ - 
to discover what you are really like and what you want to do – often used 
humorously. The solitary example is:  
 
17. She went to India to find herself.  
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Here, the discovery of some self-knowledge is evident. The sense of this is 
different from those above and the conception of lack of intent/expectation does 
not correlate. Intention/expectation may or may not be subsumed under the 
concept of discovery. One can intend to discover something and succeed (or fail), 
or one can discover something by accident, without having had that specific 
intent. These examples are, therefore, conceptually ambiguous. If the above 
definitions of find are semantically related (and it may be assumed they are, see 
1.2.1 below), we must look elsewhere for a unifying concept, if any. Returning to 
the first definition given above (repeated here), a different concept contained 
within the definition may help to unify the definitions:  
“do something without meaning to - to be in a particular state or do a 
particular thing, or to realize that this is happening, especially when you 
did not expect or intend it” (ibid.)  
If the concept realization (i.e., Awareness) is proposed as the unifying concept for 
find, all reflexive examples above can be accounted for, seen below by comparing 
all of the reflexive examples so far:  
 
18. [13] After wandering around, we found ourselves back at the hotel.  
19. [14] When he left, Karen found herself heaving a huge sigh of relief. 
20. [17] She went to India to find herself. 
 
In (18), there is the realization/awareness of some spatial perception, in (19) a 
realization/awareness of some physical, sensory perception, and in (20) the 
(possibility of) realization/awareness of one’s deeper Self. The consolidating 
notion here is not based on the perceptions themselves (physical/mental 
responses to stimuli) nor some intent/expectation to act, but an Awareness of 
experience brought about by some kind of perception. 
In the online version of the Oxford English Dictionary (2008), a focus on 
self-aware perception is found in definition 5b: To perceive oneself to be in a 
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specified place or position, or condition of body or mind. One fairly recent example 
from the 19th century is:  
 
21. “We found ourselves opposed by a parapet of congealed snow.”         (1823 
F. Clissold, Narr. Ascent Mont Blanc 21)  (ibid.)  
 
In (21), it was not the actual wall of snow or the fact that their path was blocked 
by it that is the conceptual focus of found, but the awareness of that perceived 
situation. If the experience itself were the focus, more pragmatically and 
semantically economical sentences such as (22) and (23) below would best suit 
that conception:  
 
22.We were opposed by a parapet of congealed snow. 
23. A parapet of congealed snow blocked our way.  
 
The construal of this situation through the metaphorical extension of find within 
a reflexive construction points to the author’s motivation to convey the 
Agent/Experiencer’s Self-Awareness of the experience as the prominent 
conception. 
The notion of realization/awareness is further confirmed in the Collins 
English Dictionary Online ("Collins English Dictionary online," 2014) under the 
definition find oneself (British English): “to realize and accept one's real 
character; discover one's true vocation”. Besides the seemingly ad hoc pairing of 
these definitions under the same heading, the examples below represent a 
different sense of the find oneself construal, again creating non-congruence 
between definition and examples. Only (25) displays congruency between 
definition and example: 
24. "One is rather surprised to find oneself marginally on the outside of society. 
(Times, Sunday Times (2002))  
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25. A dark forest, as Dante noted, is a good place to get lost and to find oneself 
again. (Begg, Ean & Rich, Deike On the Trail of Merlin - a guide to the Celtic 
mystery tradition)  
26. After an evening of Richard's company, it was easy to find oneself talking 
like him. (Thomas, Rosie The White Dove)  
27. In a way, an ability to remember only good things about one's past seems 
rather a benign state in which to find oneself. (Times, Sunday Times (2002)) 
       (ibid.) 
1.2.2 Lose oneself 
 
If Self-Awareness is the conceptual motivation for SA events, it must be tested 
with other SA candidate verbs. Examining the verb lose in the LDOCE, the only 
definition directly related to reflexive use is 15: "lose yourself in something--to be 
paying so much attention to something that you do not notice anything else:  
 
28. She listened intently to the music, losing herself in its beauty.  
 ("Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English," 2014) 
 
As with find above, the meaning of lose is metaphorical, i.e., 'lose oneself in the 
music' does not have the same meaning as the literal 'lose one's wallet'. The 
central concept in (28) can be identified as ‘do not notice anything else’. To 'not 
notice' is to have no perception of it, i.e., to be unaware of it. But what does it 
mean to be unaware of oneself ? It is contended here that the metaphorical sense 
of lose refers to the (temporary) loss of Self-Awareness, i.e., the loss of the 
knowledge of one’s physical and mental perceptions. SA can be understood as 
meta-perception. In some cases, the terms consciousness and awareness may be 
(nearly) synonymous, for example, I found myself knocking on her door (i.e., I was 
aware/conscious of my knuckles rapping on her door). However, this synonymy is 
incongruous with the metaphorical construal of lose oneself. Lose awareness is 
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not synonymous with lose consciousness for SA events. The former is a 
prototypically psychological state and the latter typically a physiological one, as 
seen by the LDOCE example: "By the time the ambulance arrived, Douglas had 
lost consciousness"4 This loss of awareness of perceptual states can be clarified 
further by comparing other metaphorical entries for lose in the LDOCE: lose one's 
appetite, lose heart, lose face, lose your mind, etc. (ibid.) Each of these refers to 
the loss of some particular sensory or mental/psychological perception. SA events, 
on the other hand, refer to an independent meta-perception, distinct from any 
particular physical sensory or mental/psychological perception. SA events refer to 
the knowledge of an experience, not the visceral/psychological experience itself. 
Loss of that particular knowledge can then be construed and predicated through 
sentences such as (28). 
Continuing on to the OEDO, definition 10 contains two related 
sub-entries: “To lose one’s (or its) identity; to become merged (in something else)”, 
and “To become deeply absorbed or engrossed (in thought, etc.); to be bewildered, 
overwhelmed (in wonder); to be distracted, lose one’s wits (from emotion or 
excitement) ” (2008). The only reflexive example from the first sense with a 
human5 Agent/Experiencer is: 
 
29.  I love to lose myself in other men's minds. 
 (1822   C. LAMB Detached Thoughts on Bks. in Elia 2nd Ser.)  
 
And four examples under the second sense:  
 
30. These strong Egyptian Fetters I must breake, Or loose my selfe in dotage.   
(a1616 Shakespeare Antony & Cleopatra (1623) I.ii.110)  
                                            
4 Listed under the first definition of lose: “stop having attitude/quality etc [transitive] to stop 
having a particular attitude, quality, ability, etc. or to gradually have less of it, with the 
subheading: lose your touch.” ("Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English," 2014) 
5 Non-human Agent/Experiencers are possible, for example, The company lost itself in the merger, 
but examples are rare and will be dealt with in Module 3 when detailed corpus data are analyzed. 
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31. I almost lose my selfe In joy to meete him.  
(1639 J. Shirley Maides Revenge IV.sig.G2v)  
32. As I pace the darkened chamber and lose myself in melancholy musings…  
(1809 ‘D. Knickerbocker’ Hist.N.Y.I.II.V.109) 
33. Her voice was low at first, but she soon lost herself, and then it rose above  
the other voices.  (1890 T.H. Hall Caine Bondman III.vi)    (ibid.) 
 
We can recover the focal concept of SA from all examples. The loss of the 
Self-Awareness drives the conception and subsequently its construal and 
predication. It is the perceived objects (i.e., other men’s minds, dotage, joy, 
melancholy, bashfulness) of which the Agent/Experiencers are completely and 
totally aware. The Agent/Experiencers have temporarily lost their 
meta-perception, i.e., Self-Awareness. Thus, the metaphorical reflexive lose 
oneself refers to the loss of SA. This can also be tested by comparing minimal 
pairs:  
 
34) a. I lost myself in the music. (non-meronymous, loss of SA) 
    b. I lost my dotage/joy/melancholy/bashfulness in the music.  
(meronymous, non-SA) 
35) a. Jack lost himself in thoughts of her. (non-meronymous, loss of SA) 
b. Jack lost his thoughts of her. (meronymous, non-SA) 
 
The (a) and (b) examples above have very different conceptions. Only the (a) 
examples reflect the SA conception while the (b) examples refer to some 
part-whole relationship with the perceptual physical-mental self. As stated above, 
Self-Awareness as a meta-perceptive state is proposed to be the core, focal 
conception and construal of SA events.  
  
1.2.3 Catch oneself 
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One additional verb that appears in SA events, catch oneself, will be discussed. 
Definition 24 of the LDOCE states: catch yourself doing something, to suddenly 
realize you are doing something:  
 
36. “Standing there listening to the song, he caught himself smiling from ear to 
ear.” ("Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English," 2014) 
 
The meta-perception of one’s experience is consistent with that of SA described 
above. The physical act of smiling ear to ear is not itself the conceptual focus, but 
the awareness of that large smile. This can be compared to an example where 
direct perception is the focus, as below: 
  
39. Standing there listening to the song, he felt himself smiling from ear to ear. 
 
Another definition concerning SA is number 27: To check, interrupt in speaking. 
Two examples are given: 
 
40. Not that I do (he presently caught himself) in the least confess, etc.  
(1670, C Cotton tr. G. Girard Hist. Life Duke of Espernon III.xii.623) 
41. Saying on Day thus…he immediately catch’d himself, and fell into this  
Reflection.    (a1726 W. Penn WKS.I.App.233)   (ibid.) 
 
Examples (40-41) also demonstrate SA events, employing the metaphorical sense 
of the verb catch to express meta-perceptive Self-Awareness that is gained in the 
middle of a speech act. Not only speech acts but other vocalizations such as 
laughing, giggling, etc. and certain physical, mainly involuntary movements such 
as twitching, wincing, cringing, etc. are available for SA construal.  
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42. Shelly caught herself laughing even on this sad day. 
43. Sam caught himself cringing at the notion of another transfer. 
44. The lawyer caught herself snickering in front of the judge. 
 
In all cases, Self-Awareness of a vocalization or physicality is construed and 
expressed by way of the metaphorical sense of the verb catch and used within a 
reflexive event. This type of event, as explained for find, lose and catch is termed 
in this discussion the Self-Aware (SA) event.  
 
1.3 Grammatical Definitions 
 
The complexities of delineating verb senses in relation to SA events have been 
considered above. Defining the immediate grammatical environment of SA verbs, 
i.e., the reflexive construction, is just as complex. According to the Longman 
Grammar of Spoken and Written English, there are four main functions of the 
reflexive construction: “marking co-reference with the subject, alternating with 
personal pronouns, marking emphatic identity, and empty reflexives” 
(1999:342-345). ‘Marking coreference’ is the only function considered here as it is 
the only environment in which SA occurs. The others, although bundled together 
here under the reflexive category, will not be examined except when necessary to 
contrast syntactic and semantic environments of SA events (see Section 1.4 
below).  
Considered first are descriptions of the reflexive pronoun. “In their purely 
reflexive use, these pronouns mark identity with the referent of the preceding 
noun phrase within the same clause, usually in subject position. The reflexive 
pronoun carries a different syntactic role; it is typically an object or complement 
in a prepositional phrase.” (Biber et al., 1999:342) In this description, reflexive 
pronouns have two functions; 1) to relate and mark coreference with another 
noun, and 2) to hold an object (or complement) relation in the phrase. Various 
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descriptions in which the reflexive pronoun is ‘used as object’ appear in the 
literature. “You use a reflexive pronoun to make it clear that the object of a verb is 
the same person or thing as the subject of the verb, or to emphasize this…(Collins 
Cobuild English Grammar, 2011) This explanation is similar to that given below 
by Faltz:  
 "The subject and object noun phrases are coreferent if and only if the object 
noun phrase consists of one of the words myself, ourselves, yourself, yourselves, 
himself, herself, itself, oneself, or themselves. The presence of these reflexive 
pronouns in object position to mark coreference with the subject constitutes the 
primary reflexive strategy for English." (1985:4)  
 
Thus, there is a syntactic entity called subject and a syntactic entity called object. 
Reflexive pronouns signal that these are the same entity. This seems 
straightforward, however, the semantics of the predicate often effect the 
nominals with which they are aligned. These cases have revealed the necessity to 
account for the semantics of the verb together with its nominals in descriptions of 
reflexivization. Following this, Gast and Siemund define reflexivity as, "…the 
co-indexation of two argument positions of a transitive predicate..." (2006:346) As 
stated above, syntactic definitions traditionally tethered the coreferent nominals 
to each other without regard for the verb. But Gast and Siemund’s definition 
considers the function of the verb in relation to its nominals, or more precisely, 
the whole predicate. In their definition, the restriction on the transivity of the 
verb seems logical enough given that two nominals are needed to co-refer (see 
Part 2 for a discussion of valency and transitivity). König and Gast suggest the 
following definition: “Reflexive pronouns (anaphors) are self-forms used in order 
to indicate that a semantic or syntactic argument of a predicate is co-referenced 
with another argument of the same predicate (co-argument), typically with the 
subject. This co-argument is called the antecedent of the reflexive pronoun.” 
(2002:4) They make a careful and detailed argument for incorporating a semantic 
 16 
component into the definition of reflexivity, mainly to distinguish ‘true’ reflexives 
from polysemous intensifying and logophoric -self meanings. Thus, in order to 
distinguish the different functions and environments in which the reflexive 
pronoun occurs, a definition of reflexivity that covers its semantic function is 
necessary. Without this semantic aspect, it is very difficult to account for 
predications where the semantics of the verb directly effects the whole structure 
of a phrase. Lange helps clarify and strengthen this claim: 
 
”…by extending the definition of reflexivity to include both syntactic and 
semantic arguments of predicates, examples like the following are also covered: 
(3.16) John considers himself to be the perfect candidate. (3.17) Suddenly I found 
myself in a large cave. Excluded from the class of reflexive anaphors are then all 
intensifying uses of x-SELF as well as 'logophoric' or 'untriggered' SELF-forms...” 
(2007:37)   
 
Although Lange uses (3.17) to make an argument for the necessity of a semantic 
definition of x-self to differentiate the various functions of the reflexive, it is also 
necessary in order to distinguish SA events from other reflexive types. A strictly 
syntactic definition can not account for the different meanings (3.17) could 
assume, shown below in (a-c):  
 
 (3.17) Suddenly I found myself in a large cave. 
a. I suddenly realized that I was in a cave. (SA event) 
b. I suddenly realized my true inner personality in a cave. (SA2 event)6  
c. I found a mannequin (or other physical entity made to look like me) 
 of me in a cave.  
Accounting for SA events necessitates a precise definition of reflexive argument 
                                            
6 Examples (a) and (b) are distinguished as separate but related SA events, thus the use of the superscript 
numeral 2 (see Module 3, forthcoming). 
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relations and their semantic functions. At the risk of repetitiveness, simply 
stating that (3.17) above and (45-47) below are reflexive (inasmuch as they fulfill 
the syntactic requirements for such) does not address the different meanings each 
predicates. 
 
45) John made himself a tuna sandwich. 
46) John made himself go to the gym. 
47) John made himself completely invisible. 
 
In (45-47), the reflexive pronouns, or semantic Object Pronouns (Geniusiene, 
1987) represent three different semantic roles; in (45), Recipient or Beneficiary 
(the ‘receiver’ of an action or event), in (46), Content (“the second role in verbs of 
perception and mental activity” or Patient (the affected entity of a caused event), 
and in (47), Patient (ibid.:40). These distinctions are crucial for an accurate 
description of SA events as contrasted to other literal and metaphorical reflexive 
events and are discussed in more detail in Part 2.  
Ambiguity may arise with use of the reflexive construction due to 
polysemous morphological components representing differing semantic 
conceptions and functions. The ramification of this is to understand that 
boundaries (if any) between conception and formal representation are malleable. 
Dictionary definitions provide clues to event conception, but may contain 
descriptive inconsistencies and gaps in data. The SA event verbs find, lose, and 
catch were shown to be such instances.  
 
Part 2: Valency and Transitivity  
 
In Part 1, Self-Awareness was proposed as the unifying concept for the 
metaphorical senses of find, lose, and catch, when used in a reflexive construction. 
It was also seen that there is a lack of accurate description in the literature for 
 18 
the SA event paradigm. In Part 2, focus on the semantics of the predicate will 
show the significance of two factors that play a crucial role in understanding 
reflexivity and the construal of SA. The first, considered in section 2.1, is the 
distinction between other-directed and non-other-directed situations. 
Incorporated into the meaning of some verbs is whether or not its action is 
prototypically directed towards a Patient/Object. This will be seen to be a major 
determinant for choosing the reflexive strategy.  
The second factor, considered in 2.2, is that the semantics of valency and 
transitivity need to be identified and categorized, and that transitivity is 
necessarily a gradient phenomenon. Working with notions of valency and 
transitivity entail examining the relationship of verb with its associated 
participants. Reflexive events in English are shown to be prototypically transitive, 
but may also occur non-prototypically, closer to intransitive and middle events. It 
is within this non-prototypical environment that SA events are found.  
Section 2.3 includes a discussion of middle events and its relation with 
reflexive and SA events. Two precise semantic sub-components are delineated 
and revealed to be the main components that allow SA to be accurately described, 
participant distinguishability and quality of action. 
The conclusion drawn in Part 2 is that SA events are construed as 
low-transitive reflexive events, occurring between middle and reflexive events on 
the transitivity continuum. Furthermore, distinction of participants and quality 
of action of SA events are especially critical in demarcating it from other reflexive 
and middle events. 
 
2.1 Other-directed vs. non-other-directed events 
 
The notion of other-directedness has been proposed as the underlying motivation 
for prototypical transitive events because the interlocuter expects the action of 
the verb to affect a Patient that is a separate entity from the Agent (Hopper & 
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Thompson, 1980; Kemmer, 1993; König & Gast, 2002; Konig & Siemund, 2000a; 
König & Vezzosi, 2004; Lange, 2007). The definition of ‘prototypical transitive 
event’ used in this discussion concurs with that of Rice;  
 
“Two entities, which are usually conceived of as being asymmetrically related, 
are involved in some activity; the interaction between them is unidirectional; 
because there is movement and effect, contact between the two entities is 
presumed to take place, with the second entity being directly affected by the 
contact instigated by the first; finally, the entities are taken to be distinct 
from each other, from their locale or setting, and from the 
speaker/observer/conceptualizer” (2011:423).  
 
The reflexive event, on the other hand, is used to signal that the action of the 
typically unidirectional (i.e., other-directed) event is directed towards the same 
originating entity of the action, contrary to expectation. This non-prototypicality, 
or unexpectedness, has been described as a motivational factor for the use of the 
English reflexive pronoun (Beck, 2006; Faltz, 1985; Kemmer, 1993; Konig & 
Siemund, 2000b; König & Vezzosi, 2004; Lange, 2007, 2011; Peitsara, 1997). 
“Non-other-directed” (i.e., self-directed), on the other hand, refers to events that 
are expected to have only one participant (semantic Subject), as with intransitive 
events. Only one participant is involved in the action, and the same entity that 
causes the action is also the affected entity of that action.  
 
48) Sally squashed the cockroach under her heel.  
49) The doctors swam for charity. 
50) *The doctors swam themselves for charity. 
51) Ted forced himself to finish the tea. 
 
In (48), the verb squash is prototypically transitive, requiring an entity that 
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initiates the ‘squashing’ and a separate entity that receives the ‘squashing’. In 
(49), a prototypically intransitive event, there is only one entity involved in the 
action, with the origination and goal of the action being congruent. As such, the 
reflexive, which also signals this congruency, is unnecessary and inappropriate 
when employed, as in (50). In (51), as in (48), the prototypically affected entity of 
the action is expected to be a separate entity, however, it is not. The reflexive 
pronoun signals coreference of the initiating and affected entities. Use of the 
simple personal pronoun results in an inappropriate reference to some other 
second entity, i.e., Tedx squashed himy between the walls. The reflexive pronoun 
is implemented to mark the unexpected coreferentiality of the participants in the 
event, i.e., Tedx squashed himselfx between the walls. This notion of expectedness 
was the motivation for the morphological merger of ‘personal pronoun + self’ : 
 
"Without SELF, the more likely interpretation of the sentence would be 
that subject NP and pronouns are disjoint. By intensifying the pronoun, 
SELF indicates that the referent designated by the pronoun is central, 
thereby reversing the expected prototypical transitive structure with two 
participants where an agent acts upon a patient…SELF signals that 
subject and object have the same referent..” (Lange, 2007:57). 
 
Whether verbs instantiate two separate participants of an event or one is 
illustrated in Table 1. The sub-categories listed under the Non-other-directed 
situations generally include intransitive verbs and those verbs that take the 
middle voice. Examples for each of these categories are; grooming, John shaved; 
preparing & protecting, Jack was ready; defending & liberating, Jane was free; 
and pride/shame, Jessica was proud/ashamed. 
Examples for Other-directed situations are: violent actions, John killed 
him; emotions, John loves Mary; communicating, John told him to write; and the 
final category, Mary was jealous of John, John was angry with Mary, John was 
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Table 1.                                                                                         
Non-other-directed      Other-directed 
Grooming           Violent actions (killing, destroying)  
Preparing, protecting             Emotions (love, hate)             
Defending, liberating             Communicating                                    
Be proud/ashamed of             Be jealous of/angry with/pleased with 
(Konig & Siemund, 2000b:61) 
 
pleased with Mary. If we apply the concept of unexpectedness of the coreferent 
entities onto the sub-category of verbs listed under other-directed situations in 
Table 1, sentences such as those below are predicated: 
 
52) Johnx killed himy(selfx). 
53) Johnx loves himy(selfx).  
54) ? Johnx told himy(selfx,y) to write.  
55) *? Maryx is jealous of hery(selfx,y).  
56) Johnx is angry with himy(selfx).  
57) Johnx is pleased with himy(selfy).  
 
Only two sentences raise questions of well-formedness when the reflexive test is 
performed. Examples (54-55) are acceptable if the events are construed 
metaphorically, but the reflexive pronoun in (55) is only acceptable in cases where 
someone or something (an actress or wax figure) is representing Mary and the 
real Mary is jealous of that representation. However, even though the reflexive 
pronoun is employed, it can be argued that this is not a true case of 
coreferentiality because two separate entities are manifest and therefore the 
direction of the action is unidirectional, i.e., a prototypical transitive event. 
Nevertheless, in all cases the reflexive marker signals events that are 
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prototypically expected to be other-directed but have that expectation quashed by 
being construed as non-other-directed. 
  Non-other-directed events are those in which the verbs usually occur 
with only the affected semantic Subject (which is semantically indistinguishable 
from the Agent in English, but may be aligned with the Patient in Ergative 
languages (Bowers, 2002; Comrie, 1989; Dixon & Aĭkhenvalʹd, 2000)). So, for 
example, grooming verbs include sentences such as:  
 
58) Eric shaved. 
59) Ryan washed. 
60) Jessica bathed. 
 
In these cases, the Agent and (unrealized) Patient are expected to be one and the 
same entity; therefore no reflexive strategy (nor overt Object/Patient) is required. 
Logically, if we expect these verbs to be non-other-directed, the contrary, 
unexpected situation should be that which is other-directed. This is the case, seen 
in the following: 
 
61) Eric shaved his brother. 
62) Ryan washed his sister’s face. 
63) Jessica bathed her little brothers. 
 
Although in English these are not marked (i.e., zero-marking), they are 
semantically and pragmatically atypical, construing events in which the 
Object/Patient has very little control over his/her own actions and in which their 
prototypically pragmatic Agency has been essentially undone.  
Another unexpected, non-other-directed event may take place, i.e., the 
reflexive event: 
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64) Eric shaved himself.  
65) Ryan washed himself.  
66) Jessica bathed herself. 
 
In these examples, due to some pragmatically extraordinary circumstances (such 
as incapacity, unwillingness, social inconformity, etc.), the Subject could not or did 
not previously perform the action, thus its sudden performance is unexpected.  
There are difficulties in English when applying this broad 
non-other-directed category to many verbs, however. Many of the ‘grooming’ verbs 
are meronymous and require a body-part Object to be overtly realized: 
 
67) a. Cathy brushed her hair/teeth.  
b. *Cathy brushed. 
68) a. Leslie combed his hair/moustache/beard.  
b. *Leslie combed. 
 
Difficulties also arise with other subcategories:  
69)  preparing and protecting:  
a. Henry prepared (for) dinner. 
b. *Henry prepared.  
c. Henry protected (the children, himself). 
d. *Henry protected. 
70)  defending and liberating:  
a. They defended (their house, themselves) against their enemies.   
b. *They defended. 
c. The prisoners liberated (themselves) from their captives. 
d. *The prisoners liberated. 
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Examples (67-70) are subsumed under the non-other-directed category and 
therefore prototypical predications should be zero-marked (in English) when the 
action refers to the Subject. Contrarily, some type of Object is necessary to form 
acceptable sentences. Resolution of this particular issue is adjunct to the present 
discussion (see section 2.3); however, a focus on SA events in (71-73) shows that 
the other-directed vs. non-other-directed dichotomy accurately accounts for SA 
events. In other words, use of the reflexive pronoun signals an unexpected, 
non-other-directed action of the verb from the initiator to the recipient and that 
these are one and the same entity: 
 
71) I found myself craving more and more chocolate. 
72) Frank lost himself in the drama of Amy’s love life. 
73) I caught myself daydreaming again. 
 
The semantics of prototypical reflexive events is preserved here, evidenced by the 
need for the reflexive pronoun to mark the unexpected, non-other-directed 
construal. There is evidence to provisionally conclude that SA events are 
subsumed under the domain of unexpected, other-directed events. Being so, they 
fall under the prototypical transitive construction licensing two participants, an 
Agent and a Patient; atypically, however, these are the same entity. The 
simplicity of the theory of unexpectedness and other-directed events is appealing; 
however, SA events will be shown below to be much more subtle than this notion 
alone can handle. 
 
2.2 Valency & Transitivity 
 
It was seen in section 2.1 that unexpectedness of coreference of an inherently 
other-directed verb is a significant factor in the motivation for the reflexive event. 
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There is a different facet to this verb-participant relationship, however, that 
necessitates discussion. Focusing specific attention on a predicate’s participant 
number(s) and semantic role(s) uncovers important insights into reflexive 
(including SA) events. A verb’s inherent ability to license a certain number of 
participants is termed valency. The term transitivity refers to the descriptive 
categories to which those participants lend themselves. This section will 
investigate how the reflexive event is described in terms of these notions.  
 
2.2.1 Valency 
 
Defining the parameters of valency, Martin concisely summarizes: 
 
"A verb like rain, which has no referential noun phrases associated with it, is 
said to be zero-place or avalent; a verb like disappear, which takes only a 
subject argument, is said to be one-place or monovalent; verbs like devour 
and give are said to be two-place (bivalent) and three-place (trivalent), 
respectively" (2000:375).  
 
The description above is the widely accepted generic definition of linguistic 
valency, albeit expressed in various ways in the literature (Comrie, 1989; Herbst, 
2007; Herbst & Götz-Votteler, 2007; Kalinina, Kolomatsky, & Sudobina, 2006; 
Matthews, 2007; Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1985). Their affinity lies 
in the inherent lexical property of each verb to license a specific, limited number 
of participants. This lexical idiosyncrasy creates difficulties for minimalist and 
typology researchers hoping to reveal over-arching mechanisms that account for 
syntactic and/or semantic data. Because the valency of each individual verb is 
considered, it is difficult to generalize over a wide syntactic or semantic arena. 
Herbst states, "…valency is definitely one of the more messy aspects of language. 
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Although nobody will deny that certain general tendencies are also at work… The 
amount of idiosyncratic word specific knowledge that is involved is considerable" 
(2007:27) One of the most ambitious projects attempting to record this vast 
amount of information for practical use is A Valency Dictionary of English (VDE) 
(Herbst, Heath, Roe, & Götz, 2004), a corpus-based dictionary 7  providing 
information about participant numbers, collocations and the patterning of 
semantic roles of verbs.8  
 
2.2.1.2 Valency and SA event verbs 
 
The VDE entry for find lists four separate senses: ‘discover’, ‘judge’, ‘consider’ and 
‘unexpected situation’. The reflexive pattern appears only with Sense D, 
UNEXPECTED SITUATION, noted as, “A person can find themselves doing 
something or being in a particular situation, i.e., doing something they had not 
expected” (ibid:314). This independent, corpus-based result strengthens the claim 
above (section 2.1), that the notion of unexpectedness is a pragmatic/semantic 
motivator for the reflexive marker. Considering specific coverage of reflexive 
events in Table 2, the verb find used with the reflexive object pronoun is described 
as having one Sense (D, UNEXPECTED SITUATION) occurring with four different 
valency patterns (T1, T2, T4, T6). The item’s Sense is further delineated as to 
whether the constructions are active or passive as well as the number of 
minimum/maximum valency complements the verb can license (3/3). The 
obligatory (obl) complement sense categorization (II) precedes the specific use 
(REF PRON). The reflexive pronoun is shown in four different patterns: two with 
a noun (+ N), one with a verb in its -ing form (+ V-ing), and one with an adverbial 
(+ ADV). Specific corpus examples are provided for each pattern. 
 
                                            
7 The University of Birmingham’s COBUILD corpus was utilized for this dictionary. 
8 The condensed web version, called Erlangen Valency PatternbankBETA (Thomas Herbst, 2014), is 
a freely available resource for public use. 
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Table 2: find + the reflexive construction in the VDE. (Herbst et al., 2004:312-314) 
find verb 
D UNEXPECTED SITUATION Active: 3/3 
II obl  [REFL PRON]  T1-2.4.6 
T1:  + REFL PRON + N     D Durell found himself an exile amongst exiles. 
T2: + REFL PRON + N     D Susan, about to refuse, found herself tempted. 
T4: + REFL PRON + V-ing  D I found myself, inexplicably, liking him.  
9 Their lack of education compared to men limits their opportunities, and  
they most often find themselves holding marginal jobs. 
T6: + REFL PRON + ADV   D  Alderson found himself out of a job. 
           We followed his directions to find ourselves on the steps of one of the royal palaces. 
   
The insight that can be drawn from this data is the transparency to which 
reflexive events with the verb find are predicated through distinct patterns and 
are construed under one main sense, UNEXPECTED SITUATION. However 
insightful and useful this data is for a variety of research avenues, it is not 
without drawbacks for the present discussion. Besides the given Sense 
UNEXPECTED SITUATION applying to all reflexive pronouns (seen above in 
section 2.1), the two example sentences in Table 2 (T4 & T6), determined 
extraneous () to the Sense, need to be accounted for. This can be provided by 
proposing Self-Awareness as the main Sense for all examples, i.e., [find + REFL 
PRON + N/ V-ing/ ADV]. All data may then be considered inclusive of the defining 
Sense. Taking the examples from the VDE in table 2 above: 
 
74) Durell found himself an exile amongst exiles. 
75) Susan, about to refuse, found herself tempted. 
                                            
9  indicates use not covered in the identified sense. 
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76) I found myself, inexplicably, liking him. 
77) Their lack of education compared to men limits their opportunities, and  
they most often find themselves holding marginal jobs. 
78) Alderson found himself out of a job. 
79) We followed his directions to find ourselves on the steps of one of the royal  
palaces. 
 
Instead of establishing the Sense UNEXPECTED SITUATION for these examples, 
(to the exclusion of (77) and (79)), SA is proposed as the agglutinating conceptual 
Sense. The meta-perceptive, Self-Aware conception of the SA event is construed 
and predicated metaphorically as finding someone, somewhere, who is doing, 
thinking or feeling something. In (74), the meaning of Durell found himself in 
exile is Durell is aware of himself being in exile. In (75), Susan found herself 
tempted means that Susan is aware of herself being tempted. I found myself 
liking him, in (76), conveys the meaning I am aware of myself liking him. In (77), 
they find themselves holding marginal jobs, (one of the categorical outcasts of 
unexpected situation) can be comparably expressed as They are aware of 
themselves holding marginal jobs. Example (78) means Alderson is aware of 
himself not having a job, and (79) can be rephrased, We are aware of ourselves 
being on the steps…palaces. Establishing the metaphorical use of find in a 
reflexive event as SA allows an all-inclusive categorization of the data. Depending 
on the details of each pragmatic situation, one of the above three valency patterns 
in Table 2 will then be predicated. This does not mean that UNEXPECTED 
SITUATION is not a valid conceptual notion. Its validity is attributed to the 
higher-order semantic category associated with the reflexive event in general (as 
per section 2.1), not specific to any one verb or its valency, and therefore is unable 
to account for much idiosyncratic data, SA in particular. 
More support for this claim can be seen when considering another SA 
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event, lose oneself (Table 3). For the reflexive Sense III, the second example is 
categorized as extraneous to the sense meaning. “The basic meaning of lose can 
be described as ‘no longer having something’ or as ‘not gaining something’” 
(ibid:505). Delineating [lose + REFL PRON + N/ V-ing] as an SA event eliminates 
the need to exclude the second example, thus systematically encompassing more 
data. In the case of lose, however, it is not the conception of the arising of 
Self-Awareness but the loss of Self-Awareness that is construed. This loss may 
occur for reasons such as intense concentration, intense emotional reaction, 
illness/injury, chemical toxicity (intentional or not), etc. The two examples from 
Table 3 may be rephrased as; She was unaware of herself when reading literature 
and I want your help to be unaware of my everyday self when loving you and 
others, respectively. SA as an explicit conception allows for the second, previously 
excluded example to be included. This evidence10 lends support to the proposal 
that SA is a distinct semantic event categorically subsumed within the reflexive 
event. 
 
Table 3: lose with the reflexive construction in the VDE. (ibid:504-505) 
 lose verb 
 Active 1/3 Passive 1/3  General:0 
 III  [REFL PRON] T3 
T3 + REFL PRON + in N/V-ing 
She was able to cut herself away from the demands of those around her,  
to lose herself in literature. 
 Help me to lose myself in loving you and in loving others. 
 
The use of corpus data to reveal valency patterns (along with their 
collocations) has provided a fast and accurate method for finding and analyzing 
                                            
10 Unfortunately, there was no REFL PRON data in the VDE for the verb catch. 
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recurring and polysemous complementation patterns previously overlooked. For 
this reason as well as the insights gained from Cognitive and Corpus linguistic 
research, the concept of valency has become a recently rejuvenated topic of 
discussion (see: (Dixon & Aĭkhenvalʹd, 2000; Herbst, 2007; Herbst & 
Götz-Votteler, 2007; Herbst et al., 2004; Kulikov, Malchukov, & de Swart, 2006).  
For the moment, it can be stated that the reality of valency as a viable 
categorization strategy may prove valuable for delineating idiosyncracies in 
individual data while classifying that same information into analyzable 
categories. 
 
2.2.2.1 Transitivity and Valency 
 
Valency information reveals that verbs can be categorized by the number of 
participants they license. Specific focus on the functions of those participants is 
called transitivity. The reason for distinguishing notions of valency from 
transitivity can be seen below:  
 
80) It rains. 
81) *The sky/cloud rains.  
82) ame ga futte-iru. 
 rain s  fallv-pres-cont 
83) *sora/kumo ga ame wo futteiru 
 sky/cloud  s  rain d.o.  fallv-pres-cont 
 
The verb rain in (80) is zero-valent; in other words, no entity is seen to be directly 
responsible for the raining action. The act of rain and similar examples do not, 
therefore, often appear in discussions of transitivity. Even though English marks 
for a syntactic Subject, adding a semantic S in (81) renders the construction 
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unacceptable11. The Japanese in (82) shows the participant-less status of an 
event like rain. Ame (rain) is a noun subject-marked with the particle ga. The 
verb furu (fall) is expressed in its present continuous form (verb stem + tte-iru). 
There is no need whatsoever for the presence of an initiator of the action of rain, 
and artificially adding one, as in (83), renders the sentence unacceptable. 
The monovalent sits in (84) licenses one participant. This one participant 
is both the initiator and recipient of the event action or state. This intransitive 
event can be shown by the unacceptability of inserting another participant into 
the event action, as in (85).  
 
84) Nancy sits.   
85) *Nancy sits Harold/herself.12 
86) Nancy pinched her(self) on the arm.  
87) *Nancy pinched. / *Nancy pinched her the arm. 
88) Nancy gave her(self) an injection on the arm.  
89) *Nancy gave on the arm. / *Nancy gave her(self) on the arm. 
 
Two participants (bivalent) are licensed for the verb pinch in (86), a causer or 
initiator of the event action or state (Agent/Experiencer) and a separate recipient 
of that event action or state (Patient). This type of event is termed transitive. 
When more/less than two participants are predicated, the sentences are deemed 
unacceptable, as in (87). Notice in the reflexive account in (86) that the same 
entity (Nancy, herself) is both the Agent and Patient of pinch. The two are 
regarded here as (syntactically) separate entities13 even though this may seem 
                                            
11 Determined by native speaker intuition. Not an ideal option, but one that must suffice here due 
to space limitations.  
12 Interestingly, the construction ‘sit oneself down’ is admissible, but the role of the x-self pronoun 
here is intensifying, not reflexive (see section 1.3), and therefore the intransitivity of the clause 
remains unchanged. 
13 One explanation is that ‘pinch’ licenses a body-part Patient (see transitive ‘middle’, section 2.3), 
a meronymous relationship to the Self, and therefore assumes separate entity status. However, 
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counter-intuitive to human experience. The verb give in (88) is ditransitive 
(trivalent), licensing three participants, the action initiator, the recipient of the 
action and the transferred object. Changing the number of participants is 
unacceptable, as in (89). Changing the semantic roles of the participants 
similarly affects the function of the whole argument, rendering the construction 
unacceptable. Therefore, even though valency and transitivity are related notions, 
their separation is necessary in order to distinguish subtleties in participant 
number and function.  
  
2.2.2.2 Prototypical Transitive Events 
 
The above descriptions of transitivity are broad generalizations and each has 
exceptions and idiosyncrasies, depending upon usage and language. Due to space 
considerations, however, a full account cannot be provided here. (see:Allerton, 
2006; Comrie, 1989; Dixon, 2005; Faltz, 1985; Frajzyngier & Curl, 2000; Herbst & 
Götz-Votteler, 2007; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Kemmer, 1993; Klaiman, 1991; 
König & Gast, 2008; Kulikov et al., 2006; Levin & Hovav, 2005; Næss, 2007; Rice, 
2011). Although idiosyncrasies are rampant, there are merits in postulating 
formulaic theories that attempt to capture general tendencies in the data. For 
transitivity, this has resulted in efforts to find the most common denominators in 
which to postulate a prototypical transitive event. Researchers have engaged in 
such an effort to define this ‘prototypical transitive’ notion (Bowers, 2002; Comrie, 
1989; de Swart, 2006; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Kalinina et al., 2006; Kemmer, 
1993; LaPolla, 1996; Næss, 2007; Rice, 2011; Rozas, 2007). One description of the 
prototypical transitive (two-participant) event is Kemmer’s observation, “a 
prototypical two-participant event is defined as a verbal event in which a human 
                                                                                                                                       
this does not apply in the metaphorical sense of ‘pinch’, meaning ‘to suddenly check one’s reality’, 
e.g., ‘Nancy had to pinch herself after seeing her winning lottery numbers’. Here, the body-part 
relation does not hold (unless the metaphorical sense of ‘pinch’ is considered an abstract 
parallelism for the physical action performed on a body-part, in which case, the meronymous 
relationship would be upheld.) 
 33 
entity (an Agent) acts volitionally, exerting physical force on an inanimate 
definite entity (a patient) which is directly and completely affected by that event” 
(1993:50). This idea most likely originates from the description proposed by 
Hopper and Thompson,  
 
“…transitivity is traditionally understood as a global property of an 
entire clause, such that an activity is ‘carried-over’ or ‘transferred’ from an 
agent to a patient. Transitivity in the traditional view thus necessarily 
involves at least two participants… and an action which is typically 
EFFECTIVE in some way” (1980:251-253). 
 
The two dimensions, ‘transferred action’ and ‘affectedness of patient’ seem to 
delineate the transitive event in general terms, but there are other dimensions to 
transitivity that have been proposed, one being ‘distinctness of participants’, i.e., 
to what extent each individual/separate participant is construed to be. This is 
posited by way of ‘The Maximally Distinct Arguments Hypothesis’: “A 
Prototypical transitive clause is one where the two participants are maximally 
semantically distinct in terms of their roles in the event described by the clause” 
(Næss, 2007:30). This notion of distinctness of participants, whatever the 
description, is often cited as a crucial concept of transitivity. (Comrie, 1989; de 
Swart, 2006; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Kemmer, 1993; Levin & Hovav, 2005; 
Rice, 2011)  
Thus, there are certain semantic properties of a transitive event, i.e., 
‘distinctness of participants’, ‘transfer of action’ and ‘affectedness of patient’ that 
are relevant to the basic notion of prototypical transitivity. One interesting 
quality of these properties is that they are thought to be non-binary, i.e., gradient 
(Bowers, 2002; Comrie, 1989; de Swart, 2006; Dixon & Aĭkhenvalʹd, 2000; 
Geniusiene, 1987; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Kalinina et al., 2006; Kemmer, 
1993; LaPolla, 1996; Næss, 2007; Rice, 2011; Taylor, 2003).  
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 “It has been recognised for quite some time that the concept of “transitivity” 
behaves like a prototype category…In other words, membership of the 
category “transitive verb” or “transitive clause” is gradable depending on an 
item’s degree of similarity to a central exemplar – a prototype structure.” 
(Næss, 2007:12) 
 
If the notion of gradable transitivity is taken as the modern standard for 
investigations into the transitiveness of an event, we must delineate the specific 
measures on which that scale is based. One of these metrics, proposed by Hopper 
and Thompson (1980), establishes ten distinct components that play a role in the 
prototypical transitivity of a clause, each component having a ‘high’ or ‘low’ 
quality, depending upon use in discourse. These components may be thought of as 
the semantic building blocks of a prototypical transitive event. The more building 
blocks a structure has, the more stable and concrete it becomes. The 
prototypicality of the transitive event is dependent upon the number and level of 
its semantic components. The more components relevant to the event that are 
high on the prototypicality scale, the more transitive the event, and vice-versa.  
The first component of a transitive event according to this transitivity 
matrix (Hopper & Thompson, 1980) is an inherent DISTINCTION OF 
PARTICIPANTS, i.e., the action or state of the verb that affects a definable 
Patient, and in which a definable Agent (or Experiencer, in the case of perceptual 
or psychological verbs) is the origin of that action. A prototypical transitive event 
therefore involves two participants as in (90) below, whereas an intransitive 
event involves only one participant, seen in (91). "…a transitive clause is one 
which describes an event which involves two distinct, independent participants, 
both in the sense that they are physically distinct and independent entities, and 
in the sense that their roles in the event are clearly distinct: there is only one 
instigating agent and only one affected "endpoint" (Næss, 2007:46). The 
 35 
reflexive event, however, presents an interesting situation. Only one person 
(entity) participates in the event, but that participant is realized as two separate 
entities, as in (92). Thus, although structurally transitive, it is highly 
non-prototypical. 
 
90) I asked my boss for a vacation for my birthday.  
91) I went on vacation for my birthday. 
92) I treated myself royally on my birthday.  
 
Considering the reflexive transitive event when compared to the prototypically 
highly distinct participants in (90) or to the intransitive event (lowest 
distinctness) in (91), the participants in (92) are ‘less’ distinct than (90) but ‘more’ 
distinct than (91), emphasizing and clarifying the gradient quality of transitivity 
mentioned above as well as introducing the status of the reflexive event as 
occurring as an intermediary construal between these transitivity poles (see 
section 2.3). 
Another component directly related to SA events in Hopper and 
Thompson’s transitivity matrix is ‘AFFECTEDNESS OF O’, referring to “The 
degree to which an action is transferred to a patient14 (and) is a function of how 
completely that patient is AFFECTED…” (ibid:252-253). Examples (93) and (94) 
display this parameter, showing high and low degrees of transitivity, respectively. 
In these examples, being shot (a physicality) ‘affects the O’ more than being 
considered (non-physicality) does. Other types of reflexive events, however, such 
as the causative in (95) and SA in (96-99) exhibit just how gradient this 
component can be. The quality of action in SA events can be described as the 
emergence of Self-Awareness. The action instantiates a low amount of 
‘AFFECTEDNESS OF O’ (non-physicality) and therefore its low transitivity.  
                                            
14 Hopper and Thompson define the term ‘patient’ as “an O which is in fact the ‘receiver’ of the 
action in a cardinal (prototypical) transitive relationship” (1980:252) (my parenthesis). 
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93) The policeman shot himself in the foot.  
94) The policeman considered himself a failure. 
95) The policeman made himself apologize.  
96) The policeman caught himself reaching for his gun. 
97) The policeman found himself in prison.15  
98) The policeman found himself in prison.16  
99) The policeman lost himself in thoughts of revenge. 
 
Even though Self-Awareness may be dramatic (it can be so potent as to be 
life-changing), it is still a relatively non-physical, non-observable action. The 
quality of emergent Self-Awareness is not a flow of action from A à P as much as 
an emergence (however quick) of Self-Awareness within the gestalt co-referent 
complex. The ‘AFFECTEDNESS OF O’ for this construal is prototypically lower 
than that of literal or other types of metaphorical reflexive events discussed. 
Precisely because of its intangibility and the effects on the construal of the 
‘AFFECTEDNESS OF O’, SA events are construed between the prototypical 
transitive and intransitive events, i.e., the transitive middle (see section 2.3).   
 The third component of the transitivity matrix immediately relevant to 
SA events is the ‘INDIVIDUATION OF O’, which “refers both to the distinctness 
of the patient from the A(gent) and to its distinctness from its own background” 
(ibid:253) (my parenthesis). This component has been given central importance to 
the notion of transitivity. “…the distinctness of participants is at the core of the 
notion of transitivity, and all lower-level "transitivity properties" can be 
understood as contributing in some way to this distinctness...” (Næss, 2007:122). 
Qualities of a more individuated patient are that it is: proper, human/animate, 
concrete, singular, countable, and referential/definite, whereas a 
                                            
15 This first sense has the meaning of ‘He was acutely aware that he was in prison’. 
16 This second sense has the meaning, ‘He realized his deeper, inner self in prison’.  
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non-individuated patient would have qualities such as: common, inanimate, 
abstract, plural, mass, and non-referential (Hopper & Thompson, 1980). 
According to this, (100-107) demonstrate a high-to-low gradient of transitivity, 
respectively: 
 
 100) Bob killed John. 
 101) The politician killed the bill.  
 102) Congressmen killed some bills.  
 103) Conservationists killed reform.  
 104) Bob killed himself. (Literally or metaphorically.) 
 105) The politician killed himself. (Literally, or metaphorically, i.e.,  
 ‘political suicide’.) 
106) Congressmen killed themselves. (Literally or metaphorically.)  
107) Conservationists killed themselves. (Literally or metaphorically.)  
 
The literal meanings in (104-106) display examples of meronymy and/or 
perhaps metonymy, the reflexive pronoun referring to a part of the physical self, 
in this case, the physical body (a meronymous relationship). If the physical body 
were considered a gestalt entity, and the pronoun stood for the patient, then the 
situation would be considered metonymous. Complications arise, however, when 
metaphorical senses are considered. On one hand, the A and O are pragmatically 
indistinct from one other (being co-referential), and therefore should rate low in 
individuation. On the other hand, the A and O are structurally distinct from one 
another and from their own background and therefore should rate high in 
‘individuation’. The situation becomes even more interesting when SA events are 
considered (c.f., examples 96-99). Due to the quality of the Self-Aware action, 
there is very little  ‘INDIVIDUATION OF O’. As mentioned with regard to 
‘Affectedness of O’, an emergence of Self-Awareness defines the SA event. This 
 38 
emergent quality of action has ramifications for the ‘Individuation of O’ in that 
the conception of two distinct participants is minimal. Delineation of the SA event 
with regard to the ‘INDIVIDUATION OF O’ is twofold: 1) a non-static, gradable 
view of ‘INDIVIDUATION OF O’ is necessary and 2) different ‘types’ of reflexive 
events must be distinguished (i.e., literal, metaphorical, causative, SA, etc.), each 
having their own ‘INDIVIDUATION OF O’ signatures. Taking both of these 
parameters into account allows for typological generalizations of prototypicality 
to be upheld while also accommodating semantic and pragmatic idiosyncrasies 
within the reflexive paradigm itself.  
The components taken together enable transitivity to be realized along a 
gradient scale, from those events that are highly prototypically transitive to those 
that are not, with a number of intermediate positions. These intermediate 
positions, often called the ‘middle’ are the subject of the next section. 
 
2.3  The Transitive Middle 
 
“…The conception of the middle as a verbal category seems to be as old as the 
tradition of grammatical description in Indo-European (IE) languages. Rules 
specifying the selection of middle vs. active inflections appear in the Classical 
Sanskrit grammar attributed to Pānini…” (Klaiman, 1991:82).  
 
Delineating a specific, cross-linguistic definition of ‘middle’ has proved a 
herculean task due to the multiple phonological, morpho-syntactic, semantic, and 
pragmatic contexts with which it is related. Even within a single language, the 
number of meanings to which the ‘middle’ may be related can be numerous. For 
instance, in some (Tibeto-Burman) Chin languages, “there is a prefix ki- or ng’- 
(depending on the dialect), the semantics of which covers reflexive, reciprocal, 
stative, intransitivizer, indirect benefactive, reflexive and passive meanings, all 
meanings associated with middle marking” (LaPolla, 1996:13). The middle may 
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be expressed by unique phonological markings (Smith, 2004) as in Romanian 
(Calude, 2007), by morpho-syntactic marking such as Dutch (Ackema & 
Schoorlemmer, 1994), Greek (Lekakou, 2002), Sanskrit, Indo-European, Fula, 
Tamil (Klaiman, 1991), Russian (Faltz, 1985) and Spanish (Maldonado, 2000). It 
may also share its marking with the reflexive as in Tibeto-Burman (LaPolla, 
1996) or passive as in Irish (Doyle, 2007), or have no overt marking like English 
and Dutch (Abraham, 1995; Kemmer, 1993). Categorizing the structural 
functions of the middle encounters similar difficulties:  
 
“In a middle construction, the viewpoint is active in that the action 
notionally devolves from the standpoint of the most dynamic (or 
Agent-like) participant in the depicted situation. But the same participant 
has Patient-like characteristics as well, in that it sustains the action’s 
principal effects” (Klaiman, 1991:3). 
 
“…a crucial property of middle semantics…(is) the degree to which a single 
physico-mental entity is conceptually distinguished into separate 
participants, whether body vs. mind, or Agent vs. unexpectedly contrasting 
Patient” (Kemmer, 1993:66). 
  
Klaiman addresses the similarities of the Agent-Patient construal; the 
participants seem to approach each other from opposing action-based positions 
(initiator and effected) to form a merged Agent-Patient participant. Kemmer 
focuses on the separateness of Agent-Patient as key to differentiating types of 
‘middles’. Although superficially distinct, these views may be complementary. In 
the description of examples such as (108-109), the ‘merged’ participants in the 
action simultaneously initiate and receive the effects of it (as per Klaiman). The 
participants are also distinct in that there is some concept of separation of the 
two participants (as per Kemmer), no matter how opaque and even if only one 
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participant is overtly expressed. These participants, no matter the degree of  
 
     108) Randy showered, shaved, and dressed for the dance.  
     109) Daniel moved (himself) away from the car.   
 
separation, (as long as they are coreferent) share in the action. English middles, 
not having a unique marking, share their marking with intransitive and reflexive 
events depending upon the verb. The difference between these is how close or far 
the participants are conceived as being from each other in relation to the event 
action. The participants are deemed closer in example (108) (Randy and his body 
as barely distinct entities), and further in (109) (Daniel and his holistic self as 
distinct ‘other’ entities). Furthermore, removal of the reflexive pronoun in (109) 
brings the participants closer towards a more merged conceptual entity while 
inserting it distances them. Thus, a gradient can be established with regard to 
how participants associated with an event action are construed. In other words, a 
scalable cline of participant distinction.  
The notion of participant distinction (i.e. distinguishability of participants 
(Kemmer, 1993) has obvious associations with gradient transitivity and therefore 
for the relationships between reflexive and non-reflexive middle events. Hopper 
and Thompson (1980:277) note that “Reflexives in many languages have 
properties which can be explained by appealing to their intermediate status 
between one-argument and two-argument clauses: compared with one-argument 
clauses, they may be more transitive, …compared with two-argument causes, 
they typically display features associated with lower transitivity…” If reflexive 
and middle events are both intermediate between prototypical transitive poles, 
these must be clarified if they are to be differentiated. Lange explains, “…while 
the reflexive personal pronoun serves to indicate coreference with two-place 
predicates and therefore acts as a detransitivising device, the middle marker has 
no similar syntactic status...Verbs taking the middle marker are mostly 
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intransitive in the first place.” (2007:89). Lange considers middles intransitive 
events based on their morpho-syntactic (zero-) marking and valency criteria while 
Hopper & Thompson (1980) consider reflexives and middles as two functional 
‘intermediaries’, insofar as they represent positions intermediate between the 
transitive and intransitive prototypes (i.e., the ‘traditional’ view of middle action 
based on action initiation and affect (Klaiman, 1991)17.  
 
 110) Harry placed an apple on the chair. 
 111) Harry placed himself on the chair. 
 112) Harry sat on the chair.  
 113) It’s raining. 
 
The two stances can be illustrated by examining (110-113). According to 
Lange, (110) belongs to the category transitive, (111) to the less transitive group 
due to the existence of the detransitivizing factor of the reflexive pronoun, and 
(112-113) are grouped together into intransitive events. Hopper & Thompson 
view (110-113) as one gradable cline of transitivity based on semantic components, 
different positions along that axis representing degrees of transitivity. This 
transitivity matrix might be envisioned as a numerical scale ranging from 1-1018, 
where a rating of 1 represents highly prototypical transitive events (i.e., 110) and 
a 10 rating represents highly prototypically intransitive events (i.e., 113). 
Example (111) might be judged a 4-5 due to lack of differentiation of 
Agent/Patient (coreference), and (112) might fall near 6-7 due to the inherent 
semantic reflexivity of ‘middle’ verbs. The purpose of comparison here is not to 
decide which of the theories is more valid nor the exact numerical value for each 
                                            
17 Although Klaiman rejects the view of ‘middle’ as a strictly detransitivizing device, he does 
admit typological relationships between the middle voice and affectedness, transitivity and 
reflexivity (with respect to morphological patterning on the verbal lexicon). 
18 These numerical values have not been used in the literature as far as I am aware. They are 
used here only for descriptive purposes, but are similar in concept to de Swart’s Transitivity 
Continuum (de Swart, 2006). 
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event, but to emphasize the different approaches to the notion of transitivity 
when ‘grey area’ data are found. That being said, examining SA events will lead 
to a hypothesis more in line with Hopper and Thompson (1980), Kemmer (1993), 
de Swart (2006) and Næss (2007), i.e., that transitivity is subject to gradable 
nuances regardless of syntactic representation, the interpretation of which is 
dependent on semantic and pragmatic information. Kemmer calls these nuances 
relative elaboration of events: 
 
“…the degree to which the facets in a particular situation, i.e. the 
participants and conceivable component subevents in the situation, are 
distinguished…the speaker has a choice of either marking reference to events as 
undifferentiated wholes, or making reference to their substructures or 
component parts. Thus relative elaboration of events is the key property by 
which reflexive and middle events are distinguished” (1993:208). 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to recount the detailed argument Kemmer 
makes for reflexive, middle, and prototypical intransitive/intransitive events in 
relation to the relative elaboration of events. The argument can be summarized 
as consisting of two main components; distinguishablility of participants and 
event action initiation and affect (i.e., the origin of the action and the affected 
entity of that action, respectively). These components interplay with voice (active 
vs. passive) and valency/transitivity in the conception, construal and predication 
of a transitive event (ibid). 
The amount of participant distinguishablility conceived for each event has 
immediate repercussions for the construal and predication of that event. The 
greatest level of distinction is two completely independent, sentient entities, as in 
(114) below. At the other end of the spectrum is a single, non-sentient (or empty) 
entity with no possibility of participant distinction, as in (115a, b), respectively19. 
                                            
19 See Dowty (1991) for an interesting distinction for the semantic ‘proto-roles’ of Agent and 
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And then there is everything in between. Many of these were discussed in Section 
2.2 in relation to Hopper and Thompson’s transitivity matrix20; therefore only 
those aspects directly related to the middle and SA events will be discussed 
below. 
 
 114) Marci kissed Brad.  
 115) a. The tree grew.  
   b. It snowed.  
116) Marci dressed quickly.  
 117) The child saw herself in the still water.  
 118) a. Marci considered herself healthy.   
      b. Marci thinks herself a genius. 
 119) Marci found herself liking the cough medicine.   
 120) Marci caught herself chuckling at the thought.   
 121) Marci lost herself in romantic daydreams.  
 
Examples (116-121) exhibit varying degrees of participant distinguishablility. In 
(116), the Patient is not and need not be overtly expressed; the inherent 
semantics of the verb licenses the expectation of coreference (see section 2.1). This 
expectation of coreference is thought to be one factor that positions the middle 
event in (116) closer to one-participant events than the reflexive events in (117) 
and (118) (Kemmer, 1993), even though they are all conceived and construed as 
intermediate between the prototypical transitive and intransitive poles. The 
non-metaphorical direct reflexive21 events in (117) and (118) are construed as 
two participant events in which the Patient (the entity affected by the event 
                                                                                                                                       
Patient. 
20 See Næss (2007) and Kemmer (1993) for similar yet more concise versions of this matrix. 
21 In contrast, the ‘indirect reflexive’ is described as an event in which the Patient assumes a 
Benefactive, Instrumental or other adjunctive role (regardless of syntax), such as “I did it for 
myself” and ‘I did it by myself ’ etc. Due to the differences in construal with the direct reflexive, 
however, they will not be discussed here. For further reading, see (Dixon & Aĭkhenvalʹd, 2000; 
Geniusiene, 1987; Helke, 1979; Kemmer, 1993; Lange, 2007; Lederer, 2013; Næss, 2007). 
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action) happens to be the same entity as the Agent (the starting point of the event 
action) (ibid). The difference lies in the individuation (Hopper & Thompson, 1980) 
or distinctness (Kemmer, 1993) of the Patient related to the Agent. In (117), the 
reflection that is seen is more distinct from the seer than the distinctness of the 
idea of self that is considered/thought by the thinker in (118a,b). The notion of 
distinctness of Patient (from Agent) related to transitivity has been noted within 
and across languages, although called by various names and described within 
various theoretical constructs (Comrie, 1989; de Swart, 2006; Dowty, 1991; 
Frajzyngier, 2000; Geniusiene, 1987; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Kemmer, 1993; 
Lange, 2007; Levin & Hovav, 2005; Maldonado, 2000; Næss, 2007; Onishi, 2000; 
Peitsara, 1997; Safir, 2004; Stephens, 2006; Taylor, 2003).  
SA events in (119-121) represent interesting distinction of participant 
cases. One the one hand, the metaphoricity of the events can be analyzed as 
synonymous with the non-metaphorical senses and given prototypical reflexive 
semantics, i.e., the participant distinctions of find, catch, and lose do not change; 
they are construed as separate entities (even though in reality they are 
synonymous).  On the other hand (the one developed here), the metaphoricity of 
an SA event involves changes in its inherent semantic sense, thus manifesting a 
unique distinctness of participant signature. Marci finding/catching/losing herself 
entails minimal conceptual participant distinction, less than non-SA reflexives 
but more than other middle events (which, noted above, include participant 
distinction properties within the verb semantics). Furthermore, SA events are 
also distinguished from mental events with verbs such as consider or think (118a, 
b), which construe an independent (albeit non-tangible) sense of Patient. 
Provisionally, then, with respect to the distinction of participants, SA events are 
construed as intermediary between non-SA reflexive and middle events with 
respect to participant distinguishability.  
The next component concerning middle and SA events is the source of 
the event action and the affectedness of the action on the participant. Kemmer 
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calls these Initiator and Endpoint (Kemmer, 1993), but they have been described 
in relation to prototypical transitive events as Agency, Volitionality and 
Affectedness of O (Hopper & Thompson, 1980), Volitionality, Concrete/Dynamic 
Action, and Patient effect (Næss, 2007), and Experiencer and patient (Comrie, 
1989). For the sake of both clarity and economy, I will refer to the initiation of the 
event action as initiator and the affected participant of the event action as 
affected. Sentences (122-127), (shown again for convenience), exemplify the 
participant initiator and affected properties of the event action:  
 
122) Marci dressed quickly.  
 123) The child saw herself in the still water.  
 124) Marci considered herself healthy.    
 125) Marci found herself liking the cough medicine.  
 126) Marci caught herself chuckling at the thought. 
 127) Marci lost herself in the wooziness of her fever.  
 
The middle event in sentence (122) includes the verb dress, an action that is 
usually done by oneself to oneself.22 The action is initiated by Marci (initiator) 
and the affected entity of the action is Marci (affected). There is no overt marking 
to draw attention to this point in English (except for the intransitivity of the verb) 
and the only way to know this is to know its valency/transitivity and individual 
semantics. The description just given may be misinterpreted because the phrase 
by oneself to oneself assumes a flow of action from one participant to another 
whereas with a middle event, there is only one ‘real’ participant. Therefore, the 
description for the action flow can be rephrased,  emergence of initiator/affected 
action. This notion can be more fully envisaged by comparing the actions of the 
events in (123) and (124). In these events, there is a directional flow of action 
from the initiator to the affected, irrespective of whether the affected is a separate 
                                            
22 There are some situations in which one entity dresses another entity due to age, inability, etc., 
as in Marci dressed her baby/grandmother/cat, but these are adjunct to the present discussion. 
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entity or not. In (122), however, the action of dressing oneself cannot be given a 
specific directional flow, either to one body part or another; it is an emergent 
action derived within the gestalt initiator/affected composite. This can be applied 
to other similar forms of body action middle events, as in (128-130).   
 
 128) Henry sat in the chair.  
 129) Scott shaved for the party.  
 130) Charlene laughed wholeheartedly.  
 
Although LaPolla (1996) and Kemmer (ibid) describe this mainly as a lack of 
participant differentiation, Kemmer also notes that “…the body action middles 
are characterized by minimal conceptual differentiation between initiating an 
endpoint activities” (ibid:71). Focusing on the event action brings the discussion 
back to the defining quality presented above, i.e., an emergent gestalt action 
derived within the initiator/affected composite. The SA events in (125-127) 
represent this emergence of action, not a directional flow of action.  
It was noted in section 1.2 that Self-Awareness was an accurate 
categorical label for the metaphorical senses of find, catch, and lose. Examples 
(125-127) are metaphorical and construe a separate meaning sense from 
non-metaphorical meanings. Metaphorical find, catch, and lose do not involve the 
actual physical or non-physical finding, catching, or losing of an object, which are 
transitive events and have high participant distinguishability and directional 
action flow. SA events convey the concept of the awareness of one’s experience at 
a certain moment in time and space. The SA sense rates much lower on the scale 
for distinguishablilty of participants (there is only one participant, similar to 
middle events) and action quality (emergence of action within the single 
initiator/affected participant). In other words, SA events express a minimal 
conceptual differentiation of referential entities due to the emergent quality of 
Self-Aware action. SA may, however, construe slightly more participant 
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distinction than typical middle events due to the predication of the event by way 
of reflexive morpho-syntax, suggesting perhaps, some level of conceptual 
separation of the (initiator/affected) participant. Therefore, the proposal 
advanced here is that SA events are construed as middle events, slightly more 
transitive than the body-action middle events but less transitive than literal and 
non-SA reflexive events.  
SA events, non-SA reflexive events and middle events can be identified 
by distinction of participants, but only in relation to the quality of the  
initiator/affected action. Their proposed locations on the transivity scale are given 
in Figure 1. The quality of the actions of (125-127) do not flow directionally; find 
oneself, catch oneself and lose oneself all construe an emergence of Awareness. 
 
Figure 1: SA-Inclusive Transitivity Scale  
 
 Prototypical Intransitive ------- Middle ------ SA -------- Reflexive -------- Prototypical Transitive 
 
 Emergent Action                      Directional Flow of Action 
 
The quality of Emergent Action includes middle events and SA events. In 
contrast, Directional Action Flow begins at non-SA reflexive events and continues 
through two-participant prototypical transitive events. At the risk of 
magniloquence, the difference between these conceptual actions can be imagined 
as the difference between a river (non-SA reflexive and two-participant transitive 
events) and a geyser (SA and middle events). The source of a river continuously 
flows upward from its subterranean source (Directional Action Flow), continuing 
on until its gravitational force has diminished (emptying into a larger body of 
water or it has dried up). Contrary to this, a geyser erupts upwards, its single 
burst (Emergent Action) ending abruptly, the water falling to virtually the same 
place it broke the surface (lack of continued action flow). The SA events of find, 
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catch, and lose refer to this emergence of Self-Awareness within the gestalt 
initiator/affected composite. In other words, Awareness of one’s mind/body 
experience materializes in consciousness, where it is then acknowledged and 
subsequently commented upon by the conscious mind. The expression of this 
conception is by way of the reflexive construction (which carries the coreferent 
meaning). The concept of emergence is expressed through the meanings of verbs 
find, catch, and lose, judged (unconsciously) by speakers to be 
pragmatically/semantically similar to the Awareness experience. The 
amalgamation of these two notions results in the SA event described in this 
discussion. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
A description of semantic components is vital for the proper categorization and 
delineation of valency, transitivity and event action with regard to middle and 
reflexive events. SA events are specific cases of middle event that exemplify the 
need for such detailed semantic descriptions. Generalizations about transitivity 
for reflexive and middle events gloss over important differences in their relative 
elaboration of events, perhaps the reason SA has not been described as yet in the 
literature. Classifying SA events simply as reflexive events fails to account for 
their unique participant distinguishability and event action signatures. SA 
events were seen to construe an emergence of initiator/affected action, predicated 
by way of the verbs find, catch, and lose in their metaphorical senses used within 
reflexive constructions. 
 
Part 3: Conclusions and Discussion  
 
3.1 Conclusions  
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This paper addressed two questions: 1) How is Self-Awareness expressed through 
metaphorical reflexive constructions? and 2) Can the construal and predication of 
SA events be delineated and categorized? Part 1 outlined difficulties in 
categorizing various senses of verbs that appear metaphorically. Self-Awareness 
was proposed as the unifying concept underlying the use of the metaphorical 
sense of the reflexive pronoun with the verbs find, lose, and catch, in contrast to 
other categorization labels proposed in the OED online, CEDO and LDOCE. It 
was also seen that a purely structural description of reflexivity could not account 
for polysemous idiosyncrasies that occur, especially with metaphorical reflexive 
(including SA) events. Analysis of each verb’s semantics along with the nominals 
they license is necessary to categorize these events.  
 Part 2 explored the complexities of delineating SA events with respect to 
notions of expectation, valency and transitivity. Specifically discussed in section 
2.1 were reflexive events categorized in terms of other-directed vs. 
non-other-directedness, reflexive marking implemented when coreferentiality of 
participants is unexpected. It was concluded that although these categorizations 
account for reflexivization in general, they are too broad to adequately satisfy the 
descriptive requirements of SA events in particular.  
The inherent property of a verb to license a certain number of 
participants, i.e., valency, was discussed in Section 2.2 and considered important 
for the construal of SA events. The concept of valency allows for idiosyncratic 
lexical semantic factors to be taken into account, crucial if SA is to be delineated 
with any precision. However, it was also seen that valency alone was not able to 
account for specific SA traits. To do this, transitivity was explored and shown to 
provide various tools for a detailed analysis of SA. These ‘tools’ include defining 
specific semantic components of the verb-participant relationship in a transitive 
event. Once these subcomponents are made available, participants are seen to 
differ in their distinctness from each other with respect to an event and its action. 
Along with components such as affectedness of Patient and quality of event action, 
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transitivity was seen to be susceptible to gradience, ranging from prototypically 
intransitive to prototypically transitive.  
The intermediate range along this cline, i.e., the middle, discussed in 
Section 2.3, was shown to be semantically complex as well as subtle. SA is 
delineated within this middle range when distinction of participants and 
initiator/affect event action are taken into consideration. Specifically, SA events 
express an emergence of event action with minimal participant distinction. These 
factors provide the appropriate backdrop from which SA events are adequately 
evaluated.   
In sum, Self-Awareness is conceived, construed, and predicated by way 
of the verbs find, catch, and lose when used in reflexive constructions, and this 
has not been described as such in the literature. It is concluded that SA events 
are distinct from previous categorizations of either reflexive or middle events. 
This study was an attempt to identify and categorize SA events lexically, 
structurally and semantically, hoping to provide an accurate account of an opaque 
and subtle linguistic event in the English language, namely the expression of 
Self-Awareness through the metaphorical reflexive construction.  
 
3.2 Discussion 
 
Further research in Module 2 will help clarify the conception, construal, and 
predication of SA events through cognitive linguistic theories. Discussed in detail 
will be the description of Conceptual Metaphor and Conceptual Blending as they 
relate to SA events. Descriptions of Force Dynamics (in relation to Cognitive 
Linguistics) and Reflexive Causation will be outlined in order to demonstrate how 
metaphorical reflexives may interact with mental construal. Subjectivity/Point of 
View will also be shown to play a dynamic role in the conception-construal of SA. 
Specific comparisons and contrasts in relation to Self-Awareness will be assessed 
in research by Lederer and Barlow and others such as Lakoff, Talmy and 
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Langacker. 
The second part of Module 2 will review corpus linguistics and methods 
of investigation within that field. An appropriate method for supporting and 
evidencing SA events using a corpus will then be chosen. This will prepare the 
necessary theoretical and methodological groundwork for the specific corpus data 
research and analysis in Module 3, where the collocation patterns of SA events 
will be investigated. Analysis of corpus data for frequency and collocation in both 
British and American English will be undertaken in different corpus genres; 
novels, (fiction), news, and spoken. This will provide support for the proposed 
categorization of SA as a unique subcategory of reflexive/middle events. Another 
avenue of investigation in Module 3 will be the use of a Parallel Corpus to show 
how SA events are translated into Japanese. Research along these lines includes 
a poll of native Japanese speakers of English about possible interpretations of SA 
events and how these might transfer into Japanese.  
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Part 1: Introduction  
The following research presents theoretical arguments as well as 
corpus data showing that English metaphorical reflexive expressions of 
Self-Awareness in the forms of find oneself and lose oneself (hereafter SA 
event) are cases of metaphor from metonymy (Goossens, 2002) as well as 
target-in-source metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002), wherein the 
reflexive pronoun construes a WHOLE FOR PART metonymic relationship, 
standing for the specific mental function of Self-Awareness. The overall 
expression, on the other hand, instantiates a metaphorical construal of the 
emergence (or loss) of Self-Awareness. This is expressed by way of a conceptual 
cross-domain mapping of the entailments of [FIND] and [LOSE] such that 
[FINDING ONESELF IS HAVING SELF-AWARENESS] and [LOSING ONESELF 
IS HAVING HAD SELF-AWARENESS].1 Examples (1) and (2) exemplify these SA 
events; the metaphorical senses of find and lose coupled with the 
metonymically construed reflexive pronoun in the (a) sentences, and their 
possible paraphrases in the (b) sentences. 
 
1) a. …John found himself in a large, square, tiled hall...  
(COCA:1997.MAG.GoodHousekeeping) 
b. John1 was aware that he1 was in a large…hall... 
2) a. Mary lost herself in a daydream then…  
(COCA:2015.FIC.AntiochRev) 
    b. Mary was totally engrossed in a daydream then... 
 
Within Cognitive Linguistics, specific discussion of SA events is rare, 
but when it does appear its subtleness and potential for ambiguity with similar 
construals is glossed over, and/or supporting corpus data is scant. This seems to 
me enigmatic in that, firstly, Self-Awareness is a prime candidate for the 
well-entrenched theory of image schema and/or primary domain, being a 
thoroughly embodied concept, i.e., entrenched in very early human interrelated 
developmental patterns of physicality and cognition. Secondly, readily 
                                            
1 This discussion will follow the conventional cognitive semantic typography as conveyed by 
Feyaerts (A. Deignan, 2007). Small capitals (TREE) will be used for conceptual structures, italics 
(tree) for linguistic structures, and double quotes (“tree”) will be used for semantic structures. 
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available and user-friendly corpus tools are now commonplace, creating 
opportunities to examine hypotheses against actual usage, fortifying or 
invalidating theoretical arguments with hard data. The following research is 
an endeavor in this manner. 
This discussion will proceed as follows: Section 2 presents a definition 
of Self-Awareness as a specific cognitive function based on perceptions of 
stimuli. It defines Self-Awareness in precise terms so that it may be 
implemented in linguistic analyses of metaphor. 
Section 3 defines and delineates conceptual metaphor and metonymy 
in order to lay the theoretical foundation from which SA expressions can be 
explicated in full. The verbs find and lose in the overall predication, are first 
argued to be cases of metaphor, i.e., exemplifying a cross-domain mapping 
relation between subcomponents of their ‘common’ meanings and their 
metaphorical senses. SA predications are then viewed from a metonymic aspect, 
where the reflexive pronoun and its antecedent are analyzed and concluded as 
having an intra-domain, WHOLE FOR PART relation.  
Section 4 discusses theoretical aspects of SA events from a Cognitive 
Linguistics viewpoint, specifically Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (1987b; 
2006; 2008), the ‘divided self ’ phenomenon (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992; G. Lakoff, 
1996; Talmy, 2003), and the Awareness Onset model (Grady, 2005). These 
theories have been used with relative success in cases similar to SA events and 
can account for many aspects of metaphorical reflexivity. Key to this discussion 
are the theories of image schemata and domains. Without a precise delineation 
of these terms and what they represent, any detailed discussion will necessary 
be ambiguous.  
Section 5 follows with an analysis of SA events that combines 
metaphor and metonymy, and provides evidence that the metonymical 
mapping of the object pronoun/antecedent as well as the metaphorical mapping 
of the ‘predication as a whole’ depend upon one another and consequently 
create an inseparable, gestalt metaphor, called here SA event. From this 
evidence it is concluded that SA is an instance of ‘metaphor from metonymy’, 
and that SA event construal emerges the more unambiguous from such an 
evaluation.  
Section 6 presents corpus data from both the British National Corpus 
 4 
(BNC) and Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) showing the 
ubiquity and complexity of SA event predications in the form of [find/lose + 
prorefl ]. Data is presented that supports the need for SA events to be 
categorized in their own right as a unique semantic category.  
Section 7 concludes the discussion and examines possible future 
research avenues.  
 
2. What is Self-Awareness? 
 
For the purpose of this linguistically oriented discussion, I will define 
Self-Awareness in the following way: 
 
Self-Awareness is the embodied cognitive function of conscious 
meta-perceptual insight; in other words, the conscious realization of one’s 
own physical, emotional and/or mental reaction(s) to perceptions of 
interior and/or exterior stimuli. 
 
It is critical to distinguish between Self-Awareness and perceptions, 
although in folk2 use these may be used similarly. Perception, as it is used here, 
involves the direct, involuntary reaction(s) to stimuli in/on the body and/or 
mind, in other words, the automatic, physical and/or emotional feeling(s) from 
an injury, the physical and/or emotional feeling(s) brought about by tender 
words from a loved one, etc. Perceptions therefore, are the brain’s way of 
making sense of internal or external stimuli. Self-Awareness, however, is one 
step ‘removed’ from this, as it were. It is the conscious Awareness of 
perception(s) (Damasio, 2010; Ismael, 2006; Janzen, 2008; Nida-Rümelin, 2011; 
Watson, 2006; Williams, 2000). In other words, it is the intellectual and 
emotional reactions to basic perceptions that guide the thoughts and actions we 
may pursue. 
This definition of Self-Awareness is basically congruent with that of 
self-awareness in the Oxford Dictionary of English (2015), “Conscious 
knowledge of one’s own character and feelings”. SA events in the (a) examples 
                                            
2 The use of the word folk here is used with the meaning of common, (non-specialist) use of a 
word or phrase within a given society. 
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from (1-2) above, as well as those presented hereafter are to be understood with 
this specific definition in mind. For example, in (1a), it is John’s ability to be 
aware of the physio-psychological experience of hiding in the closet, and it is 
the emergence of conscious awareness of this that is “found”. Compare the 
sentence John was hiding in the closet, where John’s conscious awareness of 
his situation is not reported. He could have known he was in the closet, or he 
could have been oblivious to his location. The narrator/author gives us no 
information about John’s own state of conscious awareness. By specifically 
expressing, He found himself…, the narrator/author wants the reader/hearer 
to know that John was aware that he was in the closet. On the other side of the 
coin, in (2a), Mary’s concentration on her daydream was so intense that her 
conscious awareness of physio-psychological perceptions other than the 
daydream was temporarily blocked or absent, i.e., lost (although it still 
functions in the subconscious. These perceptions will be termed ‘focus of 
awareness’ (see section 4.4~), and I argue from both theoretical and corpus data 
standpoints that it is precisely these perceptions that are being found or have 
become lost. 
 
3. Conceptual Metaphor 
 
3.1.1. Definition and delineation of metaphor 
 
Sometimes language is literal. During a basketball game, for example, 
if the basketball unintentionally slips from a player’s hands and the ball hits 
the floor, the player may say, “I dropped the ball.” However, sometimes the 
experience of unintentionally dropping a ball is commonly shared within a 
certain group of people. The literal meaning may then be extended (i.e., 
mapped) onto another experience that seems to have some relation to dropping 
a ball.3 For example, when a salesperson fails to sign a potential client and 
says to his boss, I dropped the ball, he means that he failed to sign the client. 
Unintentional dropping of a ball is related, in the minds of the interlocutors, to 
failing. These metaphors, if firmly established and widely used, can manifest 
                                            
3 The word seems is pivotal. It is very often ‘mapped’ only in the minds of those members who 
share that experience, not in ontological ‘reality’. 
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and spread throughout a community, and perhaps further across populations 
and/or conceptual boundaries (if other types of experiences and/or expressions 
are related with dropping and/or failing, for example).  
Clarification of the use of the term metaphor is a first necessary step 
towards proper analysis of SA events. I will begin here with what is not meant 
by metaphor in this discussion. The term metaphor, as it is used here, is not 
what is commonly known as literary metaphor, often used in poetry, literature, 
art and drama. This is the purposeful, ad hoc use of figurative language for 
dramatic and imagistic purposes. The term metaphor utilized here is often 
called conceptual metaphor (when referring to the underlying patterns of 
thought), or linguistic metaphor (when referring to the expression itself) (G. 
Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, p. 7). This type of metaphor occurs in natural 
language use. It is mainly unconscious, conceptual and grounded in human 
experience and culture (Deignan, 2008; Feldman, 2008; Kovecses, 2002; G. 
Lakoff, 1993; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Langacker, 2002; Panther, Thornburg, 
& Barcelona, 2009; Yu, 2008). The distinction between literary and conceptual 
metaphor is not as clear-cut as I have described above, however. The literary 
metaphors in the passage by Dante Alighieri below are also instances of 
conceptual metaphors, specifically, LIFE IS A JOURNEY4 and KNOWING IS 
SEEING (Deignan, 2005, 2008; Yu, 2008). 
 
3. In the middle of life’s road 
  I found myself in a dark wood.      
 (Dante Alighieri, "The Inferno", lines 1-3. In G. Lakoff, 1993, p. 237) 
 
Lakoff explains that I found myself in a dark wood evokes the knowledge that if 
it’s dark you cannot see which way to go. This evokes the image of SEEING and 
the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING…The experiential basis in this 
case is the fact that most of what non-impaired humans know comes through 
vision, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, if we see something, then we 
know it is true” (1993, p. 240). Although the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor as 
related to the first and second lines of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor is 
                                            
4 The conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY as related to Dante’s Inferno will not be 
discussed here due to space constraints, but Lakoff ’s analysis seems valid.  
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warranted (for dark wood), I believe that in this particular case there is a 
supplemental analysis for line two that is just as pertinent to the intended 
meaning. The use of the metaphor I found myself is a key component of the 
construal here, if the translator’s note (Alighieri, 2008) with regard to dark 
wood is taken into consideration. Dante’s world was socially and politically 
controlled by the Church, where ‘passions, vices and perplexities’ were 
considered evil. If SELF-AWARENESS were proposed as the metaphorical 
meaning for I found myself…, with the interpretation of I was suddenly aware 
(that I was surrounded by evil), it would certainly convey Dante’s well-known 
contempt for the unethical political situation of Church politics surrounding 
him at that time (Alighieri, 2008). This is further supported by lines 10-12:   
 
4. I cannot well repeat how there I entered, 
  So full was I of slumber at the moment 
  In which I abandoned the true way. (ibid., p. 1) 
 
Dante writes metaphorically that he cannot repeat (i.e., he doesn’t remember) 
how he entered (the dark wood) because he was so full of slumber at the 
moment (i.e., unaware). Furthermore, the true way in line three most certainly 
refers to the Catholic righteous path of moral and ethical behavior. Thus, 
because of Dante’s sudden awareness of the unethical state of affairs 
surrounding him, he chooses the expression I found myself within a dark wood, 
implying that he was previously unaware of the immoral situation, but has 
now become aware of it. Furthermore, he is now fully aware of this situation 
and he wants the reader to know this. If Dante had chosen the predication I 
was in a dark wood, the character might or might have not been aware of his 
situation (even though the author is sure to be). 
Thus, literary metaphor is often used a tool used for imagistic 
purposes, but conceptual metaphors are used throughout the literature as well 
(Gibbs, 1994; Kövecses, 2010; G. Lakoff & Turner, 2009). The construals 
[SEEING IS KNOWING] and [FINDING ONESELF IS SELF-AWARENESS] are 
conceptual metaphors that are vital to understanding the deeper meaning of 
Dante’s poem, as well as for understanding SA events in general. 
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3.1.2. Conceptual Metaphor 
 
Three general questions need to be addressed regarding conceptual 
metaphor before the specifics of SA events are discussed. 1) What exactly is a 
conceptual metaphor? 2) How are metaphorical concepts related? 3) Is there 
more than one type of conceptual relation? 
There are many variations and levels of specificity regarding definitions 
of metaphor. "A metaphor is a word or expression that is used to talk about an 
entity or quality other than that referred to by its core, or most basic meaning. 
This non-core use expresses a perceived relationship with the core meaning of 
the word, and in many cases between two semantic fields" (Deignan, 2005, p. 
34). This definition is accurate in that it captures the function and structure of 
metaphor, i.e., its non-core use, along with the establishment of a relationship 
between the meanings of a word along with the concept of semantic field. 
However, how does one define and delineate what is core and/or basic and what 
is not? What is a semantic field and what is its composition? The above 
definition lacks the specificity needed to analyze the precise components of 
metaphorical expressions. Cameron provides a more precise definition, 
“Linguistic metaphor is identified through the use of words or phrases that are 
potentially linked to a vehicle (or source) domain which is distinct from the 
domain of the surrounding, ongoing talk (a topic or target)" (2008, p. 198). The 
term linking of domains is found, in one form or another, in other cognitive 
linguistic definitions of metaphor as well (Bartsch, 2002; ibid.; Dirven, 2002; 
Gibbs Jr, 2008; e.g., Kovecses, 2002; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008; G. Lakoff 
& Turner, 2009; Warren, 2002). However, due to the subtleness of the SA event 
construal and in order to avoid as much ambiguity as possible, an even more 
specific definition of metaphor is required. The definition utilized in this 
discussion is presented in full: 
Metaphor is the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain…is 
partially mapped onto a different experiential domain, the second domain 
being partially understood in terms of the first one. The domain that is 
mapped is called the source or donor domain, and the domain onto which it 
is mapped, is called the target or recipient domain. Both domains have to 
belong to different superordinate domains. (Barcelona, 2002, p. 211) 
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The specificity of Barcelona’s definition is insightful but questions remain: 
What is an experiential domain? What is a mapping and why is the mapping 
only partial? What is a superordinate domain and why do the domains need to 
be separate? By treating each of these questions below, a common theoretical 
foundation can be built from which SA events are delineated and categorized.  
    
3.1.3. Schematicity and domains  
 
Due to their inherent abstractness, the difficultly in delineating the exact 
parameters of metaphorical domain and/or schemata should not be 
underestimated. Thus, differing opinions about what these consist of abound. 
As a starting point, however, “…a schema is a superordinate concept, one 
which specifies the basic outline common to several, or many, more specific 
concepts. The specific concepts…fill in that outline in varying, often contrastive 
ways” (Radden, 2002). Each specific concept (see encyclopaedic knowledge, 
(Tuggy, 2007, p. 83)) is either conceptually prominent (i.e., ‘profile’ (Langacker, 
2002)), or is part of the ‘background’ from which the prominent components are 
built. Background information guides the interlocutors towards shared 
meaning of a predication within its context (Langacker, 1987a; Croft, 1993; 
Littlemore, 2015). This background is the main idea behind the concept of 
‘domain’. The definition proposed by Croft is quoted in full:  
 
Profile and base are conceptually interdependent. On the one hand, profiled 
concepts cannot be understood except against the background knowledge 
provided by the base. On the other hand, the base exists as a cognitively 
unified and delimited "chunk" of knowledge only by virtue of the concept or 
concepts defined with respect to it… We can now define a domain as a 
semantic structure that functions as the base for at least one concept profile 
(typically, many profiles)" (1993, p. 166). 
 
In other words, domain knowledge guides the meaning of every aspect of what 
we hear, say and think. It is experiential and encyclopaedic, i.e., it is formed 
from physical and psychological experience and changes with every experience, 
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respectively. In sum, a thing cannot be understood except within the conceptual 
background upon which it is proposed. 
 
3.1.4. Image Schema 
 
From this concept of ‘domain’ come the terms ‘base’ and ‘profile’ 
(Langacker, 1987b, 2002, 2006), and are also related to what is termed ‘image 
schema’ (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008). In general terms, image schemata 
are the most basic conceptual components that cannot be broken down into 
smaller conceptual parts. The importance of clearly and precisely defining 
what this constitutes, however, cannot be stressed enough. Throughout the 
literature on the subject, there are various definitions and examples of ‘image 
schema’ that seem to depart from the original concept based on embodied 
perception put forth by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) and separately (in other 
terms) by Langacker (1987a). “Image schemas are among the central pillars of 
cognitive linguistics…because so many scholars have been drawn to them as 
intuitive and powerful instruments for analyzing the nature of thought and 
language…And yet there is still disagreement, and even confusion, about what 
image-schemas are, and what exactly the term refers to” (J. E. Grady, 2005, pp. 
35-36). Thus, the clarification of what constitutes ‘image schemata’ remains a 
challenge.  
Grady’s call for simplification and precise specification of the 
definition of image schema is timely. Furthermore, instead of proposing a new 
definition that encompasses facets of ‘revised’ versions of the term, he proposes 
returning to the original and most fundamental elements of those original 
definitions. In particular, he focuses on embodied perceptions as prototypical 
image schemas in which other, more abstract conceptions may be created, even 
though they themselves may be ontologically gestalt and ‘basic’. “…the most 
useful way of understanding image schemas is to see them as mental 
representations of fundamental units of sensory experience…Defining image 
schemas in this way allows us to refer to a set of mental representations with a 
special and fundamental status, distinct from the infinite variety of “schematic” 
images which we can form over a course of a lifetime…” (J. E. Grady, 2005, p. 
44).  
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For example, from the time we are infants, we physically experience 
objects being located inside receptacles. The receptacles for the items can be 
called ‘containers’. These ‘containers’ provide the boundaries that contain the 
items found within them. Our first experience of this is antenatal; our mothers’ 
uterus provides the ‘container’ in which we, as fetuses, are ‘contained’. Our 
experience of being inside a container, and then, during birth, being thrust 
outside a container is one that is physically and psychologically ‘basic, i.e. not 
based on or built on any other concept. It is an experiential gestalt concept, an 
‘image schema’ based on embodied perception and experience. This image 
schema is coined the [CONTAINER] schema (Croft, 1993; Johnson, 2013; 
Kövecses, 2003; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008; G. Lakoff & Kövecses, 1987; 
Matsuki, 1995). It is one that is continuously reinforced through life 
experiences and construed/predicated both literally and metaphorically. 
Literally, we construe and predicate concepts such as The cat is in the box. We 
use these experiences of [CONTAINER] to construe metaphorical expressions as 
well, as in I fell in love. The expression in love precludes that love is a 
conceptual [CONTAINER], so that one is ‘contained’ within the ‘boundaries’ of 
love. Thus, we can also fall out of love, where the love ‘container’ no longer 
‘envelops’ us.  
There are many ways the [CONTAINER] schema is used to talk about 
things, many having seemingly very little in common (from an ontological 
perspective). Compare the following sentences: I ran in the race, I followed in 
the path of my forefathers and I’m in big trouble. These situations do not 
include ‘physical’ containers. Use of the preposition in for these various 
situations can be explained through the [CONTAINER] schema, where 
metaphorical concepts abstract away from the original, physical concept of 
what a literal [CONTAINER] entails (Johnson, 2013; Kövecses, 2003; G. Lakoff, 
1990b; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
If non-perceptual concepts are to be included in the definition of image 
schema, then countless abstract entities are viable to be considered as such, 
and the credibility of the term becomes diffuse, confused and eventually 
meaningless. The original, embodied concept of ‘image schema’ was meant to 
address centuries of dualistic thinking of the body and mind as separate 
entities with their own logic and structure (Johnson, 2005, 2013; G. Lakoff & 
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Johnson, 1999, 2008). If this perceptual, embodied sense of the definition is 
upheld and other more abstract concepts are given other terminology, then the 
clarity, simplicity and genius of the original definition remains intact. This is, I 
believe, the spirit in which Grady (2005) writes and one which helps clarify the 
present discussion.  
Through this clarification, the SA event concept is also made more 
transparent. The foundation for proposing [SELF-AWARENESS] as an image 
schema lies in the embodied physical, sensory-motor experience of the 
mind-body complex. Each sensory input is assigned meaning by the mind (i.e., 
perception), and when the mind becomes explicitly conscious of this meaning, it 
is “Self-Aware”. When this Self-Aware pattern of thought is repeated often 
enough, it becomes strengthened and familiar (i.e., a Self-Awareness image 
schema), and can then be utilized as a ‘base’ or ‘background’ in which other 
concepts can be related and built. In this way, the ‘logic’ of Self-Awareness as an 
event can be put to use (i.e., construed and predicated) in situations deemed 
relevant to the interlocutors.  
 
5. I found myself blushing. (BNC:CEX 623) 
6. …she loses herself in the cracks in the ceiling…  
(COCA:1998.MAG.PsychToday) 
 
Taking into account the specific definition of ‘image schema’ as 
described above, it is proposed that in (5), I found myself blushing, expresses 
[SELF-AWARENESS] of the perception(s) of blushing, while in (6)…she loses 
herself, expresses lack of [SELF-AWARENESS] of mental perceptions of 
anything but the cracks in the ceiling. [SELF-AWARENESS] is thus a primary 
embodied conceptual notion, passing the requirements for image schema as 
defined in its original sense.  
  
3.1.5. Abstract Domains and Metaphor 
 
In general, a domain is usually made up of many smaller parts, but 
may sometimes be itself a gestalt-type category (Gärdenfors & Löhndorf, 2013; 
G. Lakoff, 1993; Langacker, 1987a; Radden, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 
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2002). Langacker defines a domain as “a context for the characterization of a 
semantic unit. Domains are necessarily cognitive entities: mental experiences, 
representational spaces, concepts, or conceptual complexes” (1987a, p. 91). He 
establishes two types of domains, ‘basic’ and ‘abstract’. A ‘basic’ domain is one 
that is directly rooted in experience, is an experiential gestalt concept (in that 
it cannot be broken down further into smaller conceptual parts (i.e., image 
schema)), and acts as the base for any given ‘profile’. An ‘abstract’ domain, on 
the other hand, is made up of two or more basic domains, and can be used as 
the ‘profile’ (i.e., foregrounded concept) for another domain.  
Metaphors rely on these conceptual contexts and the logic abstracted 
from them to create relations between two or more concepts, either 
superordinate or subordinate from the ‘source’. The use of the terms, 
‘super-‘ and ‘subordinate’ brings us back to Barcelona’s definition of ‘domain’ 
from above. It was stated there that the metaphorical domains must be two 
separate superordinate domains. Why is this so? Looking at the conceptual 
metaphor [GOOD IS UP], e.g. in the predication I’m so high, He climbed the 
ladder to success, She’s on top of the world, etc… the concept [GOOD] is 
comprised of the superordinate domain of [WELLNESS] and the [UP] domain of 
[SPATIAL ORIENTATION]. These domains do not ontologically share items in 
their groups. They are, for all intents and purposes, mutually exclusive. For 
metaphor, a member of the [WELLNESS] domain is mentally connected (i.e., 
‘mapped’) onto a member of the [SPATIAL ORIENTATION] domain, producing a 
‘cross-domain mapping’, i.e., metaphor. If we were to use a concept from the 
same domain, i.e., a subordinate concept, for example [WONDERFUL], the 
construal [GOOD IS WONDERFUL] is produced, which is not metaphorical. We 
could do the same for [UP], resulting in examples like, [VERTICAL IS UP], which 
is also non-metaphorical. This is the reason Barcelona defines metaphor as 
concepts from separate superordinate domains accounting for metaphorical 
use.  
Notice again (3) from the second line of Dante’s Inferno (Alighieri, 
2008): 
 3. I found myself in a dark wood… 
 
Focusing on the SA event I found myself, the subcomponents of found, i.e., the 
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domain elements, must be delineated. Using a definition of find as ‘Discover or 
perceive by chance or after a deliberate search’ (Oxford University, 2015), and 
summarizing the meaning of discover or perceive as ‘to know’,  the concept 
[FIND] is ‘mapped’ onto the concept [KNOW], resulting in the conceptual 
metaphor [FINDING IS KNOWING]. This is combined with the ‘schematic logic’ 
of the reflexive construction, such that ‘reflexive knowledge is knowledge of 
oneself ’. Thus, the combination of cross-domain mapping of [FIND] in addition 
to the meaning of the reflexive construction produces the conceptual metaphor, 
[FINDING ONESELF IS HAVING SELF-AWARENESS].  
But why would a speaker choose to construe and predicate the more 
complex SA event in lieu of a more simple, literal one such as realize, is aware 
of, is conscious of, etc.? Are there differences in construal that inspire its use? 
[FIND] contains or ‘entails’ subtle conceptual subcomponents of the meaning of 
‘discover or perceive something’ (ibid.), for example, suddenness, wonder, 
unexpectedness, etc. Similarly with the concept [LOSE], conceptual 
entailments include previous possession of a thing and current non-possession 
of that same thing, and when combined with reflexive, comes to mean [LOSING 
ONESELF IS HAVING HAD SELF-AWARENESS]. These conceptual 
subcomponents are compared to the situation in focus and help guide usage in 
context (Langacker, 1987b).  
 
7. (3) I found myself blushing. (BNC:CEX 623) 
8. (4) …she loses herself in the cracks in the ceiling…  
(COCA:1998.MAG.PsychToday) 
 
In (7) and (8), (from (3) and (4) above), domain subcomponents of [FIND] and 
[LOSE] are compared to domain subcomponents of the speaker’s 
Self-Awareness in each situation. 5  The conceptual comparison of 
Self-Awareness and [FIND] / [LOSE] connects the concepts. “A schematic 
relationship reflects a characterizing judgment based on comparison. The 
overall comparison between a schema and its instantiation summarizes over 
an indefinite number of local comparisons between corresponding 
                                            
5 Note that ‘awareness of a situation’ and ‘awareness of one’s Self in a situation’ are two 
different construals, SA events representing the latter. 
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substructures” (ibid., p. 150).  
One proposal by Grady that takes Awareness into specific account is the 
matrix in Figure 1, its explanation quoted in full: 
 
Here X represents the object of perception and X' represents knowledge 
associated with X as a perceptual stimulus. We experience scenes like 
the one schematized in Figure 2 (1) many times each day - whenever 
we perceive something in our environment as it emerges from a 
containing space - and the association between the perceptual and 
inferential aspects of such scenes is likely to be very well-established in 
our cognitive structure (Grady & Johnson, 2003, p. 539, my 
parenthsis). 
 
Figure 1. Primary Scene: Becoming aware by seeing. (J. Grady & Johnson, 2012, p. 541, Fig. 2) 
 
 
The matrix in Figure 1 reveals the tripartite interaction between the 
moment of Awareness, the internal/external perceptual stimulus and its 
conceptualization.  
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It is this type of ‘conscious attention to aspects of experience’ that is 
the foundation for the onset of Self-Awareness. Figure 2 shows the matrix for 
the onset of Self-Awareness. The upper dimension of the horizontal axis, called 
the Perceptual Subscene represents actual stimulus perception. The Cognitive 
Subscene below the horizontal axis represents the awareness of perception of 
the stimulus. 
 
Figure 2. Primary Scene: The onset of Self-Awareness, based on Grady & Johnson (ibid.) 
 
 
The vertical axis represents the Self-Aware onset point; left of the vertical axis 
represents stimulus that is pre-perceptual (upper) and pre-Aware (lower), right 
of the axis represents perceptually-registered stimulus (upper) and the 
awareness of the perception (lower). 
 
9. …he found himself squinting and raising his hand…  
(COCA:2007.FIC.Analog).  
10. …she loses herself in a conversation about the sixties…  
(COCA:1991.FIC.Atlantic) 
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Applying this matrix to (9), in the upper-left quadrant the subject is 
squinting and raising his hand, but with no perception (his body may feel the 
direct stimuli, but his mind has not yet made sense of these neuronal signals). 
In the lower-left quadrant, the subject is not yet Aware of his/her situation. In 
the upper-right quadrant, the subject’s mind perceives the physical acts of 
squinting and raising his hand (the mind interprets the nerve impulses). In the 
bottom-right quadrant, the subject is Aware of squinting and raising his hand. 
In other words, the focal point of Self-Awareness is the vertical Onset Point, i.e., 
the moment of perceptual and cognitive Awareness, which is then profiled in 
construal and the resulting predication.  
In (10), the same matrix efficiently explains the SA event lose oneself 
as well. The only revision is a reversal of the right and left quadrants on either 
side of the vertical Onset Point. When this is applied, direct stimulus 
perception and Self-Awareness in/of the situation is represented on the left side 
of the Onset Point (with upper and lower quadrants keeping their placement) 
i.e., she is aware of herself and the conversation, whereas the right side of the 
Onset Point represents the lack of perception and Awareness, i.e., she is only 
aware of the content of the conversation, not herself engaged in that 
conversation. Here as well, the focal point of the construal and predication is 
the Onset Point of Awareness. 
In conclusion to this section, the notions of image schema, domain and 
onset point above strongly indicates a positive argument for proposing 
Self-Awareness as a basic domain / image schema. The two reasons, restated, 
are that 1) the basis for Self-Awareness is direct embodied stimulus/perception, 
not another conception, and 2) Self-Awareness is used as a base concept for 
which metaphoric (and non-metaphoric) construals and predications are based.  
The discussion now turns to how Self-Awareness, as a basic domain, is 
mapped onto other domains to create metaphoric relationships. 
 
4. Cognitive Grammar and SA events 
 
This section will begin with a review of the literal expression The man 
found the cat according to Cognitive Grammar (CG) (Langacker, 2002, p. 
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Chapter 6) and then propose an original analysis for The man lost the cat based 
on that same model. Similarities and differences will be analyzed and 
discussed. Following this, a discussion of reflexive expressions in CG reveals 
that reflexive expressions are treated as special cases of Subjectification in 
which the viewpoint of the conceptualizer, most commonly implicit, is included 
in the predication. Revision of previous models will be necessary to reflect the 
verbs find/lose as they occur metaphorically, especially with regard to the 
reflexive ‘Subjective’ elements contained in the overall construals. It will be 
shown that even an amalgamation of these elements cannot account for the full 
construal of SA events. This conclusion leads to the need for further analysis 
based on metaphorical mapping, discussed in Section 5. 
 
4.1 Cognitive Grammar 
 
Because Cognitive Grammar differs drastically from more traditional 
semantic explanations, a brief summary of the basic tenets is provided.6 
Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar (hereafter CG) (1987b, 2002, 2008) 
was chosen specifically for this research due to its ability to provide an 
explanation for general cognitive abilities as well as psychological realities of 
the interlocutors as they relate to language use. This is crucial for the 
description of SA events, where traditional syntactic and semantic methodology 
has difficulty accounting for the highly psychological nature of the Self-Aware 
cognitive function and its role in language, the former discussed previously in 
Module 1.  
Within CG, there is no ontological reality that language is required to 
assimilate. Each moment in time is processed through the mind of the speaker 
and hearer through sense stimuli and perception of these stimuli in the mind, 
as well as independent thought processes not directly connected to the physical 
world. The ideas we form (construal) and choose to convey linguistically 
(predication) have distinct semantic realities, although these may differ from 
any objective, ontological reality. In order to be conveyed, this semantic reality 
needs some kind of form. In CG, the form is binary, having a phonological and 
                                            
6 Due to space constraints, only the most relevant aspects of CG, with respect to SA events, will 
be described here. 
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semantic pole connected to each other by symbolic relations. The semantic pole 
(i.e., meaning) takes shape through the specific phonological pole (i.e., sound) 
by way of a symbolic relationship (i.e., phonology, morphology, syntax, etc.) 
previously decided on (however unconsciously) by the language users. Because 
there are only these two poles and the relationship between them that govern 
and control the creation and use of language, there is no need for an 
autonomous syntactic mechanism. There are no deep structures (i.e., 
underlying ‘basic’ grammar) from which the surface grammar emerges. The 
syntax represents schematic patterns of meaning that have been organized in a 
certain way and repeated often enough to become familiar and easily used 
without conscious effort. The patterns that emerge from language use form a 
general scale of abstractness, from fine-grained and concrete (such as 
phonemes) to abstract (such as syntax and discourse patterns). Each relates to 
and feeds off of the other, forming a type of meaning-form matrix driven by 
speaker and hearer intention. This meaning-form matrix has a fundamental 
experiential cognitive basis. It is supported by our natural ability to notice that 
some things are prominent in our consciousness (i.e. they are salient and ‘stand 
out’) and some things are not (i.e. they fade into the ‘background’). Our minds 
are limited in capacity to access and analyze sensory input, and so we must 
pick and choose what to focus on and what to momentarily ignore (Langacker, 
1987b).  
That this inborn, automatic cognitive process is the basis for linguistic 
structuring is no less than prodigious. From the patterning of sounds to the 
patterning of syntax, what each person, and ultimately culture, chooses to 
focus on for their language ‘tools’ depends very much on what they ‘notice’ in 
their physical and psychological environments. For example, all humans have 
the ability to produce a ‘click’ sound, but only a few cultures decide to use this 
in their phonetic inventory. All of us understand how some things in the world 
are naturally round and some things are naturally long and thin, but only some 
cultures ‘decide’ to categorize and code these into their language, explicitly 
systematizing this in their syntactic ‘patterning’. 
These types of ‘noticing’ and ‘ignoring’ happen all the time, at many 
levels of abstractness. This is the basis for CG’s descriptions of the terms, 
‘figure/ground, base/scope, trajectory/landmark, and onstage/offstage’. 
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Although these differ in their level of granularity, the fundamental principle of 
‘noticing’ or ‘ignoring’ is essential. For example, a ‘foreground’ idea has more 
‘weight’ than a ‘background’ idea, and therefore takes prominence and is more 
likely to be explicitly coded and marked topic or subject. On the other hand, a 
background assumption often takes a ‘lower’ status such as direct object or 
adjunct, and may not even be explicitly predicated at all.  
 
 11. Well, he came home and he, he came running up the stairs…  
(COCA:2011.SPOK.ABC_20/20) 
 
For example, in (11), he is the most ‘noticeable’ concept, and as such, it is 
explicitly predicated in topic/subject position. However, in the background 
lurks a mostly unnoticed speaker ‘Point of View’.7 If the listener were asked, 
“Where is the narrator’s psyche now?”, the answer would most likely be ‘in the 
house, upstairs’, because native speakers know that use of the verb come 
assumes ‘a motion towards the self ’ (as opposed to go that assumes ‘a motion 
away from self ’). This knowledge ‘hangs around’ in the background construal 
but still provides psychological input for the ‘shape’ of the construal and 
predication.  
 
4.1.2. Cognitive Grammar and find/lose 
 
How is it that CG accounts for expressions using find and lose as they 
occur in language use?8 In (12), there are two nominals (i.e., ‘things’) and one 
verb (i.e., ‘processual relation’)9.  
 
 12. The man found the cat. 
 
“The base of [FIND] includes a search process of indefinite duration. Only the 
final stages of that process are actually designated by the predicate and hence 
                                            
7 ‘Point of View’ is used here in its specific definition according to CG. 
8 The original analysis (Langacker (1987)) discusses the Hopi language, but the methods and 
analyses supporting his theory are applicable to this proposal. 
9 ‘Thing’ and ‘Relation’ are CG specific terms. See Langacker (2002) for precise definitions. (In 
this example, the definite article will not be analyzed for ease of explanation.) 
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profiled…” (Langacker, 2002, p. 169). In other words, the action of [FIND] 
contains some kind of ‘searching’, but the ‘noticed’ construal that is predicated 
includes only the culmination of the process. This is true for many cases, shown 
in the (b) examples below. However, counter-examples in which find does not 
include a ‘search’ process are also construed.10 For example, a ‘base’ concept of 
‘search’ is untenable in (13a) and (14a): 
 
13a. (John lost his wallet last night. John does not know Jenny.)  
    Jenny suddenly had a new wallet…Jenny found the wallet in the street.  
13b. (John asked his friend Jenny to look for his lost wallet.)  
    Jenny found the wallet in the street. 
13c. Jenny unintentionally/accidentally found the wallet in the street. 
 
14a. (Harry went to the garden for some privacy, but to his surprise, his wife  
was already there.) Harry found his wife sitting in the garden. 
14b. (Harry was searching for his wife.)  
Harry found his wife sitting in the garden. 
14c. Harry inadvertently/coincidentally found his wife in the garden. 
 
In (13a), Jenny does not know John and did not know he had lost his wallet, 
and therefore there can be no ‘search’ conception involved for [FIND]. The 
wallet appears simply as a visual stimulus, at which point it is found (there 
need be no actual acquisition of the wallet for it to be found, although 
acquisition is probably the prototypical case).11 In (14a), Harry does not go 
looking for his wife, but to his surprise, she is in the garden where he was 
heading. For these types of examples, lack of a ‘search’ construal can be further 
instantiated by the (c) examples, where find is modified with an adverb 
incompatible with ‘search’ and construes acceptable and even unmarked 
instances.  
Langacker’s analysis is still accurate for ‘search’ instances of [FIND] as 
                                            
10 This point was discussed previously in Module 1. 
11 The use of the definite article for the wallet presumes a narrative Point of View (POV), 
where the narrator knows that John lost his wallet, although Jenny does not. Taking a 
non-narrative POV would necessitate the indefinite article, i.e. a wallet. (For more on POV, 
refer to the discussion of Subjectification later in this section.)  
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well as the observation that only the ‘culminating event’ is profiled for [FIND] 
(for both ‘search’ and ‘non-search’ variations). Furthermore, the mental 
scanning operation used for any relational process is valid here as well – the 
‘things’ and their relationship to the scene are compared and contrasted 
through time (Langacker, 1987b). For the ‘search’ [FIND] type, the scanning 
process is as explained above (also see Langaker, 2002, p. 168, Fig. 3), but even 
the ‘non-search’ variation of [FIND] involves a scanning operation equivalent to 
‘perception of an object standing out from its surroundings’, although there is 
minimal presence of linear time involved in the scanning process.  
Because there are now two variations of [FIND], the ‘base’ construal of 
[FIND] is proposed as [PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS OF A THING OR RELATION], 
furthermore, that ‘search’ and ‘non-search’ variations are ‘immanent’ (in the 
Langackerian sense) alternatives to this more schematic [FIND]. Panther and 
Thornburg come to a similar conclusion for variants of find12, stating, “…on 
conceptual grounds, it makes sense to derive the more complex second meaning 
‘come upon by searching’ from the conceptually simpler meaning ‘come upon’ ” 
(2009, pp. 39-40). With full predications, [FIND] interacts schematically with 
its most prominent ‘thing’ or ‘relational process’ (i.e. ‘trajector’ (tr)) and the next 
most prominent (i.e., ‘landmark’ (lm)). The composite scene is created out of the 
relationship between the more abstract schema levels and more concrete levels, 
as needed by the speaker and hearer to decode the intended message.  
 
Figure 3. FIND-CAT-MAN according to Langacker (2002, Fig. 7). 
                                            
12 Their analysis is based on conceptual [ACHIEVEMENT] and [ACCOMPLISHMENT] 
metonymies of [FIND]. It proposes the metonymy [RESULTANT ACHIEVEMENT FOR 
ACCOMPLISHEMNT]. See (2002, p. chapter 6) for details of this hypothesis. 
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In Figure 3, Langacker provides a schematic for The man found the 
cat in which the ‘search’ type of [FIND] correlates with [CAT] and [MAN]. As 
proposed in this discussion, however, a new schematic for ‘non-search’ [FIND] is 
also necessary, provided in Figure 4. Only two sub-events are necessary for 
describing the trajector (tr) and landmark (lm) along the processual timeline (t). 
The first (left side) where the man (tr) is not ‘aware’ of the cat (lm), (i.e. the 
man is not searching for the cat), and the second (right side) where the man (tr) 
is aware of the cat (lm), (i.e. the man’s awareness of the cat has emerged). The 
ellipse surrounding the man (corresponding to the tr perception of ‘search’ 
(from Fig. 3), is now representative of ‘Awareness’ (i.e., ‘non-search’ perception 
of stimulus). Thus, with only slight adaptations to account for the ‘non-search, 
Aware’ alternation of [FIND], the CG model accommodates cognitive 
representations for both ‘search’ and ‘non-search’ variations of [FIND]. 
A similar schema can be proposed for [LOSE], as in The man lost the 
cat, shown in Figure 5. Here, the ‘search/Aware’ ellipse in the final stage occurs 
only with the man (tr) due to the lack of perceptual contact with the cat (lm). 
The (tr) is, however, conscious of that fact, i.e., the man knows that he lost the 
Figure 4. Schematic representation of ‘non-search’ [FIND] in The man found the cat. 
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cat. The dotted ellipse in the first time frame (left side) represents this 
knowledge, i.e., the man previously had perceptual contact with the cat at an 
earlier point in time, and recognizes this fact in the present, at which point the 
cat becomes lost. More schematically for [LOSE], it can be stated that an (lm)
cannot be [LOST] until the (tr) is aware that the (lm) is no longer in perceptual 
contact13.  
 
 
 
Having discussed the literal conceptions of [FIND] and [LOSE] as a 
starting point, we are now in position to discuss how reflexive predications are 
construed using these same representative schemata.  
 
4.2 CG & Reflexive [FIND] and [LOSE] 
 
Complexity emerges when the (tr) and (lm) refer to the same entity, 
i.e., the reflexive construction:  
                                            
13 Notice that this is a very different conception from that of the lm knowing that it itself is 
lost. In one scenario, the more likely conception/predication is that of tr in an intransitive 
clause (i.e., The cat is lost, i.e., it cannot find its way home.) In another scenario, the tr has 
intentionally run away, and is therefore not lost (from it’s own perspective). However, in The 
man lost the cat, from the perspective of the tr, these scenarios may be identical iff the tr 
believes that the cat has not intentionally run away. 
Figure 5. Schematic representation of The man lost the cat. 
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15. Deliberately, he pinched himself on the thigh.  
(COCA:1996.FIC.FantasySciFi) 
16. She saw herself once again in the cheval glass.  
(BNC:FPH.W_fict_prose) 
 17. …and so we found ourselves in a brand new flat…  
(BNC:F82.S_interview_oral_history) 
 
How can these reflexive events be represented? In the simplest of 
schemata, a semi-circular line connects the coreferent (tr/lm), showing the 
relation between the referent and the referred. One other possibility is that the 
line starts from the (tr) and returns upon itself, forming a circle (Kemmer, 
1993; Langacker, 2006). These are useful for schematically representing the 
basic situation in which the ‘Point of View’ (POV) is not a major consideration 
(15) and (16). However, when the POV needs to be specifically taken in account, 
as in (17), these simple schemata do not describe the semantic complexity of 
the event in enough detail to be useful for more subtle metaphoric 
phenomenon. 
One analysis that takes this ‘viewing relation’ (i.e., ‘Point of View’ or 
‘Subjectification’ (Langacker, 1985; 1990, 2002; 2006)) into account is that of 
Van Hoek (1997, pp. 171-216), an analysis that goes a long way in delineating 
the construal for the reflexive schema. Examples such as (15) and (16) are 
claimed, supported by Faltz (1985), to be prototypical reflexive examples, 
where “the reflexive codes a landmark of the verb which corresponds with the 
trajector” (Van Hoek, 1997, p. 173). The claim is that the difference between the 
reflexive and emphatic markers (both having the same morpho-syntactic form 
but differing in function) is based on the ‘Subjectified’ view of the referent. 
Noting that any first or second person account of an event constitutes some 
level of subjectification on the part of the referent and thus would not 
distinguish the pronoun and reflexive, Van Hoek’s position on subjective 
reflexivity is provided in full: 
 
“The referent of the reflexive… is viewed semisubjectively within the 
onstage region. That is, some participant in the scene views him/herself 
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semisubjectively. The semisubjective perception of the referent is part of the 
agent’s experience, part of the conception being put onstage rather than just 
part of the speaker and addressee. This viewing relation is maintained 
throughout most of the extensions from the reflexive prototype.” (Van Hoek, 
1997, p. 175) 
 
The extensions referred to in the last line indicate such things as metaphorical 
use, SA events included. She does not give further account nor examples of 
these, as her argument aims to distinguish between anaphoric and reflexive 
pronouns and their environments. Before describing the details of SA events, 
however, a more in-depth definition and description of ‘Subjectivity’ is 
necessary. 
 
4.3. Subjectivity and SA events 
 
Subjectivity is a subtle phenomenon that describes the relationship 
between the speaker, hearer, and the conception being conveyed. It concerns 
the conceptual ‘stance’ of a predication, the mostly implicit viewpoint from 
which the speaker codes meaning into a message and from which the hearer 
decodes that message. The conceptualizer creates meaning from a particular 
‘stance’ that may totally exclude the conceptualizer such as The boy walks the 
dog, or greatly included in the conception, i.e., I thought I would walk the dog. 
There are various facets of these examples that could be described here, but the 
main concern for this discussion is ‘Point of View’ (POV) (Van Hoek, 1997). Is 
the speaker (i.e., conceptualizer) or his vantage point explicitly involved in the 
construal, or does it remain implicit?  
One example from the sport of golf14 might help to clarify this point. 
Golfers who have become fairly proficient will notice (or even learned) that 
when practicing, attention is paid to the mechanics of the swing; the stance, the 
weight distribution on the feet, the rotation of the pelvis in relation to the spine 
and shoulder girdle, the position of the ball, etc. However, once on the course 
and involved in a game or tournament, the mechanical aspects (hopefully) fade 
                                            
14 Any sport can be used to exemplify this point. 
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into the background. The focus of attention is on the target (the fairway or 
green, pin and cup) and the object that needs to reach that target (the ball). 
Players ‘in the zone’ experience a total lack of self-reference and a complete 
goal-oriented mindset. This ‘goal-oriented’ mindset can be equated with the 
‘objective scene’ described in the example The boy walks the dog from above. 
There is no explicit mention of the conceptualizer in the construal/predication. 
It is an objective viewpoint -- an ‘optimal viewing arrangement’ -- where the 
conceptualizer remains ‘offstage’, as it were (Langacker, 1985, 1990; 2006). On 
the other hand, I thought I would walk the dog represents a more subjective 
viewpoint, an ‘egocentric viewing arrangement’ (ibid.) in which the 
conceptualizer (and possibly the conception itself) is explicit and even focused 
on, i.e. put ‘onstage’. In sum, and quoting in full:  
 
“The optimal viewing arrangement…can be equated with the 
conceptualization focused primarily on OTHERS—the role of the 
conceptualizer S is then subjective to the extent that S loses conscious 
awareness of this role. The egocentric viewing arrangement 
…corresponds to instances where S is specifically concerned with 
SELF and consequently functions as both the conceptualizer and an 
object of conceptualization” (Langacker, 1985, p. 123).  
 
Various stages or degrees are present between these extremes, 
Langacker claiming at least five (2008). Due to space constraints however, only 
that which is directly relevant to SA event construal and predication will be 
discussed. Specifically, the SA event construal represents an egocentric viewing 
relation in which the S (conceptualizer) is at maximum Subjectification. “The 
observer S is thus situated within the boundaries of this more extensive 
objective scene, reflecting the fact that S is no longer simply an observer, but 
also to some degree an object of observation. SELF-consciousness therefore 
attenuates the subjective/objective distinction” (Langacker, 1985, p. 122).  
The following examples elucidate the difference between a simple 
Subjective schema and an SA event schema, represented schematically in 
Figure 6. 
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18. I was in the hospital.   
19. I found myself in the hospital. 
 
Figure 6. CG models with metaphorical SA [FIND]. 
 
In the left-side schematic for (18), the square box labeled ‘H’ represents the 
conceptualizer placed inside a structure, Hospital. Since there is no processual 
element involved, no timeline appears below the schema. (18) represents a 
viewing arrangement where the Ground (G) element (viewpoint of the 
conceptualizer S) is semi-subjective -- SELF is part of the conception. It is also 
included within the ‘scope of predication’ (dotted square), i.e., it is ‘onstage’. In 
general, this is the conceptual basis for construal and predication in the first 
person. “Rather than fading from awareness (as subjectivity demands), the 
SELF is placed on stage and viewed in basically objective terms. The 
observer/observed asymmetry is essentially neutralized, and the subjectivity of 
G is minimal” (ibid., p. 126).  
For the right schematic of (19), I found myself in the hospital 
represents a construal in which Awareness (S’) of the event is ‘profiled’ by the 
conceptualizer (S). Because Awareness (S’) is profiled, (although both (S’) and 
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the conceptualizer (S) are put ‘onstage’), (S) loses its main profiled status (but 
keeps some hint of profile, i.e., SELF is still some part of Awareness). It 
remains linked to profiled (S’), predicated by way of the reflexive pronoun. In 
essence, the conceptualizer’s Awareness is put onstage as the profiled object of 
conceptualization, while the sub-event, I was in the hospital, no longer receives 
main profiling, (but remains within the scope of predication). A profiled bold 
connecting line between S’ and G’ represents the 1st person conceptualizer as 
the one that finds the Ground (Self-Awareness). This relationship, in turn, 
relates to the sub-event being construed (i.e., self in a hospital), a solid arrow 
depicting this connection. The dotted arrow connecting the overall left and 
right components indicate that this is a processual relation, however 
momentary that process may be. [FIND], as a (search or non-search) process, 
includes a time (t) element (outside the ‘scope of predication’ – i.e., an implicit 
reference point). Only the end result of the process is profiled, as discussed 
above for the literal use of [FIND].  
There is another construal for the predication [FIND + oneself] that 
appears in English and must be addressed at this time. In these cases, it is not 
the ‘Awareness of perception’ that is profiled, but the ‘Awareness of a 
transcendental or deep Self ’. The differences between the two can be 
illustrated by (20) and (21): 
 
20. I’d be terrified if I found myself alone in London…  
(BNC:CBC/W_newsp_other_social) 
 
21. You know, I didn’t do so well. But I found myself. I was in the military.  
These are the values I have.   (COCA:2011.SPOK.Fox_Oreilly) 
 
The first difference lies in the viewing scene. In (21), the conceptualizer 
construes the SELF as a completely separate entity, as a 2nd person within the 
physical confines of the first. This is representative of the ‘divided self ’ or ‘true 
Self ’ metaphors, discussed in detail in section 4.4. 
The second difference is seen in the ‘degree of adjunctiveness’ of the 
post-SELF elements. In (20), the prepositional phrase is (mostly) obligatory to 
convey the meaning of the SA event construal; however, in (21), post-SA event 
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elements are optional and are often lacking.  
How can the difference in construal be depicted using CG-type 
schematics? (20) is represented similarly to the construal of the right side of 
Figure 6 above. (21) is shown below in Figure 7 and represents “…a detached 
outlook in which the speaker treats his own participation as being on par with 
anybody else’s...” (Langacker, 2002, p. 328). This is a matter of degree. (21) 
displays this criteria to a high degree. However, the claim being made here is 
that the SA event in (20) represents a maximum degree of ‘egocentric viewing 
arrangement’, i.e. there is only a very ambiguous ‘object’ to ground the subject 
referent. The ‘objects’ in SA events are limited to the cognitive function of 
Awareness emerging within the Conceptualizer. Thus, as represented in Figure 
7, SELF assumes all roles of Subjectivity and Objectivity, and for SA events, 
construes those roles as maximally egocentric. The Subject of Perception (S) 
and Object of Perception (P) are maximally connected and onstage (OS); in 
other words, the conceptualizer [SELF] and the conceptualizer’s [AWARENESS 
OF PERCEPTIONS] are inextricably bound entities. In the schema, the 
semi-subjective stance from which the construal is conceived (S’) is connected 
to the onstage construal by a dotted arrow, representing the scene as construed 
semi-subjectively from the offstage Ground (G), yielding a [[SELF] VIEWING 
[SELF-AWARENESS]] construal. 
 
Figure 7. Maximally egocentric construal of the SA event I found myself. 
 
 31 
 
Turning attention to the reflexive event for [LOSE], schematizing (22) 
presents an interesting challenge: 
 
22. I lost myself in the world of imagination.  
(COCA:2001.FIC.VirginiaQRev) 
 
 
 
Figure 8. CG model for I lost myself in the world of imagination. 
 As discussed above, [LOSE] metaphorically extends to mean [LOSS OF 
SELF-AWARENESS] when contained within the reflexive event. However, this 
construal includes the presupposition that at some previous moment 
[SELF-AWARENESS] was present. In figure 8, this concept is represented by the 
central, dotted, arching arrow. Precursory Self-Awareness (the left portion of 
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the diagram), although falling within the scope of predication, remains offstage 
(surrounding dotted boxes for the conceptions of [SELF-AWARENESS] and 
[WORLD OF IMAGINATION]. Only the relationship between the Conceptualizer 
(S’), the Ground (G’) and the event (vertical arrow) remain profiled (bold lines). 
The final event (right portion of the diagram) of the timescale (bold line due to 
its final-stage profiling) represents the [LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS], as the 
conceptualizer’s (S’) Awareness was totally absorbed in the world of 
imagination (WI) (but is not anymore 15 ). The Ground (G’) is profiled 
(SELF-AWARENESS is explicit) but is removed from the ‘scope of predication’ 
(small square dotted box), [SELF-AWARENESS] now being totally Subjective 
in viewpoint (i.e., ‘offstage’) and “serving only as a point of reference for 
situating those entities that attract the focus of viewing attention” (Langacker, 
1985, p. 124). It is lost, after all. 
Because of the 1st person vantage point, however, the coreferential 
conceptualizer (S-S’) still maintains the profiling and onstage status. This is 
possible due to the past tense of the processual relation. The event has already 
passed - it is complete, and the conceptualizer is relating the event that is no 
longer in progress. This is represented by the blunt-end profiled timeline, the 
left dot in the timeline representing the onset of the loss of Self-Awareness and 
the right dot representing the time of predication of the event, which is no 
longer in progress. Similar to Figure 6, a profiled bold connecting line between 
S’ and G’ represents the 1st person conceptualizer as the one who has here lost 
the Ground. This relationship, in turn, refers to the sub-event being construed 
(i.e., world of imaginings), a solid arrow depicting this.  
In conclusion to this section, CG schematic representations can 
delineate the subtleties of SA events, however, implementation can be intricate 
and the resulting description quite opaque. This is due to the extremely 
abstract quality of the construal of both the metaphorically extended 
predicates as well as the pseudo-reflexive coreferent nominals. 
 
                                            
15 The metaphorical extension of [[LOSE] + oneself] is heavily biased towards the past tense. 
This is likely due to the cognitive idiosyncrasy of the function of awareness. We are not able to 
be in the midst of [LOST AWARENESS] and simultaneously vocalize that experience. In other 
words, to say I have now lost awareness is technically an oxymoronic statement, for to be 
consciously vocalizing that state of being is to not be [LOST] any longer.  
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4.4. The Divided Self and SA 
 
A different type of analysis proposes a distinct, semi-independent 
psyche, a phenomenon often called the ‘divided self ’, where one part of the 
mind is ‘at odds’ with or ‘exerts force upon’ another part of the mind/body, and 
even interactively among individuals and social groups (Gilquin, 2010; A. 
Lakoff & Becker, 1992; G. Lakoff, 1996; Langacker, 1985; 1987b; Lederer, 2013; 
Talmy, 2000a, 2000b). Research conducted on the causative forces influencing 
linguistic construal and predication (Gilquin, 2010; Talmy, 2000a) has proposed 
that: 1) objects (Agonists) can apply, block or remove physical and/or 
psychological force to/from other objects 2) objects (Antagonists) can have 
physical and/or psychological force applied or freed (blockage removed),  3) 
exertion of these forces is not binary but exist on a cline, and 4) the way we 
view the effects of force in a particular situation is the way it is construed and 
predicated. Applications of force dynamic principles to various types of 
construal and predication are ubiquitous; “…force-dynamics thus emerges as a 
fundamental notional system that structures conceptual material pertaining to 
force interaction in common ways across a linguistic range: the physical, 
psychological, social, inferential, discourse, and mental-model domains of 
reference and conception” (Talmy, 2000a, p. 409). 
Force dynamics is proposed as the base or image schema for various 
levels of force in construals of causative constructions: 
 
 23. Tommy spilled the milk. 
 24. The milk spilled all over the table. 
 25. Tommy tried not to spill the milk. 
 26. Tommy wanted to spill the milk.  
 27. Tommy prevented the milk from spilling. 
 
Due to space constraints, an in-depth analysis of causation will have 
to be put aside here. However, one specific point directly related to SA events 
will be discussed. This is a subcategory of force dynamics called 
‘Psychodynamics’ (Talmy, 2001) where a psychological force is exerted upon one 
or both of the participants in a construal. Within psychodynamics is the specific 
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case of reflexive constructions, termed ‘coreferential causative constructions’ 
(Gilquin, 2010; Talmy, 2001).  
 
 28. He held himself back from responding. 
 29. He exerted himself in pressing against the jammed door.  
      (Gilquin, 2010) 
 
The psychodynamic situations in these examples are intriguing. If 
‘force’ is applied from one object to another, what and how is the force being 
manipulated during a reflexive event? It has been proposed that one part of the 
Self (a peripheral part) acts upon another part of the Self (a central part)16. The 
fundamental concept behind this ‘divided self ’ phenomenon is a two-tier system 
comprised of the following (depending on one’s terminology): Ego, Id, Subject, 
Super-ego and Self (Talmy, 2001, p. 432), one of these being the ‘core’ or ‘center’ 
of consciousness and the other the ‘mundane’ or ‘peripheral’ action-based mind. 
In some cases, one part of the Self exerts force upon the physical body; in other 
cases, the Self exerts control over another part of the psyche. Different levels 
and types of force can be exerted, and these guide the choice of construal and 
predication. Gilquin’s (2010) discussion of the ‘divided self ’ is based on Talmy 
(2010), and includes much detail as well as corpus evidence supporting her 
arguments. Being specifically a study of causation limits its applicability to SA 
event construal and predication, however. The type of energy construed for SA 
events [FIND / LOSE ONESELF] is very different from that of causative physical 
or psychological forces. There are similarities that cannot be ignored, however.  
 
30. After 30 days of chanting “OM”, Mary found herself. 
 
In (30), a ‘peripheral’ part of Mary’s SELF searches17 for another ‘central’ part, 
and subsequently finds (i.e., becomes aware of) this part of her psyche that was 
perhaps psychologically hidden or underdeveloped. This construal adequately 
                                            
16 Talmy uses the terms ‘peripheral’ and ‘central’ to refer to general patterns of 
Agonistic/Antagonistic forces, respectively. He claims that the basic state of the ‘central’ part is 
‘repose’ or inaction, while the ‘peripheral’ part ‘exerts’ the force. Many construals lend 
themselves to this kind of analysis, but it is proposed here that SA events are not one of these. 
17 I assume here that the reason for her chanting was to search for her deeper Self. 
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corroborates the ‘divided self ’ phenomenon (without explicit causation18). The 
construal can be represented as maximally egocentric, i.e., the Subject views 
the Self in the same way he would an independent Object. However, (31) 
exemplifies a different construal.   
 
31. After a month of dieting, Mary found herself in the kitchen at midnight. 
 
In (31), although two ‘SELVES’ seem to be predicated, the construal is actually 
a singular [SELF-AWARE] cognition of certain perceptions, in this case, spatial 
location (in the kitchen). There may be a minor, fleeting recognition of the 
‘divided self ’ iff the literal construal is quickly considered but then 
subsequently denied. The claim here is that this predication construes and 
refers to the cognition of Self-Awareness as a singular entity. It is along this 
parameter that the differences in meaning between (30) and (31) may be 
understood and delineated.19  
Lakoff and Johnson (2000a, 2001) examine the ‘divided self ’ by way of the 
folk theory of ‘Essence’, whereby “…each person is seen as having an Essence 
that is part of the Subject (‘center’). The person may have more than one Self, 
but only one of those Selves is compatible with that Essence. This is called the 
“real” or “true” Self” (1999). Due to the importance of this explanation with 
regard to SA events, the following quote is provided in full: 
 
In the general Subject-Self metaphor, a person is divided into Subject and 
one or more Selves. The Subject is in the target domain of that metaphor. 
The Subject is that aspect of a person that is the experiencing consciousness 
and the locus of reason, will, and the judgment, which, by its nature, exists 
only in the present. This is what the Subject is in most of the cases; however, 
there is a subsystem that is different in an important way. In this 
subsystem, the Subject is also the locus of a person’s Essence-that enduring 
                                            
18 There may be a secondary causation, however, as the force of chanting provoked the ‘central’, 
deeper Self to become known to ‘peripheral’ consciousness. 
19 One interesting aspect of (31) is that both meanings may be construed here (‘divided self ’ 
and SA event). It seems (native speaker inquiry) that intonation and/or sentential stress divide 
the two phenomena; heavy phonological stress placed on found construes the ‘divided self ’ 
whereas the post-SA adjunct is stressed for SA predications. In usage, collocational 
idiosyncrasies divide the two. See section 6 for further details concerning corpus analysis.  
 36 
thing that makes us who we are. Metaphorically, the Subject is always 
conceptualized as a person. The Self is that part of a person that is not 
picked out by the Subject. This includes the body, social rules, past states, 
and actions in the world. There can be more than one Self. And each Self is 
conceptualized metaphorically as either a person, an object, or location.  
(G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 242) 
 
This explanation begins to delineate the metaphorical aspects of 
expressions like (32-36): 
 
32. I gave myself a task… (COCA:2005.SPOK.CBS_Morning) 
 33. And then I asked myself the question…  
(COCA:SPOK.THE CHARLIE ROSE SHOW) 
 34. I kicked myself for being so stupid. (COCA:2002.MAG.BoysLife) 
35. …James Brown found himself back at home, alone in his old room…  
(COCA:1998.MAG.Ebony) 
 36. No one could imagine Lucy losing herself in sensuality...  
(COCA:1999.FIC.NewEnglandRev) 
 
According to the Lakoff quote above, the Subject is the deeper, central 
(Essence) part of the SELF and the Self is the peripheral, actively changing 
aspect of the SELF. In (32, 33), the central part of the SELF metaphorically 
gives (= assigns), and asks (= questions) the peripheral part of the 
physical/mental SELF, respectively. These cases are clear and unequivocal 
examples of the divided-self phenomenon, where not only are there two aspects 
to the SELF, but the deeper construal of the metaphor is also congruent with 
these two aspects. In other words, to ask/give something of/to someone IS 
Subject asking/giving something of/to oneself (or vice-versa). This is the reason 
for including the ‘true-Self ’ metaphor into this category, being two ‘divided’ 
interacting aspects of the SELF. 
(34) presents an interesting case, however. Here, even though two 
aspects of SELF (Subject-Self) are predicated, the construal of the expression is 
non-dualistic in nature. To kick oneself means to regret doing something 
(McGraw-Hill, 2002). The event as a whole metaphorically refers to an 
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emotional feeling of regret. It is not inherently based on the dualism of 
Subject-Self. It is only at a shallower stage of construal, closer to the level of 
predication, that the divided-self construal emerges from the metaphorical 
form of the predication.  
It is along these lines that SA events are construed as well. For 
examples (35) and (36), even though the dualism of the predication may 
momentarily form a divided-self image in shallow construal, it is quickly 
replaced with the meaning of the deeper construal, i.e., the emergence [FIND] 
or temporary lack [LOSE] of Self-Awareness. The complexity of this cannot be 
overstated. Self-Awareness is in itself a type of dualistic phenomenon, in that a 
Subject’s Awareness of Self (i.e., perceptions of stimuli) defines the cognitive 
function of Self-Awareness. In other words, it is an additional perspective (i.e., 
viewpoint, vantage point) from which the mind notices other aspects of mental 
and bodily experiences. However, as a metaphorical expression, reference to 
that specific mental function is a singular, non-dualistic event (i.e., I find 
myself = I am aware.) Whether or not the cognitive function is dualistic in 
nature is irrelevant (for the moment). Sentence (35) means that James Brown’s 
Self-Awareness of his surroundings suddenly and acutely emerged at that 
moment in time. And in (36), Lucy, not being prone to emotionalism or 
romanticism, would probably not be the kind of person who gets so intensely 
absorbed in sensuality that her Self-Aware cognitive function is temporarily 
disengaged by it. Both of these SA events construe the emergence or lack of a 
single cognitive function, Self-Awareness. The ‘divided-self ’ metaphor, certainly 
present at some level of construal, if only fleetingly, must give way to the more 
schematic, inclusive construal that is reference to the single cognitive function 
of Self-Awareness. 
Thus, although Psychodynamics and the ‘divided self ’ phenomena help 
clarify many metaphorical reflexive instances, the precise construal of SA 
events still remains vague. Therefore, the discussion continues on to the 
specifics of how SA events come to have the metaphorical meanings they have 
with the predications they are given.  
 
4.5. Mapping of Metonymy and SA events 
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In cognitive linguistics, the term mapping is used to describe a 
relationship between two or more concepts. Regarding metaphoric expressions, 
it describes a concept from one domain related to a concept of another domain 
(Barcelona, 2002; Croft & Cruse, 2004; Fauconnier, 1985; G. Lakoff, 1993; 
Langacker, 2009; Panther et al., 2009). These domains may be basic or abstract, 
but the mapping usually proceeds in only one direction for metaphor, from the 
concrete to the abstract category, as opposed to metonymy, which are in general 
reversible (Kuno, 1987; Panther et al., 2009). The term source (also called 
topic) is used for a concept's foundational domain, the domain from which the 
concept is taken. The term target (also called vehicle) is used for a concept 
whose domain is used in the expression.  
For example, the metaphoric expression, Sally is an absolute angel, 
means that Sally is profusely imbued with angel-like qualities. The speaker 
intends to convey that the positive qualities displayed by Sally such as 
compassion, joy, generosity, tenderness, etc., (i.e., the source domain concept), 
are mapped onto those conceived qualities usually (deemed by a particular 
culture) displayed by angels (the target domain concept). The mapping is only 
partial because there are many qualities that angels have besides those 
mentioned above; for example, they have wings, halos, they are able to fly, come 
down from heaven and convey messages from God, etc. In our understanding of 
the metaphor above, we do not map wings, halos, flying from heaven, onto Sally. 
Sally has a specific and limited number of traits of the source domain concept,20 
but not all of them, because if the mapping were total, the concepts would be 
identical and indistinguishable. In this way, metaphorical concepts ‘connect’ 
one to another.  
Another type of mapping that is a major factor in the delineation of SA 
events is the mapping of concepts within the same domain, called ‘metonymy’, 
and has often been cited as being referential in nature. Many definitions of 
metonymy include this referential aspect (Croft, 1993; Goossens, 2002; G. 
Lakoff & Johnson, 2008; Langacker, 1987b; Littlemore, 2015). However, as 
pointed out (Langacker, 2009; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002), there are 
metonymies that are not directly referential; for example, Mary is just another 
                                            
20 See Lakoff for further details of metaphorical mapping especially with regard to conceptual 
constraints, called the ‘Invariance Hypothesis’ (Barcelona, 2000; G. Lakoff, 1990a) 
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pretty face, where pretty face does not directly refer to any one person’s pretty 
face, but beauty in general. Due to this type of non-referential construal, 
referentiality may be excluded from a general definition of metonymy. An 
alternate definition based on domain inclusion/exclusion, metonymy being the 
former and metaphor the latter, is proposed. This is similar to Goossens’ 
definition, " …the crucial difference between metonymy (as well as synecdoche) 
and metaphor is that in a metaphoric mapping two discrete domains are 
involved whereas in the metonymy, the mapping occurs within a single domain” 
(2002, p. 351), a definition that is concurrent with others (Barcelona, 2000; 
Kovecses, 2006; Littlemore, 2015).  
Mendoza and Velasco (2002) further characterize metonymy based on 
whether a specific characteristic of the concept is being highlighted within the 
domain (called source-in-target) or whether the domain as a whole (called 
domain matrix) is being used to stand for a particular member of that domain 
(called target-in-source). These have traditionally been labeled WHOLE FOR 
PART and PART FOR WHOLE relationships (Feyaerts, 2000; Kovecses, 2002; G. 
Lakoff, 1990a, 1993; Littlemore, 2015). 
 
 37. The ham sandwich is waiting for his check.  
   (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 35) 
  
38. A lefty can’t just sit anywhere they want. (Hunt, 2016) 
 
The underlined parts of (37) and (38) show metonymic construal of the PART 
FOR WHOLE (i.e., synecdoche) and WHOLE FOR PART types, respectively. In 
(37), the predication, ham sandwich corresponds to a PART of the person as a 
WHOLE, specifically, the part that ordered the ham sandwich in the restaurant 
corresponding to the entire person. In (38), A lefty corresponds to a WHOLE 
group of people that display left-hand orientation and corresponds to a specific 
person (PART) who becomes an archetype.  
WHOLE FOR PART metonymy is applicable to SA events. It is the 
WHOLE person (predicated in the form of a reflexive pronoun) that stands for a 
PART of the person, i.e., Self-Awareness of a particular perception and/or 
experience.  
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39. The plane began to fall. Barry found himself stepping on the gas. 
  (COCA:1998, FIC.Bk:WasItSomething) 
40.  After 14 months of unemployment, he found himself lying drunk  
on the floor of a room…” (COCA:1999.NEWS.Atlanta) 
 41. She goes from Rome to Greece, where she basks in the sun and  
loses herself in reading about the mythic lives of the gods and 
goddesses. (COCA:1997.FIC.BK.PassionDreamBook) 
42. …setting aside their identity in the outside world and (visitors to  
the Gallery) losing themselves in the art on the walls…  
(COCA:2003.ACAD.ArtBulletin (my parenthesis)) 
 
The reflexive pronouns in (39-42) do not refer to dualistic entities, as with (43) 
and (44) below: 
 
 43. Bernard Goldberg published a book titled 100 People Who Are  
   Screwing Up America and I found myself listed as culprit number 80.  
(COCA:2011.ACAD.AmerScholar) 
  
44. Father, I fear I have badly lost myself in the woods.  
  (COCA:2005.FIC.FantasySciFi) 
 
(43) represents what is described as Picture Noun Phrases (Kuno, 1987) or 
‘displacement’ (Langacker, 1987a). Here, some ‘alternate world’ is conceived 
where the Self is an actual entity, whether in a picture or other form. In (44), 
the literal meaning is construed, and the physical Self is literally lost in some 
spatial location. For the SA events in (39-42), the construal of the whole event 
must be considered, i.e., an emergent or absent Self-Awareness, and as such 
the reflexive pronoun cannot refer to the antecedent in a simple one-to-one 
relationship. If this were the case, the meanings of (39-42), and all SA events, 
as well as a select number of other metaphorical reflexive events (such as (34)) 
could not be construed accurately; their metaphorical construal would be 
inaccessible. For SA events, the construal of the predicate as a whole (i.e., 
emergence or absence of Self-Awareness) dictates to what the reflexive pronoun 
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refers. The pronoun is metonymic in the sense that the concept of 
Self-Awareness is contained within the superordinate domain of Self. There is 
no cross-domain mapping. In (39-42), what is found or lost is not the physical 
person, not the gestalt psychological person, not the ‘true-Self ’. What is found 
and lost is the cognitive function of Self-Awareness of a particular perception or 
experience, the reflexive pronoun metonymically ‘standing for’ that Self-Aware 
construal, i.e., a WHOLE FOR PART relationship (for further details, see 
section 5). 
 
4.6. Conceptual Metaphor and SA events 
 
How do we get from the literal, I am aware that I am in the kitchen to 
the metaphorical I found myself in the kitchen? Looking at the specific logic of 
conceptual metaphor for SA events, KNOWING IS SEEING (G. Lakoff, 1993; G. 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) represents a well-known conceptual metaphor (see 
section 3.1) that plays a role in SA event construal. This is instantiated by 
examples such as: 
 
45. I see what you mean. (COCA: 2011.SPOK.CNN.Behar) 
 
For this metaphor, one cannot KNOW what one does not SEE, and so KNOWING 
IS SEEING represents the conceptual logic underlying the linguistic metaphor 
in (45). FINDING IS KNOWING is another common conceptual metaphor, 
instantiated by examples such as: 
 
46. So many people find it very very difficult…  
(BNC:G3V.S_classroom) 
47. …Students found this exercise helpful…  
(COCA:2009.ACAD.CommCollegeR) 
 
Furthermore, if FINDING IS KNOWING then LOSING IS HAVING KNOWN21, 
exemplified by (48) and (49): 
                                            
21 As discussed above, the inherent meaning of LOSE contains previous perceptual contact that 
is no longer available.  
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48. Your generation has lost touch with solitude…  
(COCA:2012.FIC.MassachRev) 
49. …the Government has lost sight of their stated aims...  
(BNC:K5D.W_news_other_report) 
 
The metaphors FIND to mean KNOW and LOSE to mean HAVING KNOWN are 
proposed here to be the base conceptual metaphors for SA events. However, due 
to the intent to construe KNOWLEDGE OF SELF, i.e., SELF-AWARENESS, the 
reflexive pronoun is employed for the linguistic metaphor: 
 
 50. One night, I found myself at a party with Naomi Campbell…  
(COCA:2012.SPOK.ABC_20/20) 
 51. I lost myself in thoughts of meeting kind people…  
(COCA:2008.FIC.Triquarterly) 
 
In (50), a particular kind of SELF-KNOWLEDGE, i.e. Self-Awareness of 
unexpectedly22 being at the same party as Naomi Campbell is conveyed by I 
found myself, while in (51), SELF-KNOWLEDGE that was present but is no 
longer is conveyed by I lost myself.  
Two further conceptual metaphors are needed to complete the logic of 
SA events in their entirety. One is THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS 
(G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and the other is MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS 
(Yu, 2008). When we think of the mind, we imagine it as a container that holds 
things like ideas, dreams, hallucinations, theories, etc. We imagine putting 
things in the mind as well as taking things out of the mind. For example, in 
(52) and (53): 
 
 52. I had other people in mind as well actually.   
(BNC:FM2.S_meeting) 
 53. That’s one of those things I think I blanked out of my mind.  
(COCA:2012:SPOK.ABC_20/20) 
                                            
22 See Module 1 for discussion of the inherent semantics of expectation for reflexive events. 
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 54. His mental state has been very stable…  
(BNC:CBF.W_newsp_other_report) 
 55. …there are no fresh ideas on how to do it.  
(COCA:2012:SPOK.CBS_NewsEve) 
 
The mind can also be in different states, and each of these can be thought of as 
some kind of object. For example, emotions can be light or heavy, ideas can be 
stale or fresh, logic can be strong or weak, etc. Examples (54) and (55) are 
instances of the conceptual metaphor MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS.   
In order for SA events to be able to convey SELF-AWARENESS, the 
three conceptual metaphors above need to work in collaboration: FINDING IS 
KNOWING, THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS, and MENTAL STATES 
ARE OBJECTS. Furthermore, two SA event-specific metaphors can now be 
proposed: FINDING ONESELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF and LOSING ONESELF 
IS UNAWARENESS OF SELF. The following conceptual logic for SA events is as 
follows: 
 
1. THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS 
2. MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS 
3. OBJECTS CAN BE FOUND OR LOST 
4. SELF-AWARENESS IS A MENTAL STATE 
Therefore,  
5. SELF-AWARENESS IS AN OBJECT THAT CAN BE FOUND OR LOST 
 
This is not to say that every time an SA event is predicated, the 
interlocutors consciously go through all five steps in order. What is proposed 
here is that entailed within the SA event construal is the conceptual metaphors 
of (1) and (2), collaborating with the ontological facts of (3) and (4), culminating 
in the conclusion in (5). These are immanent to the understanding of SA event 
metaphors.  
Contextual knowledge is necessary for SA events to be understood. This 
information is crucial for the proper construal and delineation of SA events. By 
carefully taking heed of the specific conceptual environments of SA events, it 
can be gleaned that both WHOLE FOR PART metonymy as well as conceptual 
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metaphor are present within SA events. 
 
5. Categorizing SA events: metonymy and metaphor 
 
Goossens (2002) proposes cases where metaphor and metonymy are 
both at work within the same expression. He describes four main types, but 
due to space considerations, only one type, ‘metonymy within metaphor’ will be 
discussed, SA events being instances of this type. “The typical case… is that a 
metonymically used entity is embedded in a (complex) metaphorical expression. 
The metonymy functions within the target domain. As we found out in the 
instances we analyzed, this often, but not necessarily, goes together with a 
metaphorical reinterpretation of the relevant entity in the donor domain” 
(Goossens, Pauwels, Rudzka-Ostyn, Simon-Vandenbergen, & Vanparys, 1995, 
p. 172). 
 
56. Surprised, Colby found himself recalling a distant, early  
memory… (COCA:2011.FIC.AntiocRev) 
57.  I ignored her and lost myself in the joyous simplicity of  
munching on a perfectly vine-ripened tomato.  
(COCA:2000.FIC.Bk:SullivansIsland) 
 
One crucial element in the description and delineation of SA events is 
the metonymic characterization of the reflexive pronoun. The main argument 
here is that Self-Awareness is a unique cognitive function able to be identified 
and referred to independently of its Subject/Conceptualizer/Agent. The next 
step is to reveal the mapping from the reflexive pronoun onto that cognitive 
function, showing an intra-domain mapping that leads to the metonymic 
construal. According to Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco (2002), the metonymic 
aspect of SA events would likely be categorized under ‘target-in-source’ 
metonymy, a situation in where a whole domain stands for a part of the domain, 
in other words, WHOLE FOR PART. They call this a domain reduction due to the 
highlighted feature (thus, a type of conceptual narrowing) of the domain matrix 
being central to the conception. For SA events, the conceptually gestalt 
reflexive pronoun stands for the specific cognitive function of Self-Awareness (a 
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part of oneself), shown in Figure 9. 
 In the source domain, a person finding an object is mapped on to a 
person aware of his/her perceptions/experience. In the target domain there is a 
metonymic interpretation of Self-Awareness in which the reflexive pronoun is 
in a WHOLE FOR PART relationship with the specific cognitive function of 
Self-Awareness. The construal of this, however, is dependent on the metaphoric 
construal of the predicate. In other words, depending on the construal of the 
predicate, the metonymic mapping of the pronoun changes, and both of these 
mappings are sensitive to pre- and post- event construal/predication 
environments.  
 
 
Figure 9: Mapping of SA events, based on Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco (2002) 
 
58. (32) I gave myself a task… (COCA:2005.SPOK.CBS_Morning) 
 59. (33) And then I asked myself the question…  
(COCA:SPOK.THE CHARLIE ROSE SHOW) 
 60. (34) I kicked myself for being so stupid. (COCA:2002.MAG.BoysLife) 
61. (35) …James Brown found himself back at home, alone in his old room…  
(COCA:1998.MAG.Ebony) 
 62. (36) No one could imagine Lucy losing herself in sensuality...  
(COCA:1999.FIC.NewEnglandRev) 
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In (58-62) (reproduced from (32-36)), conceptual entailments of each of 
the verbs (metaphorical or not) point the interlocutors towards plausible 
reflexive pronoun-antecedent referent construal. In (58), the verb give entails 
the transfer of something from one entity to another, and thus, the reflexive 
pronoun refers to the receiving part of Self (whatever that may be which is 
appropriate for the situation). In (59), the verb ask designates an interrogative 
verbal act, thus the reflexive pronoun is assigned to a part of the mind that can 
‘hear’ the question being posed. In (60), it is not only because kicking oneself is 
literally quite difficult that the metaphoric interpretation is construed, but also 
because the post-event adjunct, for being so stupid, urges the interlocutors 
towards the metaphoric interpretation of kick. That being established, the 
reflexive pronoun is easily assigned metonymic construal, i.e., myself 
STANDING FOR the part of the mind that receives the scolding, an 
intra-domain mapping. (61) and (62) are SA events and have already been 
described in detail, but in a nutshell, [FIND / LOSE] entail KNOWLEDGE of 
perception/experience (or loss thereof) along with the inherent meaning of the 
reflexive pronoun entailing that the action occurs back on the Self, thus 
KNOWLEDGE must be of the Self, i.e., Self-Awareness. 
 Concluding this section, SA events cannot be precisely delineated 
without reference to their total pre- and post- event conceptual environments 
that contribute vital information to the interlocutors for conceptual 
decision-making. SA events contain ‘target in source’ or WHOLE FOR PART 
metonymic construals wrapped inside a larger metaphoric event which is 
hinged upon the conceptual entailments of the predicate, a phenomenon 
Goossens calls ‘metonymy within metaphor’.  
 
6. Corpus Data and Analysis 
 
Corpus data from the British National Corpus (BNC) as well as the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) suggests that SA events 
are numerous, unique and productive; furthermore, SA events have a unique 
collocational profile that distinguishes them from the ‘true-self ’ metaphor in 
that the reflexive event adjunct is a conceptually necessary part of the SA event 
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construal, but truly adjunctive, i.e., optional, for ‘true-self ’ metaphors. This is 
supported by the observation that ‘true-self ’ metaphors occur exclusively in 
clause-final position, whereas SA events necessarily contain adjuncts 
containing the conceptual focus of Self-Awareness. 
 
6.1. General Findings: [pp*] [v*] [ppx*] 
 
Using search parameters [pp*] [v*] [ppx*] (i.e., any personal pronoun 
followed by any verb (lemma) followed by any reflexive pronoun) and excluding 
reciprocal instances, for the most frequent 100 verbs (22,684 and 4,980 total 
hits for COCA and BNC, respectively), the lemma [find] yielded a 37% hit rate 
in the COCA and a 34% hit rate in the BNC. [find] represents 50% of the verbs 
in the most frequent 20 for COCA, and 40% for the BNC. The lemma [lose] hit 
140 times in the COCA and 16 times in the BNC; however, there were zero 
instances within the most frequent 100 in both corpora. 
 
Table 1. Overall frequencies of [find] and [lose] in the COCA and BNC 
COCA: [pp*] [find] [ppx*]: n=8542  COCA: [pp*] [lose] [ppx*]: n=140 
 BNC: [pp*] [find] [ppx*]: n=1752   BNC: [pp*] [lose] [ppx*]: n=16 
 
6.2.1. [FIND] : [pp*][find][ppx*] 
 
A 100 item random sample of [pp*][find][ppx*] in the COCA (see 
Appendix) yielded 97 SA event instances. Of the non-SA instances, one was 
benefactive (#13), one was the ‘true-self ’ metaphor (#47), and one was the title 
of a report (#70). Two instances (#21, #50) were SA in context, but might be 
construed as benefactive out of context. In these examples, a noun follows the 
reflexive construction. However, in these examples, a dropped be verb is the 
source of possible ambiguity; once the verb is re-inserted, no benefactive 
ambiguity remains:  
63. I found myself (to be) the owner of an enormous wooden chest…  
(COCA:2009.MAG.CountryLiving) 
64. She found herself (to be) a widow in less than a decade.  
(COCA:2009:FIC.Triquarterly) 
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Seen in Table 2, of the 97 SA event instances in the COCA, post-SA 
event predicate adjuncts occurred 68% of the time. Of these, the passive voice 
accounted for 7%. For the remaining 93%, the verb was in present continuous 
34%, and past continuous 65%. The frequency of the past continuous, i.e., to 
have been aware of something that had been done, is perhaps due to the 
psychology of Self-Awareness itself; the experience of Self-Awareness is easier 
to express after the fact. However, this also may be due to the idiosyncrasy of 
the corpus source data.23  
Prepositional phrases followed the reflexive event 24% of the time, the 
most frequent being in (66%), followed by at, with (16%), on (8%) and out on 
(4%). Spatially construed prepositions in, at, on, out on together comprise 90% 
of the total preposition instances, strongly suggesting that awareness of spatial 
perception or experience is a very commonly construed and predicated 
phenomenon. 
Finally, adjunctive adjectives followed SA events 5% and adverbs 
followed SA events 2%. 
In the BNC, 99 of 100 random sample items were SA event types. The 
meaning of the outstanding item (#65) was obscure and could not be retrieved 
from the data. Post-SA event predicate adjuncts made up 75% of total instances. 
The passive was used (10%), a minimal 4% difference between the BNC and 
COCA sample. The frequency of the present continuous was 14%, significantly 
less than in the COCA data, and the past continuous accounted for 53%, again 
only minimally different from the COCA data. This suggests that in British as 
well as American English, after-the-fact Self-Awareness, i.e., to have been 
aware of something that had been done, is a common construal and predication 
within SA events.  
Post-SA event prepositional phrases occurred 16%, a difference of 8% 
from the COCA24. In the BNC, the preposition in accounted for 56%, on 18%, 
and one instance (6%) each of between, with, at, over, outside, and opposite. 
                                            
23 These points will be researched and discussed in detail in Module 3. 
24 Slightly telling, perhaps, of the linguistic variation between the American and British 
English varieties. One other possible reason for the distinction might be the different kinds of 
source data of the corpora themselves. Unfortunately, definitive answers cannot be explored 
here in this brief discussion, but will be discussed in detail in Module 3. 
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Here again, Awareness of spatial perception or experience can be suggested for 
these occurrences. One interesting idiosyncrasy that appeared in the BNC data 
is that the SA event appeared as the object of a relative clause (7%), perhaps 
telling of regional variation and/or source data discrepancies. Adjectives 
followed the reflexive construction five times (5%), similar to the COCA data. 
There was no instance of post-SA event adverb use in the BNC. 
 
Table 2. Adjunct distribution frequencies of [pp*][find][ppx*]. (Random sample, n=100) 
    COCA  BNC 
Post-SA Event Prepositions: 24%  16% 
 In:   66%  56% 
 On:   8%  18% 
 At:   16%  6% 
 With:   16%  6% 
 
Verbs:    68%  75% 
Past Part.:  7%  10% 
Present Cont.:  34%  14%  
Past Cont.:  65%  53% 
Rel. Obj.:   0%  7% 
 
6.2.2. Reflexive Pronouns & [find] 
 
Based on type of reflexive pronoun for the lemma [find] in both the 
COCA and BNC corpora shown in Table 3, the first person (plural included) is 
most commonly used (49% and 35%, respectively) followed by the third person 
(plural included) (45% and 55%, respectively). This may be due to cognitive 
and/or psychological reasons such as Self-Awareness being most accessible to 
the first person psyche. For the third person data, a likely reason is due to the 
nature of the data in which narratives where the author assumes the psyche of 
the character are frequent. The next frequent is the second person pronoun. In 
all of these cases, the psyche of the subject was assumed, queried, or reiterated. 
The impersonal pronoun ‘it’ occurred a minimal number of times (0.8% and 1%, 
respectively), all referring to a political party or business organization that is 
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metaphorically construed as a person, a common conceptual metaphor. 
 
Table 3. Pronoun distribution frequencies for [find]. (Random sample, n=100) 
                          COCA            BNC 
    #   %   #   % 
I-myself:  3294  39%  476  27% 
You-yourself:  1248  15%  136  8% 
He-himself:  1690  20%  364  21% 
She-herself:  1471  18%  440  25% 
We-ourselves:  882  10%  144  8% 
They-themselves: 588  7%  158  9% 
It-itself:   67  0.8%  21  1% 
 
6.3. [LOSE]: [pp*][lose][ppx*] 
 
Implementing the search parameter [pp*][lose][ppx*], complexity and 
possible ambiguity was immediately evident. Because it is literally and 
metaphorically possible to lose oneself in a spatial location, larger contexts 
needed to be examined when deciding whether the expressions were literal, 
‘true-self ’, or SA event construals.  
In the COCA, 2% possible literal interpretations were found, 
compared to 25% in the BNC. For example, in (65) and (66) below, both literal 
and SA event construals are possible: 
 
 65. As you walk through the industrial town you lose yourself  
in labyrinths of little brick houses blackened by smoke.  
(BNC:EG0:W_non_ac_soc_science) 
66. He lost himself in the mountains of Maelienydd and Brecon.  
(BNC:HGG.W_fict_prose) 
 
Here, [lost] can be literal (getting lost in the town or mountains) or 
metaphorical (being totally absorbed in the labyrinths of brick or the scenery of 
the mountains). Only upon examination of the larger context could the 
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ambiguity be resolved. 
In the COCA random sample (n=100), one item was a duplicate. Of the 
remaining 99 instances, 75% construed SA events, while the remaining 25% 
construed the ‘true-self ’ metaphor. This ratio is in accord exactly in the BNC, 
although the number of actual instances is small (n=16). The ‘true-self ’ 
metaphor occurred exclusively in clause-final position, supporting the 
hypothesis that there are distinct grammatical environments for metaphorical 
compared to literal events (Deignan, 2005, 2007, 2008), and I would add, for 
different types of metaphorical events as well, SA event and ‘true-Self ’ 
metaphor comparative data supporting this claim.25  
For total SA event data (COCA + BNC, n=115), prepositional phrases 
followed SA events 65% of the time, in accounting for the majority (88%), to 
following at (4%), and 1% each of on, between, through, for, around, like and 
against. Again, this data supports the analysis that Awareness of spatial 
perception/experience is a common occurrence in construal and predication for 
SA events. This is logical considering that the ‘background/base’ concepts 
immanent to the verbs [FIND] and [LOSE] are primarily dealing with the 
spatial location of some entity.  
For all instances, the past tense of the verb accounts for 50% of the 
total. This frequency shows that Self-Awareness of actions/states reported 
after-the-fact is a common occurrence. 4% of instances were those in which the 
SA event was the object of a relative clause, and 3% of SA event adjuncts were 
adjectives and adverbs.  
 
6.3.1. Reflexive Pronouns [LOSE] 
 
Based on type of personal pronoun, the following data was gathered 
for [lose], presented in Table 4: 
Interesting results appear for the first and second person pronouns. 
There is a 14% discrepancy between the COCA and BNC for the first person 
pronoun and a 15% difference for the second person, again suggestive of 
regional variety or perhaps source data differentiation. 
                                            
25 This point as well will be dealt with in breadth and detail in Module 3. 
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Table 4. Pronoun distribution frequencies for [pp*][lose][ppx*].  
           COCA     BNC 
I-myself:  39 27%  2 12% 
You-yourself:  14 10%  4 25% 
He-himself:  30 21%  5 31% 
She-herself:  23 16%  1 6% 
We-ourselves:  16 11%  2 12% 
They-themselves: 6 4%  1 6% 
It-itself:   4 2%  0 0% 
Herobj –herself:  2 1%  1 6% 
One of them-itself: 1 0.7%  0 0% 
 
In Table 5, comparing total pronoun frequency for both [find] and 
[lose] in both corpora, similar patterns emerge. Third person use leads the first 
person by 10%-12%, while the second person trails by 27% compared to the first 
person pronoun. There is a 51% difference between first and second person 
pronoun use for [find]. Although this will be analyzed in detail in Module 3, it 
can be tentatively proposed that, on an interpersonal psychological level, it is 
difficult to assert or assess what another person’s mental state of awareness is 
at a certain time. However, frequent use of the third person pronoun, as stated 
above, can be accounted for by the narrative use of prose, the author or speaker 
assuming the point of view of the subject. 
 
Table 5. Overall pronoun frequencies for [find] and [lose]. 
                   FIND  LOSE 
I/We - myself/ourselves:    74%    62% 
You – yourself/yourselves:   23%    35% 
He/She - him/herself:    84%           74% 
 
6.4. Semantic themes 
 
A semantic theme is defined here as the perception/experience that is 
the focus of the construal for an SA event. In other words, the types of 
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situations in which one finds and loses oneself. In theory, if expressed 
metaphorically, almost anything is possible given the proper context. However, 
the patterns described here, being based on corpus data, have been used in 
real-world speech and text and thus represent a more realistic snapshot of 
language use.  
Most often, semantic themes are predicated as SA event adjuncts,  
 
67. …soon I found myself in deeper waters.  
(COCA:2003.ACAD.AmerScholar).  
 
In (67), in deeper waters is the situational perception/experience for 
Self-Awareness. Sometimes, however, the semantic theme was more elusive, 
and the broader context was needed to recover the thematic reference. For 
example, in many instances the theme was stated outright, as in (68)  
 
68. So I lost myself in the oils and condiments of my well-stocked kitchen.  
(COCA: LOSE: #6, 1996, FIC:Bk:BeachMusic) 
 
But sometimes the semantic theme was not easily recoverable, as in (69): 
 
69. …and I lost myself in it. (COCA:LOSE #17:2000, FIC:Esquire) 
 
In these cases, the whole context was referenced, shown in (70): 
 
70 (69). It was work—simple, repetitive, nonintellectual—and I lost myself in  
it.   (COCA:LOSE #17:2000, FIC:Esquire) 
 
6.4.1. [find + oneself + ?] 
 
In the COCA corpus, there were no particular semantic themes that 
dominated. In frequency order, mental actions as well as situations had a 17% 
occurrence rate, followed closely by a 13% hit rate for both physical actions and 
locations. Mental states were instantiated 12% of the total. The semantic 
theme thinking (including considering, and wondering) hit 10% and talking 
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(including debating, explaining, etc.) each hit 8%. In final frequency position, 
gov’t-related situations such as ‘on the defensive’ and ‘at the breaking point’ hit 
3% of the time. 
The BNC corpus showed a different profile from the COCA. The 
dominating theme was situations with a 36% occurrence rate, followed by 
physical actions with 22%, locations and mental actions at 11% each, talking 
(including speaking, arguing, and muttering etc.) hit 8%, thinking occurred 6% 
of the time, and in finally was mental state at 5%.  
 
6.4.2. [lose + oneself + ?] 
 
In the COCA, losing oneself ‘in media (including pictures, books, music, 
etc.) occurred 17%. Watching, (including gazing, etc.) and passion/love were 
next in frequency at 11.%. The semantic theme thinking (including thoughts, 
ideas, etc.) occurred 10%, and work/study hit 4%. In the BNC, passion/love hit 
18.7%, followed by media at 12.5%. All other instances hit only one time each. 
Summarizing this section on semantic themes, preliminary data 
suggests that the types of things that are the focus of Awareness are not 
random. Although human imagination can create almost anything to be 
focused on by Awareness, it seems from the data gathered here that this is not 
the case. Semantic themes tend to recur, and they can be broadly categorized.  
 
7. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
This research presented theoretical arguments based on Cognitive 
Grammar and conceptual metaphor theory that English metaphorical reflexive 
expressions of Self-Awareness, in the forms of find and lose oneself, are cases of 
target-in-source metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002) that occur within a 
broader phenomenon, metaphor from metonymy (Goossens, 2002). In other 
words, the reflexive pronoun functions as a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy, 
standing for the specific cognitive function of Self-Awareness. This metonymy 
occurs within a reflexive event construed metaphorically, i.e., the emergence or 
lack of Self-Awareness, expressed by way of cross-domain mapping of 
entailments of [FIND] and [LOSE] such that [FINDING ONESELF IS HAVING 
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SELF-AWARENESS] and [LOSING ONESELF IS HAVING HAD 
SELF-AWARENESS]. Corpus data supports this evaluation and provides 
evidence that SA events are an independent phenomenon, semantically and 
environmentally distinct from the literal use and other similar metaphorical 
events such as the ‘true-self ’ metaphor and ‘Picture Noun’ expressions. The 
embodied, cognitive function of Self-Awareness is pointed to here as the base 
concept for both the metonym and the metaphor, strongly supporting the 
proposal that the cognitive state of Self-Awareness is an image schema (i.e., 
basic domain). As such, it motivates construal and predication and is 
implemented as a base concept in a variety of metaphorical cases.  
 
7.1 Future Research Avenues and Module 3 
  
Some further avenues of research for this topic are to discover the 
specific conditions and environments that motivate or are motivated by 
Self-Awareness. This corpus-based research will begin with an analysis of the 
reflexive construction, specifically, recovering instances of predicates and their 
various construals that occur within the reflexive construction. Environmental 
and semantic patterns will likely emerge from the data and will be analyzed 
and categorized. This will reveal insights into the conception of the reflexive 
construction itself, and some of the collocational conditions in which it is used. 
From this, candidates for SA events will be proposed and explored in detail. 
Corpus analysis from each of these categories will likely reveal that 
Self-Awareness is cognitively real and used as an ‘image schema’ (i.e. ‘basic 
domain’) for a significant number of predications in English. Furthermore, this 
research will reveal the specific collocational environments in which SA events 
occur, providing support that SA events have a different semantic and 
collocational profile from other construals such as the literal, the ‘true self ’, 
and the ‘psychodynamic reflexive causative’, etc.  
When complete, this research will help strengthen the hypothesis that 
concept and construal play a crucial and inter-dependent role in predication 
and phrase structure formation, and that many basic domain concepts that 
display seemingly polysemous predications actually have individual, distinct 
collocational and semantic profiles that can be delineated and categorized. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
A unique, corpus-based methodology was created to determine reflexive construction 
metaphoricity. The method was able to retrieve metaphorically-expressed verbs, which were 
input into the verb slot of the reflexive construction in two online corpora. Results of the 
analysis show that some verbs have the ability to metaphorically construe different aspects of 
the self, one of them being perceptual self-awareness. The precise onset of perceptual self-
awareness is usually sudden, reflected in the semantics of each of the verbs. This unexpected 
suddenness is a prime conceptual environment to cradle the construal of Self-Awareness as it 
emerges in cognition.  
Even though polysemy seems inherent within the data, corpus analysis shows that each 
has a unique collocational environment that helps delineate and differentiate collocational 
distinctions that can be supported by context in the form of the Focus of Awareness (FoA), i.e., 
the focus of the perceptual experience. Corpus data show that the FoA is a non-adjunctive, 
mandatory part of the conception. Data retrieval and analysis of collocational environments 
surrounding these metaphoric constructions are shown to be necessary components of this 
research methodology as a way to clarify fuzzy and/or borderline construals as they occur in 
actual language usage. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and purpose of the research 
 
The old grey donkey, Eeyore stood by himself in a thistly corner of the Forest, his front 
feet well apart, his head on one side, and thought about things. Sometimes he thought 
sadly to himself, "Why?" and sometimes he thought, "Wherefore?" and sometimes he 
thought, "Inasmuch as which?" and sometimes he didn't quite know what he was 
thinking about. (Milne, 1926, p. 11) 
 
Linguistic research sometimes seems to totter on the precipice of Eeyore-hood, meaning that 
in the search for more and more explicit explanations and explications, we sometimes lose 
ourselves in the lingua-stratum and need to catch ourselves, take a few long, deep breaths, and 
find ourselves again. The current research attempts to do just that, i.e., to clarify and exemplify, 
by way of corpus analyses, the theories and ideas presented in Modules 1 and 2. In particular, 
this research presents corpus data and analyses of Self-Aware Events, defined as reflexive 
events which metaphorically construe Perceptual and Situational Self-Awareness. It will 
demonstrate conceptual subtlety and ambiguity but also uncover structure and order within that 
‘fuzziness’. Numerous examples and contexts will be analyzed in order to specify the precise 
metaphorical construal of that ephemeral mental state called Self-Awareness when predicated 
within the reflexive construction. 
The rationale for the present research is based on the need to concretely delineate the 
construal of Self-Awareness in expressions such as [NP + find/catch/lose + x-self]. Many 
aspects of the reflexive construction and its various meanings have been explored in detail in 
the literature from various perspectives, but Self-Awareness is rarely mentioned, and when it 
is, details are lacking, are purely intuitive, or fail to account for a wide breadth and depth of 
data. For this reason, the corpus inquiries in Chapters 2 through 4 are analyses of these three 
constructions discussed theoretically in Modules 1 and 2. Can these expressions be objectively 
and precisely delineated and evidenced by corpus data as described in those analyses? In other 
words, is there corpus evidence to support those theoretical proposals? In order to answer this, 
the current research first examines how to, fundamentally, identify metaphorical construal and 
predications within the reflexive construction. It explores methodological issues for 
identification, retrieval and analyses of metaphor in a linguistic corpus and examines 
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collocational contexts in an effort to understand the role that they play in the metaphor’s 
construal and predication. This research, then, is basically a bottom-up endeavor beginning 
with corpus data retrieval and analysis and concluding with hypotheses based on those analyses. 
Before taking up these specific inquiries, however, a brief recapitulation of the theoretical 
background is necessary. 
Module 1 explored different aspects of the reflexive construction with regard to two 
questions: 1) How is Self-Awareness expressed through metaphorically-construed reflexive 
constructions? and 2) Can the construal and predication of SA Events be semantically 
delineated and categorized? Answers to these questions were explored through semantic 
analyses related to the notion of expectation as well as diachronic and synchronic motivations 
of transitivity. It was claimed there that Self-Awareness, as metaphorically construed and 
predicated within the reflexive construction, be defined as awareness of one’s perceptions, 
where perception is defined as the direct physical and/or mental reaction to stimuli. This meta-
perception was seen to be the fundamental semantic entailment and intention for the Self-
Aware Event, specifically predicated by the metaphorically-construed verbs find/lose/catch + 
x-self. It was stated there that, “SA events refer to the knowledge of an experience, not the 
visceral/psychological experience itself” (Module 2, p. 11).  
The notion of coreference was also discussed in relation to SA Events. “Accounting for 
SA events necessitates a precise definition of reflexive argument relations and their semantic 
functions” (Module 1, pp. 16-17). This was illustrated by way of the following three examples 
(numbering reflects original text): 
 
 1.1. (45) John made himself a tuna sandwich. 
 1.2. (46) John made himself go to the gym. 
 1.3. (47) John made himself completely invisible. 
 
The reflexive object pronouns in the examples above all have different semantic functions, and 
this level of distinction was found to be necessary for delineating the parameters of SA Events. 
The notion of transitivity was also shown to be necessary for delineating these kinds of 
subtleties. The polysemy of the verbs find, lose, and catch, when contained within the reflexive 
construction, cannot be accounted for by syntactic analyses alone. An analysis in which a more 
semantic and gradient notion of transitivity is proposed allows SA Events to be understood as 
occurring closer to ‘middle transitivity’ in two ways; first, that the object of the event is an 
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unexpected self, (predicated by way of the reflexive pronoun), and second, that a lack of 
concrete action is performed on a prototypical ‘other’ (i.e., that a low-action verb affects a 
‘non-other’ self). SA Events were concluded to be low-transitive reflexive events occurring 
between middle and prototypical reflexive events, where “the reflexive pronoun signals an 
unexpected, non-other-directed…emergent action of the verb within the initiator/affected 
composite” (Module 1, p. 24, 46). 
In the Cognitive Linguistic-influenced analysis of Module 2, it was seen that SA Events 
instantiate a metonymy within metaphor (Goossens, 2002), where the overall reflexive event is 
a metaphoric construal of emergence (or lack) of perceptual Self-Awareness centered around 
the verbs find and lose, while the reflexive object pronoun in particular construes a target-in-
source metonymy (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002). In other words, for Self-Aware Events, 
the reflexive pronoun displays an intra-domain, whole-for-part metonymic relationship to the 
specific mental function of perceptual Self-Awareness, and this metonymy is construed within 
the larger metaphor, i.e., Finding Oneself Is Having Self-Awareness and Losing Oneself Is 
Having Had Self-Awareness. Self-Awareness, in the embodied, perceptual sense, was proposed 
to be an image schema (Lakoff, Johnson (1987)) or basic domain (Langacker (1987), Croft 
(1993)). It is this specific image schema that was proposed as the conceptual base for the Self-
Aware Event.  
Along those lines, it had been suggested 1  that the conceptual mappings FIND IS 
KNOW and LOSE IS HAVING KNOWN from Module 2 is counterintuitive because source 
domain concepts are usually concrete, whereas KNOW is an abstract concept. This 
complication arises, perhaps, due to the type of knowledge involved. As proposed below, the 
knowledge referred to here, i.e., Self-Awareness, is an embodied, perceptual knowledge that 
emerges directly from sensory information, and as such, it is a more tangible and concrete 
concept than, for example, knowing the distance of the Earth from the Sun. For lose, there is 
an additional temporal factor involved, where Self-Awareness previously existed but does so 
no longer. In other words, the experiencer had awareness but does not now. In this way, the 
fundamental conception for the source domain is proposed as knowing, and when used 
reflexively, knowing what we know (or not knowing what we once knew). 
Module 2 presented three main theoretical arguments in order to explain SA Events; 1) 
the definition of Self-Awareness, 2) the delineation of metaphor and metonymy in general, 3) 
                                                
1 I am grateful to Zoltan Kövecses, Andrew Goatly, and Ad Foolen for their comments on this research 
presented at “Metaphor: Retrospects and Prospects”, at the University of Genoa, Italy, in June, 2016.  
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theoretical explanations of metaphorical reflexivity by way of Cognitive Grammar (CG) 
(Langacker, 1987), the Divided-Self Metaphor (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992; G. Lakoff, 1996; 
Talmy, 2003), and the Awareness Onset Model (J. Grady, 2005). In that research, Self-
Awareness was specifically defined as, “the embodied cognitive function of conscious meta-
perceptual insight; in other words, the conscious realization of one’s own physical, emotional, 
and/or mental reaction(s) to perceptions of interior and/or exterior stimuli” (Module 2, p. 4). 
This specific definition was deemed necessary to distinguish it from other, more common 
senses of the term. The term metaphor was also defined, and the differences between literary, 
linguistic and conceptual metaphor were discussed. The difficulties in delineating precisely 
what is meant by the foundational components domain and image schema were also examined. 
It was concluded that the original meaning of image schema by Lakoff & Johnson (1999) be 
retained and implemented, as stated by Grady, “…the most useful way of understanding image 
schemas is to see them as mental representations of fundamental units of sensory experience…” 
(2005, p. 44). This definition of image schema proves useful, as Self-Awareness is defined as 
one of these “fundamental units of sensory experience”. Because Self-Awareness is developed 
at a very young age, is embodied and so ingrained as to be mostly subconscious, I proposed 
that it be considered an image schema that can function as the base for other, higher-order or 
more complex metaphors. This image-schema-type awareness was schematized by Grady and 
Johnson (2012) who proposed an exact point of the onset of awareness (Module 2, p. 15). This 
model was also adapted for Self-Aware Events (Module 2, p.16, also see section 5.2.2 below). 
 Module 2 also examined Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1987) and proposed possible 
theoretical explanations for the metaphors occurring in SA Events. An original example given 
by Langacker (ibid.), The man found the cat, was analyzed and shown to have both search and 
non-search senses. Because of this, a base-level construal for [FIND] was proposed as 
[PERCEPTUAL AWARENESS OF A THING OR RELATION]. This having been set, CG 
schematic representations of both senses of [FIND] as well as [LOSE] were then presented. 
The discussion then turned its attention to reflexive construction cases in which [FIND] and 
[LOSE] were predicated. Subjectification, specifically the egocentric viewing arrangement, 
was deemed relevant to SA Events, defined as “instances where S (conceptualizer) is 
specifically concerned with SELF and consequently functions as both the conceptualizer and 
an object of conceptualization” (Langacker, 1985, pp. 123, my parenthesis). Find x-self and 
lose x-self were analyzed according to CG criteria. It was concluded that “CG schematic 
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representations can delineate the subtleties of SA Events; however, implementation can be 
intricate and the resulting description quite opaque” (Module 2, p. 32).  
SA Events were then analyzed by way of the Divided Self, “where one part of the mind 
is ‘at odds’ with or ‘exerts force upon’ another part of the mind/body…” (Module 2, p. 33). 
Within this broad conception is one specific type of Divided Self called Psychodynamics 
(Talmy, 2001) and a more specific phenomenon called coreferential causative constructions 
(Gilquin, 2010), in which causative Divided-Self events work within the predication of 
reflexive constructions. This will be examined again here in Chapter 4 for catch x-self as well 
as briefly in section 6.2 for check x-self. It was concluded in Module 2 that although 
psychodynamics is common and covers a wide-range of conceptions, SA Events construe a 
more non-dualistic conception, i.e., that of self-awareness emerging (for find x-self), and self-
awareness temporarily lacking (for lose x-self). It was conceded there, however, that due to the 
conceived duality of the actual cognitive state of self-awareness (i.e., Self-aware-of-self), “the 
precise construal of SA Events still remains vague” (Module 2, p. 37). 
 Definitions and conceptual mappings for metaphor and metonymy were also discussed, 
and SA Events were concluded to consist of both types. Metonymy was construed by way of 
the reflexive pronoun, where a WHOLE FOR PART (or target-in-source (Ruiz de Mendoza & 
Díez, 2002)) type of metonymy occurred in which the pronoun (WHOLE) stands for (i.e., intra-
domain mapping) the mental state of self-awareness (PART). Metaphorical construal is 
comprised of the cross-domain mapping of the verb and the predication as a whole, i.e., 
FINDING/LOSING IS AWARENESS/LACK OF AWARENESS. Five steps are involved 
with this complex metaphor (not necessarily in order). These are: 
 
a. THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS 
b. MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS 
c. OBJECTS CAN BE FOUND OR LOST 
d. SELF-AWARENESS IS A MENTAL STATE 
e. Therefore, SELF-AWARENESS IS AN OBJECT THAT CAN BE FOUND OR 
LOST. 
  
It was concluded that because the reflexive pronoun was metonymically construed, and this 
takes place within the confines of the larger metaphor (which is also part of the construction), 
the event is the type of phenomenon aptly called Metonymy within Metaphor (Goossens, 2002).  
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Lastly, a precursory corpus analysis was conducted and results were discussed. Due to 
the in-depth nature and improvement of the methodology of the present research, however, the 
details of the previous analysis will not be commented upon in detail here. In a nutshell, for the 
brief corpus analysis in Module 2, it had already been assumed that there was a metaphorical 
phenomenon called ‘SA Event’, having theoretically described it. This approach is inadequate 
for the present inquiry, as theoretical assumptions may taint objectivity. This research hopes to 
rectify this, and aspires to address a general methodological issue of whether or not 
metaphoricity can be objectively identified, observed and evidenced in a corpus. 
It is in the light of the previous research that the present investigation has been 
undertaken. Specifically, it was considered vital that the theoretical claims made in Modules 1 
and 2 be evidenced by objective data. Without this, justification for the claims made there 
seemed shallow, even if intuitively warranted.  Considering the vast amount of corpus data 
now readily available and the functionality of modern user interfaces, quantitative and 
qualitative validation (or not) for the hypotheses proposed in Modules 1 and 2 should be readily 
obtainable. Using a quasi-corpus-driven approach, answers to the three research questions 
guide the present inquiry; 1) How can metaphoric events be identified and delineated within 
the reflexive construction, 2) Within the reflexive construction, do Self-Aware Events and 
other metaphors display unique collocational patterning, and if so, are these patterns 
predictable? and 3) Do the results corroborate or refute the theoretical claims made in Modules 
1 and 2?  
For this investigation, data from both the British National Corpus (BNC XML Edition, 
2007) and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies, 2008) are examined. This 
research proposes a unique method of corpus research methodology for metaphor retrieval and 
analysis that is proved useful in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The results uncover a 
wealth of information and allow for coarse- and fine-grained analyses. This method begins 
with the query, “What verbs are instantiated within the reflexive construction?” In this respect, 
it is methodologically similar to collostructional analysis in that the search “always starts with 
a particular construction and investigates which lexemes are strongly attracted or repelled by a 
particular slot in the construction…” (Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2003, p. 214). This is followed 
by the question, “Which of the verbs that appear in the reflexive construction are used 
metaphorically and how can this be evidenced?” Once metaphorically-construed verbs are 
objectively identified, they are grouped into categories based on the semantics of the verbs. It 
is only at this point in the process that possible verbs that metaphorically express Self-
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Awareness are identified. These verbs are then analyzed, token by token, with an effort to 
‘allow the data to speak to the researcher’, as it were. In other words, an effort was made to 
keep theoretical assumptions to a minimum. It is at this stage that Self-Aware Events are 
positively identified, and as shown below, many unpredictable results also emerge, confirming 
the method as a productive tool for uncovering under-specified and undetermined conceptions 
and construal.  
It has been noticed that corpus retrieval of metaphors is “almost impossible for the 
simple reason that conceptual mappings are not linked to particular linguistic forms” 
(Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2007, p. 2). This basically refers to corpus-based metaphor studies 
that mine data using metaphoric SOURCE conceptions as their input search parameters. 
However, the present research methodology overcomes these disadvantages by first limiting 
itself to the reflexive construction, an easily-searchable syntactic parameter. Second, the 
method searches for metaphoric cross-mappings by objectively identifying TARGET domain 
samples, and only then are SOURCE domain mappings proposed, analyzed and categorized 
according to semantic content, context and collocational patterning. In this way, the method 
provides a way to uncover previously undetermined and underspecified metaphoric SOURCE 
data. This method has proven to be advantageous, resulting in a number of important findings, 
the details of which are presented in the next section.   
 
1.2 Metaphor Identification Method 
 
The process of distinguishing between literal and metaphorical expressions is clearly 
the most basic and crucial stage in any study of the nature and patterning of metaphors 
in language, and is therefore fundamental to any attempt to extrapolate conceptual 
metaphors from linguistic data (Heywood, Semino, & Short, 2002, p. 35).  
 
The procedure adopted (and adapted) for this research for determining and analyzing possible 
metaphors mined from corpora are based on the Pragglejaz Group’s key operational procedures 
from the Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP). “…the purpose of MIP is to provide a 
procedure that starts from the actual discourse, and inductively builds the case for why a 
particular word was used metaphorically in context” (Group, 2007, p. 34). However, I have not 
adopted this process in its entirety. Only its basic methodology is used here, providing a 
simplified decision-making tool for distinguishing between metaphoric and literal use of a 
word and phrase. It differs from the MIP in that a strict adherence to analyzing the data with 
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respect to linguistic propositions has been forgone, in other words, an expression’s truth value 
is not taken into account. This is due to this research not being directly concerned with the non-
human, computational processing of the literal vs metaphor nor linguistic vs conceptual 
metaphor distinction. Interpretation and analyzation of metaphor by the reader/hearer is 
considered a necessary function of metaphor comprehension. In agreement with Goatly (2002) 
and Gibbs (2002), human conceptual processing is always necessary when deciding between 
linguistic and process metaphors. For the purposes of metaphor identification, proposing an 
artificially created dichotomy between these such as some propositional level of metaphor is 
therefore unnecessary. Furthermore, and in line with comments by Kövecses (2002), the level 
at which semantic propositions are proposed for text analysis (in the MIP) is different from that 
of the standard analyses of conceptual metaphor, whether the data is taken from corpus sources 
or not.  
This research is specifically concerned with efficient methods for mining and analyzing 
collocational patterns that instantiate metaphoric use. More specifically, a procedure was 
needed for deciding relevant cross-domain mappings of target domain samples taken from 
large corpora.  Thus, I have omitted some details of the MIP version of text analysis (and its 
reliance on propositions (Crisp, 2002; Heywood et al., 2002; Steen, 2002)) and incorporated 
only the essential procedures that make data retrieval and analysis more systematic and reliable. 
For this research, the most recent version of the MIP, called the Metaphor Identification 
Procedure Vrije Universiteit (aka MIPVU) was used as a foundational framework. It is a more 
encompassing and intuitive version (Steen et al., 2010) in which the following 6-step guideline 
is recommended for the identification of metaphors within a text:  
 
1. Find metaphor-related words (MRWs) by examining the text on a word by word basis. 
2. When a word is used indirectly and that use may potentially be explained by some form of 
cross-domain mapping from a more basic meaning of that word, mark the word as 
metaphorically used (MRW). 
3. When a word is used directly and its use may potentially be explained by some form of cross-
domain mapping to a more basic referent or topic in the text, mark the word as direct metaphor 
(MRW, direct). 
4. When words are used for the purpose of lexico-grammatical substitution, such as third person 
personal pronouns, or when ellipsis occurs where words may be seen as missing, as in some 
forms of co-ordination, and when a direct or indirect meaning is conveyed by those 
substitutions or ellipses that may potentially be explained by some form of cross-domain 
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mapping from a more basic meaning, referent, or topic, insert a code for implicit metaphor 
(MRW, implicit). 
5. When a word functions as a signal that a cross-domain mapping may be at play, mark it as a 
metaphor flag (MFlag). 
6. When a word is a new-formation coined, examine the distinct words that are its independent 
parts according to steps 2 through 5.” 
 (Steen et al., 2010, pp. 25-26) 
 
Because not all of the above steps are necessary and/or relevant for the present objectives, the 
following steps were employed for delineating metaphorical use within reflexive events (once 
potential verbs have been identified, see section 1.5): 
 
1. Reflexive construction parameters are input into the corpus search field, with the verb slot 
‘open’ or ‘filled’ by the researcher. 
2. Check the retrieved data for 1) antecedent-pronoun consistency (noun1 + verb + refl. pro1), 
2) reflexive meaning (i.e., compared to emphatic, benefactive or logographic, etc.), and 3) 
missing antecedents or pronouns (ellipses). 
3. Check data for metaphor-related words (MRWs) by examining the text on a word by word 
basis by referencing ‘base’ meanings in a corpus-based dictionary (as per MIPVU). 
4. If a word’s use is considered metaphorical, analyze TARGET à SOURCE mappings.  
5. Find contextual and/or collocational evidence corroborating the mapping in #4. 
6. Analyze data statistically and confirm results. 
 
From the above six procedures, only number three is the same as the MIPVU. Original MIPVU 
procedures one and two were combined and cross-domain plausibility checks were limited to 
the reflexive verb, anaphoric NP, and the reflexive’s immediate adjuncts (called the FoA, see 
section 1.4. below). Procedure number two was added to distinguish reflexive from non-
reflexive anaphors as well as to confirm antecedent-pronoun agreement. The decision to 
perform this procedure at this time was more practical than theoretical. Simply, it was more 
efficient to weed out the non-reflexive, non-anaphoric elements of tokens before proceeding 
with the more time-consuming metaphoric identification and analyses. For procedure number 
four, various metaphorical interpretations were possible for many tokens in the data, and it was 
critical to remain open to all possible interpretations. This was sometimes difficult, and the 
expanded context of tokens were consulted frequently. Procedure number five was added in 
order to confirm collocational and broader contextual evidence when encountering ambiguous 
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metaphorical interpretations. Although this was time consuming, it allowed for more objective 
judgements to be made for metaphorical interpretation. Finally, in step six, the data is analyzed 
statistically and the results are categorized according to parameters set by the researcher. 
 
1.3 Corpus Research Method 
 
This research makes use of two corpora, the British National Corpus (BNC), ("The British 
National Corpus (BNC XML Edition), 2007)     comprised of 100 million words, and the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) (Davies, 2008), currently comprised of 
over 500 million words. The web interface used for both was the corpus query interface at 
Brigham Young University. By using data from both corpora, a more encompassing and 
balanced data set was able to be analyzed. Although this could not eliminate all the 
idiosyncrasies of collected works inherent in any corpus, it was hoped that the strength of each 
corpus would add statistical value to the research by including two regions whose native 
language is English as well as different registers contained within the corpora themselves. 
Although there are many statistical tests used for corpus analysis, the Fisher Exact test 
of independence was used here as a variable relations significance test, with corpus frequency 
ratios2 used as input values, rounded to the nearest whole number. Although the related Chi 
Square test is also common, the Fisher test “neither makes any distributional assumptions nor 
does it require any particular sample size” (Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2003, p. 218). Further, 
although t- and Z-scores can show relative significance along a single parameter (such as 
relative frequency) within a corpus, Fisher Exact tests show relations between two or more sets 
of data and whether there is attraction or repulsion of one lexeme with regard to the 
collostruction to which it is compared (ibid.) Because the current research attempts to find the 
relational significances of different semantic construals within the reflexive construction, the 
Fisher Exact test was considered the most appropriate tool for this endeavor. 
In this way, corpus research supports theoretical and intuitive research by adding a level 
of significance in use, a parameter that assigns weight value to an expression as used in society. 
But it still stands that this data must be analyzed by human eyes, with a human mind 
knowledgeable in the language and the patterns being analyzed. Patterns can be found by a 
computer program, but these patterns need meaning. Statistics can help to uncover hard-to-find 
                                                
2 In general, frequency ratios (i.e., percentages) were used as the input values of the significance tests due to the 
different total items among the corpora (for cross-corpora analyses) and among the pronoun data sets (for intra-
corpora analyses). When raw frequencies are used, it is duly noted. 
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patterns and trends, but exceptions to these often also reveal fascinating insights. It is to this 
general end, then, that this research attempts to combine this more straightforward, transparent 
method of corpus analysis with the human factor necessary (in the present era, at least) for the 
analysis of metaphor.  
 
1.4 Preliminary Corpus Analysis and Methodological Considerations 
 
For this first step, the COCA and BNC corpora were mined with the search parameters [v*] 
[ppx*], (i.e., any verb lemma followed by any reflexive pronoun).3 The 500 most frequent verb 
lemmas with a minimum hit value of 10 (i.e., ≥10) were collected. The 500th-ranked verb had 
a frequency of 16 in the COCA, and 18 in the BNC. Next, reciprocals (i.e., [v*] [each], 
[v*][one]) were deleted, leaving 462 total hits in the COCA and 468 in the BNC. A cross-
corpora comparison was then conducted and a list of common verbs was created (see Appendix 
1). The motivation for this cross-corpora comparison is that it lessens the influence of region-
specific varieties of English.4 Each of the verb lemmas from this data was then entered into 
each of the respective corpus search engines in order to retrieve tokens of that particular verb 
within the reflexive construction, e.g., [find][ppx*]. If more than 100 hits were retrieved for 
any pronoun group (i.e., myself, himself, etc.), a random sample5 (n=100) was chosen for the 
analysis. The results were then checked for metaphoric instantiation in a corpus-based 
dictionary, as per the methodology discussed in Section 1.2. 
As described above, metaphoricity was determined according to criterion number two 
established in Section 1.2. At this stage, the potential for metaphoricity, not the specific 
cognitive mappings nor motivations for those mappings, was determined. If a token was 
suspected of being used metaphorically, a corpus-based dictionary was consulted (LDOCE, 
2014) to determine the verb’s ‘base’ or ‘literal’ meaning. Because metaphors are often syntax-
sensitive6, the syntax of the data was preserved for the dictionary consultation. All conceptually 
ambiguous tokens were compared with dictionary definitions to ensure data accuracy and 
                                                
3 Another interesting line of research is the construction [n*/p*][v*][_i*][ppx*], or [NP + VP + PP + Prorefl], 
where a preposition occurs before the reflexive pronoun, as in John believed in himself. However, due to space 
constraints, this will have to be set aside for a future endeavor.   
4 Although a fully international data set of all native (and non-native) varieties of English is ideal, it is beyond 
the scope of this research. 
5 The data sample is truly random, according to Davies, “…a routine in SQL Server randomly assigns a number 
to each one, and then I just take the top 100 or so, based on those random numbers” (2016). 
6 A simple example of this is the word dog. When used metaphorically as a noun, it means a man with low 
moral values, as in He’s a dog, but when used as a verb, it means to pursue with intensity, for example, The 
police dogged the criminal. 
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objectivity. In some cases, these were not easy decisions. For example, when the physical, 
concrete meaning of a verb was archaic and currently not well entrenched in contemporary 
meaning, that meaning was not considered a ‘base’ for the metaphor, because metaphoricity 
involves some sort of comparison to ‘normal use’ (Langacker, 1987). If that ‘normal’ use is 
not part of a person’s working cognitive lexicon, there can be no cross-domain mapping 
comparison from which to draw. If, however, a ‘base’ meaning and ‘figurative’ meaning 
comprised a fairly obvious cross-domain mapping, the instance was marked metaphoric. 
Admittedly, this is not as cut and dry as it seems, but the utmost effort was made to ensure 
reliability and consistency throughout the data by adhering to published (i.e., dictionary) 
sources. 
One issue that arose during this stage was whether or not post-predicate (adjunct) verbal 
constructions were phrasal verbs or verb + preposition, and whether to count these as 
metaphoric or not. The corpus-based dictionary was consulted here as well, and verb + 
preposition was considered a single phrasal verb (and metaphoric if it displayed cross-domain 
mapping.) This choice was motivated by the way these phrasal verbs were subcategorized 
under the main verb listing, i.e., one complete meaning sense within a subset of the main 
meaning. 
Lastly, tokens were analyzed and categorized according to metaphoric sense. Shown 
below, the surrounding linguistic contexts (i.e., collocations) proved invaluable as a decision-
making resource. When context was directly related to a construction’s meaning under analysis 
and was deemed a necessary semantic component of the construction, it was labelled Focus of 
Awareness (hereafter FoA), a label that conveys the conception under immediate consideration 
for the construction. For Self-Aware Events, the FoA is the Conceptual Object of Self-
Awareness. In other cases, it is the object referred to by the metaphor. Shown in the examples 
below, the main metaphoric components are in bold, and the FoAs are underlined.  
 
1.4. Wade finds himself feeling like the papa bear to a bunch of frisky cubs.  
(COCA:2009.MAG.SportsIll) 
 
 1.5. How ironic that her eulogy found itself in an issue whose lead articles treat  
the evils of tobacco…     (COCA:1998.MAG.America) 
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In the first example, labelled SA Event, what is Wade aware of (i.e., what does he find?) He is 
distinctly aware of his paternal feelings. This is the Focus of the Awareness (FoA). In the 
second example, categorized as a Picture Noun Schema (Kuno, 1987), what is being noticed 
or realized (i.e., found)? It is that the eulogy was written in a certain issue of a magazine or 
newspaper. In all examples provided in the present research, the relevant metaphor is put in 
boldface and the FoA is underlined. 
One general complication at this stage arose because decisions needed to be made from 
only one line of text (i.e., the token). In many cases, there were no obvious or predicated 
referents for the metaphor and/or the FoA. In these cases, the token’s expanded context, 
consisting of approximately 180 words of text, was consulted, and in most cases, this resolved 
the uncertainty. “Any instance of language depends on its surrounding context. The details of 
choice shown in any segment of a text depend – some of them—on choices made elsewhere in 
the text, and so no example is ever complete unless it is a whole text” (John Sinclair, 1991, p. 
5). Reference to longer and more complete contexts led to more accurate and confident 
decisions about the FoA, the metaphoricity of the construction, and thus, the reliability of the 
analyses and results therein. 
 
1.5 Results  
 
A total of 67 metaphorically-construed verb lemmas concurred with the procedural criteria 
described above and were instantiated in both the COCA and BNC. 42 verbs were evaluated 
as non-metaphorical. There were 12 metaphorically-construed verbs whose ‘base’ meanings 
were difficult to assign due to the high number and variety of metaphorical and non-
metaphorical senses, as well as a few of them functioning as auxiliary verbs. These verbs were: 
do, get, give, have, hold, keep, make, put, set, take, and turn. These verbs were eliminated from 
the analysis. The remaining data were grouped into four metaphorical and six non-metaphorical 
semantic categories. These categories were not predetermined, although they occasionally 
overlap with established verb categorizations (see: Levin, 1993). The present data-based 
categorization procedure was determined necessary to ensure consistency for the current 
research methodology. Shown below are the four metaphorically conceived categories (verbs 
listed alphabetically, category marker in parenthesis). 
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1. Self-Perception (P): be, catch, check, feel, find, identify, immerse, lose, 
perceive, regard, see, watch 
2. Self-Causation (F)*: assert, bring, catch, check, drag, draw, drive, fling, 
force, hang, haul, help, kill, launch, lock, pull, push, resign, set, shake, steel, 
throw, work 
3. Societal Interaction (SI): align, attach, behave, call, commit, distance, 
distinguish, establish, excuse, expose, express, identify, involve, lend, lower, 
present, prove, raise, sell, show, suit 
4. Self-Maintenance (M): brace, compose, feed, help, resolve, save, settle, 
shoot, support, treat, watch, wrap 
 
* (F) stands for ‘Force-dynamic’ conception. 
 
Listed below are the six non-metaphorical conceptual categories. 
 
1. Sense-Perception & Physicality (P’): hear, know, manifest, seat, sit 
2. Self-Causation (F’): allow, busy, calm, let, steady, stop, will 
3. Social Interaction (SI’): avail, extricate, identify, introduce, reveal, concern 
4. Self-Communication (C): ask, blame, remind, repeat, teach, tell  
5. Self-Judgement (J): believe, fancy, feel, hate, imagine, pride, think, trust 
6. Self-Maintenance (M’): calm, ease, enjoy, prepare, rid, organize, protect, steady, 
surround, transform 
 
A few verbs construed more than one category, such as catch and check. In these cases, 
the verbs were counted once for each category due to unique conceptions being construed for 
each of the predications. 
 
1.6  Verbs of Self-Perception 
  
Metaphoric and non-metaphoric categories having been determined, the question of types of 
construal may now be addressed. Specifically, is Self-Awareness metaphorically construed and 
predicated within the reflexive construction? The categorization procedures above were 
necessary to identify verbs that might convey this meaning, with as little subjective interference 
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as possible. Likely candidates for construed Self-Awareness are found among the first 
metaphorical category, Self-Perception (P). This category comprises TARGET-SOURCE, 
cross-domain mappings referring to one’s physical, mental, or spiritual perceptions. All of the 
verbs in this category use sense perceptions as well as cognition and ontology as their SOURCE 
domains. Admittedly, ontology is not traditionally used in a perceptual sense, but here it is 
warranted, the reason being that in many cases, the true nature of one’s being comes under 
consideration, as in the ‘True-Self’ or ‘Loss-of-Self’ metaphors (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992; G. 
Lakoff, 1996) discussed in Module 2 and below (see Chapters 2 and 3). From this category (P), 
the verbs that have their SOURCE domains in sense perceptions are be, catch, check, feel, find, 
identify, immerse, lose, perceive, regard, see, and watch. The task now is to concretely 
determine if any of these metaphorically construe Self-Awareness. It was claimed in Module 
2 (and is repeated here) that Self-Awareness is defined as an image schema or basic domain 
because Self-Awareness is based on direct experience and is not based nor built upon any other 
conception. Self-Awareness can be regarded as a meta-sense perception because the mind 
becomes aware of a specific or total sum of sense perceptions at a particular moment in time. 
The antecedent/pronoun pairs in this category reflect metonymic mappings of the reflexive 
pronoun onto some self-perception, and this synchronizes with the semantics of the reflexive 
construction to reverse the expected action of the predicate object from an ‘other’ onto the 
antecedent itself. Thus, the metaphorical construal of a reflexive construction for which a Self-
Perception verb is predicated may7 describe the Awareness of a particular or gestalt perception, 
i.e., an SA Event. 
 Examples from the metaphoric perceptual verb category above which convey self-
perception are the following: 
 
BE: The metaphoric sense of be oneself means being aware of one’s deep, basic, or ‘real’ Self, 
and then taking some action to establish that Self. 
 1.6. …what you really need to do is let people get to know you, be yourself.  
(COCA:2015.SPOK.CBS) 
 
CHECK: This may take the meaning of self-awareness of one’s action, thought, or situation.  
1.7. But the whole notion of society and manners forces you to check yourself if you 
have those tendencies.     (BNC:ED7.W_pop_lore) 
                                                
7 The modal ‘may’ is used here to convey the polysemy that often occurs within the reflexive construction. 
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This also expresses the meaning of self-causation (Gilquin, 2010; Talmy, 2001), and as such, 
it is also listed under the (F) category. 
1.8. It was as much as Millie could do to check herself from saying,' Oh, I don't  
think I should do that.    (BNC:CK9.W_fict_prose))  
 
FEEL: When used metaphorically, feel is used to convey the meaning of think or believe. 
1.9. And when I’m with the other I just feel myself to be a better person.  
      (BNC:A08.W_fict_prose) 
  
IDENTIFY: When metaphorically expressed, this means to align or understand oneself to be 
similar in some way with a group, person or thing. 
 1.10. Sixty-two percent of respondents identified themselves as either not  
religious or atheist, placing the country behind only China…  
(COCA:2015:NEWS.CSMonitor)  
 
IMMERSE: When metaphorically construed, this means to completely engage one’s efforts in 
some activity. At first glance, this seems to convey the same concept as lose x-self, and the 
activities performed are, in many cases, similar. However, here, even though one is totally 
involved with an activity, there is no loss of other perceptions nor loss of a deeper Self, as seen 
by the examples below. Even when immersed in the various situations, one can still engage 
normally with other people. This is not possible with SA Event lose x-self nor the ‘loss-of-self’ 
metaphor.  
1.11. They visited pubs all over the country, immersing themselves in pub culture -- 
playing darts and drinking with the lads.   (BNC:K1V.W_news_script) 
 
1.12.  I was thinking of ethnography, which means you have to immerse yourself in the 
situation and talk to the people involved like an anthropologist would.   
      (BNC:EC7.W_ac_medicine) 
 
PERCEIVE: This means to think of oneself as… or understand oneself to be some ‘type’ of 
person. 
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1.13. Many women who served in the military don’t perceive themselves as veterans… 
       (COCA:2007.NEWS.CSMonitor) 
  
REGARD: This means to think of oneself as… or understand oneself to be some type of person. 
1.14. …I do not regard myself as disabled, I have a disability…  
(BNC:J9D.S_meeting) 
 
SEE: This means to think of oneself as… or understand oneself to be some type of person. 
1.15. …he began to see himself not as cursed but blessed, …  
(COCA:2013.FIC.ParisRev) 
 
Another meaning is imagining oneself being or doing something. 
1.16. So what sort of targets do you see yourself setting?  
(BNC:KLX.S_meeting) 
 
WATCH: This means be careful and is the only usage besides the literal. This could also be 
put into the Self-Maintenance (M) category due to its meaning of physical or mental caution.  
1.17. Richard jump down. Oh dear. Watch yourself there now.  
(BNC:KB8.S_conv) 
 1.18. And Lightening (horse’s name) is a stubborn as they come. If he doesn’t  
watch himself, he won’t be pulling a carriage for much longer.  
(COCA:2013.FIC.Bk:FlirtingWithTexas)(my parenthesis) 
  
1.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that metaphoric as well as non-metaphoric use can be determined fairly 
objectively and accurately by way of the identification procedure outlined above.  Granted, 
intuitive decisions could not be eliminated completely, but the vast majority of linguistic 
metaphor data could be analyzed by the method and provide enough quasi-corpus-driven data 
to posit systematic semantic categorizations for metaphoric and non-metaphoric use.  
Deepening this line of inquiry, three specific verbs, investigated theoretically at length 
in Modules 1 and 2 and which appear here in the category of metaphoric Self-Perception, are 
discussed in detail below. These verbs frequently construe metaphorical meta-self-perception, 
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i.e., Self-Awareness, when contained within the reflexive construction. These verbs are find, 
lose and catch, the first of which will be dealt with in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FIND X-SELF 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the collocational find x-self and provide evidence that strongly 
suggests that the Self-Awareness is the fundamental conception for the majority of find x-self 
data. This further suggests that Self-Awareness is most likely functioning as an image 
schema (aka basic domain). It will be seen that Self-Aware Events contain two sub-types of 
construal; the Self-Aware type, in which awareness of an experiencer’s internally-based, 
direct perception(s) is described, and the Self-Aware Unexpected Event type, which describes 
the experiencer’s awareness of an externally-initiated, unexpected situation. 
The overall results of the corpus analysis for find x-self points to its construing four 
distinct metaphorical senses; 1) Self-Aware Events, 2) Self-Aware Unexpected Events, 3) 
True-Self Metaphors, and 4) Picture Noun Schemas, as well as literal meanings. This has 
repercussions for semantic and cognitive linguistic analysis, specifically, that Self-Awareness 
can in fact be used as a conceptual anchor, i.e., SOURCE domain concepts, for cross-domain 
TARGET conceptual mappings.  
 
2.2 Self-Aware Events and find x-self  
 
Theoretical issues for SA Events were presented in Modules 1 and 2. In these discussions, two 
points in particular helped clarify the meanings of [find x-self] and possible motivations for its 
use. The first is the semantics of the reflexive construction. It was seen in Module 1 that the 
reflexive pronoun marks an unexpected event, i.e., the self as object for a transitive verb, where 
the prototypical unmarked form takes an object that is ‘other-than-self’ (Faltz, 1985). This 
lexical mirativity (i.e., unexpectedness or surprise) affects the subject’s perceived participation 
in the event (Calude, 2007; Faltz, 1985; Fukaya, 2002; Kemmer, 1993). Reflexivity thus 
weakens the transitivity of the event, drawing it closer to the transitivity found in middle events. 
Barlow (1996), from the standpoint of corpus research, also notes this:  
 
Other verbs that occur frequently with the reflexive in the corpus have what we call 
middle semantics…Many of the middle-like uses of the reflexive are highly idiomatized 
expressions with their own special semantics, such as find myself, consider myself, 
	 25	
control myself, expose myself, and feel myself. These phrases are non-compositional (in 
the sense that the meaning of the phrase is not completely predictable from the meaning 
of the constituent parts) and should be distinguished from the ordinary productive 
reflexive device in English (Barlow, 1996, pp. 7-8). 
 
Barlow’s mention of idiomaticity in line 2 was shown to be comprised of the metaphoricity of 
the overall expression (anchored to the verb), as well as the metonymy of the pronoun, i.e., the 
phenomenon called metonym within metaphor (Goossens, 2002). The second point regarding 
the delineation of SA Events is the denotation of the verb find. It was shown in Module 2 that 
find x-self does not necessarily include a semantic entailment of search, and that a meaning of 
‘non-search’, unexpected or sudden ‘coming upon an object’ is also viable and productive for 
the verb find. The object of this ‘sudden coming upon’ was shown through Conceptual 
Metaphor and Cognitive Grammatical models to be the experiencer’s Self-Awareness, 
metonymically mapped onto the reflexive pronoun. And so, the semantics of find together with 
the semantics of the reflexive event both contribute to the construction find x-self, meaning ‘to 
be aware of oneself’ physically, emotionally, intellectually, and/or situationally. These points 
are briefly mentioned in research by Barlow (1996), as he introduces his schema-based 
approach to grammar (Barlow & Kemmer, 1994). He mentions and provides corpus data on a 
variety of verbs, one of them being the construction vp[find + REFL Participle Phrase]. The 
research presents frequency and t-score statistics to evidence the ubiquity of this construction 
in use. 
 
This preliminary corpus study shows that the verb occurring most frequently with the 
reflexive form is find. The very high frequency of occurrences of the lemma find 
compared with the other verbs in this corpus suggests that the association between find 
and reflexives will be found in the language in general - an association, which has, as far 
as I know, never been mentioned in any discussion of reflexives (Barlow, 1996, p. 8). 
 
The focus of Barlow’s research is the common associations of various components within the 
reflexive construction and what these might mean, providing valuable data and methodology 
upon which more detailed and encompassing analyses can be undertaken. Although the present 
research is independent of Barlow’s, it is congruent with many of those results, specifically, 
his brief mention of [find + x-self] as containing the meaning of self-observation (i.e., self-
awareness) as well as the semantic entailment of surprise, mentioned above. 
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 The meanings associated with the find plus reflexive construction involve self-observation, 
in particular with some degree of distancing of the protagonist from the action. It is as if 
someone is observing his/her own actions from a distance and is even surprised by what is 
taking place (Barlow, 1996, p. 6). 
 
The lack of detail and elaboration on these points is unfortunate; however, his research was not 
specifically focused on the [find x-self] construction but on the many types of verbs that appear 
within the reflexive construction and their associative frequencies. The detection of self-
observation, aka self-awareness, is further exploited at length in the present research. 
Barlow’s analysis of find plus reflexive construction constitutes an example of what is 
coined here ‘Self-Aware Unexpected-Event’ (hereafter SA-UE). However, the ‘Self-Aware 
Event’ (hereafter SA), proposed in Modules 1 and 2, is completely absent from this analysis, 
leaving about 40 percent of the data unaccounted for, as seen in Figure 1. The following corpus 
analysis examines both of these events in depth (see section 2.4 for further details). 
 
Figure 1: Frequency ratios for all semantic categories in the COCA & BNC. 
 
SA=Self-Aware Event, SA-UE=Self-Aware Unexpected Event, TSM=True-Self Metaphor, 
PNS=Picture Noun Schema, X=non-reflexive, ?=indeterminate, DUPL=Duplicate, LIT=Literal use 
  
Other research that examines [find x-self] is by Fukaya (2002), who labels the 
construction FINDSELF. This research begins by introducing Barlow’s research above, and 
then discusses the discourse functions of FINDSELF by way of corpus analysis using the Bank 
of English corpus. Mirativity is a continuing theme, dictionary and corpus examples are 
SA SA-UE TSM PNS X ? DUPL LIT
COCA 43.28% 49.85% 2.57% 0.57% 2.57% 0.57% 0.42% 0.14% 
BNC 40.71% 54.57% 1.57% 0.14% 1.85% 1% 0.14% 0.00% 
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provided as evidential support, and the high frequency of FINDSELF is established. It is here 
that common ground with the current research ends, however. In that brief article, FINDSELF 
is discussed in relation to: main and subordinate clauses, background vs foreground, 
collocations including prepositions, adjectives and adverbs, data on different corpus registers, 
verb tenses and pronouns that are tentatively related to the function of FINDSELF as a 
localization device. The topics discussed are numerous and due to the very select and limited 
nature of the data, evidential support for the claims made there are tenuous. For example, he 
offers evidence and supports conclusions from Taoka (1999, 2009), who researched 
FINDSELF from a corpus of two fiction writers’ novels. In that discussion, two subcategories 
are proposed for the FINDSELF construction, the first being:   a. emotions, b. reactions to 
emotions, and c. passives, and the second: a. identifying one’s position, and b. un-
intentionalization. She lists examples for the first subcategory as: 
 
a. …found himself getting angry 
b. He found himself sputtering. 
c. Adam found himself pushed down…  
 
And examples for the second subcategory as: 
 
a. …find herself in the elevator with him. 
b. …find herself staring into Brenda’s face. 
 (1999, pp. 131-134. In Fukaya, 2002) 
 
Questions immediately arise as to the overall validity of these subcategorizations. In 
subcategory one, a and b refer to emotional states whereas c refers to a syntactic construction. 
This incongruence is left unexplained. Furthermore, in 1b, the example sputtering is cited as a 
reaction to emotions, and if this example is cited because it is the ideal, then the subcategory 
is suspect. In a corpus collocate search (+/- 4) conducted here with the lemma [sputter], the 
most frequent collocate is engine, referring literally to the sound an engine produces when not 
in good condition. The next most frequent is economy, referring metaphorically to the lack of 
power or health of an ‘economic engine’. Of the most frequent 100 collocates with the lemma 
[sputter], the following nine had some connection to emotional states: rage, laughter, red-faced, 
cursing, muttering, outrage, helplessly, indignation and swore. However, the total token 
	 28	
frequency ratio of these is only 6.7% (n=52). Although there is usage related to emotional 
qualities or reactions to those emotions, more detailed and comprehensive data supporting the 
claim of reactions to emotions would have further clarified and supported the arguments. Since 
there are none, we must presume that sputter is the ideal case, which is accurate only perhaps 
for the very small corpus used therein, and not congruent with a variety of registers and a larger 
data set.  
Other questions arise about Takao’s categories and Fukaya’s support of them. For 
example, if subcategory 1c refers to passives, and 2a refers to identifying one’s position, 
assuming that these categories are mutually exclusive, we are forced to choose between one or 
the other. But finding oneself pushed down can be construed either as a passive and/or as 
identifying one’s position. (literally and/or metaphorically). Similarly, and more importantly, 
un-intentionality in 2b seems to cover all examples above. As stated in previous sections above, 
un-intentionality is a part of the basic entailment of both one meaning of find and of the 
reflexive construction. Fukaya’s acceptance of these categorizations, along with his own 
corpus analysis, lead him to the conclusion that ‘localization’(from categorization 2a of Takao 
and from Barlow’s comment about a ‘distancing relation’ (1996, pp. 6-7)) is the determining 
factor and reason FINDSELF is used so ubiquitously. Granted, Fukaya’s is a discourse-based 
study, not strictly linguistic, but his data collection and reporting methodology is imprecise and 
his conclusions are incongruent. The corpus data used there show differences in the frequencies 
of the use of FINDSELF between main and subordinate clauses, when-clauses, and their 
associated conjunctions and coordinators, concluding that: 
 
…the FINDSELF construction has a general tendency to occur more often in the subordinate 
clause than in the main clause because of its function of backgrounding. But it is also possible 
to highlight the background by placing the subordinate clause after the main clause...it tends to 
make its appearance in the background position in a complex sentence; however, in coordinate 
sentences, it occurs more often in the foreground second clause position…the common function 
of FINDSELF is to localize the subject of the second conjunct depending on the semantics of 
the verb find and the reflexive pronoun, and consequently to put the location in the foreground 
information (ibid. , pp. 82-83).  
 
Needless to say, these conclusions warrant a more accurate delineation of the FINDSELF 
construction that can account for more data in a more systematic and efficient way. This is not 
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an easy task, especially for such a common and flexible metaphorical conception as find x-self. 
This complexity in the corpus data is the subject of discussion of the next section. 
 
2.3   Subtleties in the Corpus Data8 
 
Eight categories are proposed for the data retrieved for the search parameter [find][ppx*] (i.e., 
the lemma find followed by any reflexive pronoun). These categories were not predetermined 
from some model, but are based on the data, and thus can be seen as moderately corpus-driven, 
in line with Sinclair, who states, “Without relinquishing our intuitions, of course, we try to find 
explanations that fit the evidence, rather than adjusting the evidence to fit a pre-set 
explanation…” (1991, p. 36). The categories are as follows:  
 
1) Self-Aware Event (hereafter SA) is an event in which the specific object of 
Awareness, aka the Focus of Awareness (FoA), is the experiencer’s embodied 
self-perception. 
2) Self-Aware Unexpected Event (hereafter SA-UE) is an event in which the 
specific object of Awareness (aka FoA), is an externally initiated, unexpected 
situation. 
3) True Self Metaphor (G. Lakoff, 1996)(hereafter TSM) is the Awareness of 
an internally deep or central part of the psyche. 
4) Picture Noun Schema (Kuno, 1987)(hereafter PNS) is an event in which the 
experiencer’s physical or psychological self-representation (picture, film, statue, 
hallucination, etc.) is present in the scene. 
5)  LIT is the literal use of the construction. 
6)  X is the non-reflexive use (e.g., emphatic, benefactive, etc.) of the construction. 
7)  ? is the marking for cases that were categorically inconclusive or unintelligible. 
8)  DUPL is the marking for duplicates in the corpus data.  
 
Throughout the data presented here, experiencers (i.e., reflexive anaphors) are shown in 
boldface, and FoAs are underlined. For tokens that were conceptually ambiguous, extended 
contexts were consulted to increase accuracy through contextual clues. 
                                                
8 Since the data in this research was not independently checked by more than one researcher, as it would be in a 
larger research project, all data and analyses were checked at least twice by the author to avoid possible errors 
and inconsistencies. 
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Within the four types of metaphoric construal found in the data (i.e., SA, SA-UE, TSM 
and PNS), the most frequent are the two types of Self-Aware Events, SA and SA-UE. The 
distinctions between these are construed and predicated by speakers and writers, evidenced by 
collocational data (see section 2.3.1). Although clear-cut cases are the norm, there is a cline of 
metaphoricity within these events. In the present research, data suggests a metaphorical 
continuum that extends from a personal, direct perceptual Self-Aware Event, where Maggie is 
aware of her own physical, visual perceptions, in the example below, 
 
2.1. In the light, Maggie found herself staring directly at Bryce…  
(BNC:AN7.W_fict_prose)  
 
to an event that is much more situationally external from the experiencer’s point of view, as in 
the following example.  
 
2.2. The place in which he found himself was a tall grimy building with a long  
passageway…     (BNC:CKD.W_fict_prose)  
 
Intermediate cases, although harder to categorize, are also interesting in terms of the subtleties 
of construal and predication. For example, in most cases when the experiencers are a collection 
of people, a situation can be construed as perceptual, but not directly perceptual for the 
individual experiencers. For example,  
 
2.3. Upon hospitalization, even for brief and simple interventions, people find  
themselves in an extremely awkward public space: sharing rooms with  
strangers…      (COCA:2009.ACAD.AnthropolQ)  
 
In this and similar cases, the situation of being in an extremely awkward public space: sharing 
rooms with strangers is construed as a perceptual experience, evidenced by the exactness of 
the time frame upon hospitalization. In addition, the adjective awkward suggests immediate 
emotional reactions on the part of the experiencers. However, the event is describing the 
experiences of a collection of people and of some external location, and is therefore 
perceptually distant and/or removed from the direct perceptual stimulus of a single individual. 
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Because of this contextual evidence, this example is labeled SA-UE. Subtleties like these as 
well as the more straightforward cases will be examined at length in the following sections. 
 
2.4 Results for find x-self 
 
In a search (see Table 1) of the most frequent 500 tokens for the lemma find + reflexive pronoun 
(i.e., [find][ppx*]) in the COCA corpus, the total frequency was 47,498 (excluding reciprocals 
(v+each; v+one), compared to a total 101,403 tokens with any verb (lemma) + reflexive 
pronoun (i.e., [v*][ppx*], (excluding reciprocals). This yielded a [find x-self] frequency ratio 
of 46.8%. For the most frequent 500 tokens in the BNC corpus, from a [v*][ppx*] total of 
35,661, [find][ppx*] yielded 5,426 tokens, resulting in a [find x-self] frequency ratio of 15.2%.  
It may be argued that find x-self, as a unique construction consisting of the verb find cast 
within the reflexive construction, is not statistically salient. In other words, that the instantiation 
ratios are comparable to the patterning ratios of the verb find when placed within any 
construction. This was tested for both corpora using the Fisher Exact test, and the results are 
significant (p=0; p<.05) 9 (Stangroom, 2017). This suggests that the verb find and the reflexive 
construction display dependence and differ in collocational profiling from the find + non-
reflexive counterparts. Thus, both the frequency ratios together with the Fisher Exact results 
reveal the great extent that the [find x-self] construction is used with the reflexive construction, 
corroborating Barlow’s (1996) findings. This was strong motivation to continue with a more 
in-depth and fine-grained search and analysis.  
In an expanded search (see Table 2), the total frequency of [find][ppx*] in the COCA was 
27,188 (n-lemma=3000(n≥10)), excluding reciprocals. The total frequency for [v*][ppx*] was 
276,810, yielding a [find][ppx*] frequency ratio of 10.18%. In the BNC, the same [find][ppx*] 
search yielded 5,064 tokens ((n≥5), excluding reciprocals)), while the total [v*][ppx*] 
frequency was 51,626 (n-lemmas=1997(n≥5))10, yielding a [find][ppx*] frequency ratio of 
                                                
9 The contingency table values are as follows: COCA corpus: Categories= [find], [v*]: Groups=[any 
Construction], [ppx*]. [find]+[not ppx*]=525,022; [v*]+[not ppx*]=89,318,707; [find]+[ppx*]=27,643; 
[v*]+[ppx*](minus [find])=278,801. 5000 hits max., lemma sorting, n ≥10. In the BNC corpus: [find]+[not 
ppx*]=88,686; [v*]+[not ppx*]=16,483,316; [find]+[ppx*]=5102; [v*]+[ppx*](minus [find])=51,326. 5000 hits 
max., lemma sorting, n ≥5. 
10 A minimum token frequency was set at ten for the COCA (n≥10) and five (n≥5) for the BNC. Although the 
COCA has five times more data than the BNC, and therefore minimum frequency should be adjusted for this 
(i.e., minimum frequency (n= 2) for the BNC), due to linguistic entrenchment concerns, I decided to set the 
minimum frequency at five for the BNC. Granted, this does not ensure linguistic entrenchment (and there is still 
debate about what is required for such entrenchment). This decision, however formally un-statistical, thus 
seemed a reasonable compromise between theory and practice. 
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10.19%.11 Although the results are statistically not significant, the cross-corpora frequency 
ratio of over 10% along with the similarity of ratio across corpora is consequential in that its 
use can be considered common and consistent across both regions. Although frequency in and 
of itself does not prove linguistic entrenchment, it does suggest it. This is corroborated by the 
search sorted by register (see Appendix 2 & 3, and section 2.5) where, although the register 
fiction yields the highest number of tokens, other registers are also commonly instantiated. 
 
Table 1. Results of most frequent 500 search for [v*][ppx*] and [find][ppx*]. 
Corpus [v*][ppx*] [find][ppx*] 
ratio of      
find x-self Fisher Exact results 
COCA 101,403 47,498 46.8%  
BNC 35,661 5,426 15.2%  
Total 137,064 52,924 38.6% p=0; p<.05; = significant 
 
 
Table 2. Results of expanded search (lemma n=3000) for [v*][ppx*] and [find][ppx*]. 
Corpus [v][ppx*] [find][ppx*] 
ratio of        
find x-self Fisher Exact results 
COCA 276,810 27,188 10.2%   
BNC 51,626 5,064 10.2%   
Total 328,436 32,252 10% p=0.942485; p<.05; = not significant 
 
The frequency of metaphorical Self-Awareness (according to the guidelines explained in 
section 1.2) for the [find x-self] construction as an overall semantic category (i.e., SA + SA-
UE) yielded a frequency ratio of 93.1% in the COCA and 95.3% in the BNC (avg. = 94.2%), 
far outranking all other metaphorical categories. Uncovering the ubiquity of the Self-Aware 
Event for [find x-self] is an important observation at this point because it evidences Self-
Awareness as an authentic and unique conception and provides motivation for further, more 
in-depth analyses.  
Differentiating between the two sub-categories of Self-Aware Events, SA and SA-UE, also 
proved informative. In a cross-corpora analysis, SA-UE instantiated an average of 65.2% while 
SA yielded a 28.7% average across seven pronouns. In other words, there is a preference for 
                                                
11 Due to the large data set, this particular analysis does not delete emphatic and other non-reflexive 
anaphor tokens. These are, however, filtered out in all other analyses below. 
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using find x-self to describe the awareness of oneself in an unexpected situation in both 
American and British English compared to the more visceral and internal SA construal. This 
is also congruent with Barlow’s explanation for find x-self in that a majority of examples 
construe the ‘self-observation… with some degree of distancing” (1996, p. 6). 
The frequent instantiation of the Self-Aware Event as a general metaphorical category in 
both corpora lends strong support to the theoretical proposals in Modules 1 and 2. Compared 
to the Self-Aware Event, the True-Self Metaphor (TSM) and the Picture Noun Schema (PNS) 
categories yielded much lower frequencies, 2.1% and 3.5%, respectively. These results 
illustrate the advantages of using corpus data to support (and perhaps ignite) theoretical and 
intuitive research, providing social context and statistical weight to theoretical claims.  
One example of the benefits of corpus research is related to my claim in Module 2 that the 
TSM construal has a tendency to occur clause-finally. This was tested here. The results suggest 
a 92% likelihood for the TSM construal to be in clause final position (clause-final position 
(n=26); other (n=2)). These results thus support this claim and confirm its objectivity and 
accuracy. 
One component of the find x-self construction that seemed important for distinguishability 
of construal was the type of antecedent in the event, i.e., whether the antecedent was predicated 
as a pronoun or full noun. The motivation for this seemed to be the metonymic construal of the 
full noun antecedents, as in the following example. 
 
2.4. America found itself deeply and violently divided about its national purpose. 
        (COCA:1991.MAG.AmHeritage) 
 
 Although I am familiar with no research that overtly analyzes these pronoun vs. full noun 
distinctions for the overall metaphoricity of the construction within a corpus framework, due 
to the presence of these types of examples in the data, this was specifically examined in the 
present research for all three SA Event-related constructions, find x-self, lose x-self, and catch 
x-self.  
 
2.5 Results for PRO + find x-self 
 
The parameter [p*][find][ppx*] (i.e., any pronoun followed by the verb lemma find followed 
by any reflexive pronoun), was input into the two corpus search engines. Each pronoun 
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SA SA-UE TSM PNS X ? DUPL LIT
COCA 43.28% 49.85% 2.57% 0.57% 2.57% 0.57% 0.42% 0.14% 
BNC 40.71% 54.57% 1.57% 0.14% 1.85% 1% 0.14% 0.00% 
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category consisted of a random sample (n=100; pronoun categories n=7), totaling 700 tokens. 
A minimum frequency of ≥10 was set for the COCA data, and ≥5 for the BNC (see footnote 
10). The cross-corpora total frequency ratios (i.e., n=200, per pronoun) for [p*][find][ppx*], 
according to semantic category and corpus, are provided in Figure 2 (duplicated from Figure 
1). These data are shown in more detail and charted according to pronoun and semantic 
category in Table 3. 
At the outset, a few of the values and relationships are readily discernible. The first is 
from Figure 2 and concerns the relationship between the COCA and BNC data for the SA and 
SA-UE categories. The graph visibly shows a difference, and this may entice one to conclude 
that there is inherent meaning in these differences, but the results of a significance test do not 
support such an assumption. By inputting the values of the two corpus groups (COCA, BNC) 
and the two categories (SA, SA-UE) into the Fisher Exact contingency table, the resulting value 
is 0.662 at p < 0.05, which is not significant. In other words, SA and SA-UE are, for all intents 
and purposes, equally construed for find + x-self in the COCA and BNC when the antecedents 
are pronouns. The discrepancy between this and the more general [find][ppx*] results are 
interesting, and point to the possible importance of making this type of antecedent distinction 
for other kinds of metaphoric analyses. 
 
  Figure 2: Frequency ratios of [pro+find+x-self] according to semantic category. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
It is timely now to raise one question that has been a major motivation for this 
investigation. With the exception of Barlow mentioned previously, cognitive linguistic and 
semantic research has mentioned Divided Self Metaphors (e.g., True-Self Metaphor, aka TSM) 
and Picture Noun Schemas (PNS), but the corpus results here point to a much greater frequency 
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of Self-Aware Events for find x-self. Therefore, what is the frequency distribution for TSM, 
PNS, SA and SA-UE Events? The data from Figure 5 below reveals that, compared to the SA 
event category, TSM has a much lower frequency for all instantiated pronouns except the 
impersonal it, where TSM is more frequent (+ 2.5%), although much less frequent than the SA-
UE construal category (-84.5%). For all pronouns, SA instantiates 28.7% and SA-UE 65.2% 
on average, whereas TSM instantiates only 2%. PNS has even lower frequency rates across the 
board, instantiating at most 0.5% for only four pronouns (we, she, you, it) and zero for the 
others. Needless to say, PNS is a minor event within the reflexive construction with the verb 
find. This does not in any way discount the event’s importance for construing conceptual 
experiences of seeing/viewing/finding oneself in a newspaper, movie, picture, etc…, but it can 
be said with confidence that for find x-self, it instantiates rarely. Self-Aware Events dominate 
the metaphorical construal of [pro + find x-self].  
  Another observation from Figure 5 concerns the SA to SA-UE frequency ratios for the plural 
pronouns they and we and the impersonal pronoun it. By far the most frequently instantiated 
subcategory is the SA-UE construal, with a difference of 75, 84.5 and 60.5 points, respectively, 
compared to the SA construal. The results for the plural pronouns are not unexpected, however, 
as discussed above (section 2.2), i.e., that an embodied, internal perceptual awareness is 
difficult to describe for a group of people. The data here thus supports that proposal. However, 
this does not account for the 84.5-point value differentiation for the pronoun it. A likely 
motivation for it to show similar frequency patterning is that the pronoun it refers to a singular, 
non-human, non-sentient antecedent. As such, describing an embodied, perceptual awareness 
(i.e., the SA event construal) is unnatural. 
 
  Table 3. Cross-corpora frequency ratios of [p*+findv+ ppx*], by pronoun and semantic category. 
 he they she I you it we 
SA 26.5 11.5 59 55 30.5 1 17.5 
SA-UE 70.5 86.5 33.5 41.5 61 85.5 78 
TSM 2 1 2.5 1 2 3.5 2 
PNS 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 
X 1 1.5 3.5 1 4.5 0.5 1 
? 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
literal 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 
DUPL 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 1 
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This can be seen in the following SA-UE examples. The first one is reference to Iran’s 
nuclear program’s computer system, called Stuxnet: 
 
 2.5. And then, depending on where it found itself, Stuxnet was supposed to self- 
destruct.      (COCA:2010.MAG.Newsweek) 
 
Another example construes the human body as non-sentient (i.e., THE BODY IS A MACHINE 
conceptual metaphor). 
2.6. But the body is very efficient, " says Maxwell. " It adapts quickly to whatever  
position or movement pattern it finds itself in most often.     
(COCA:2014.MAG.MensHealth) 
 
The next example construes a metonymic antecedent in which Atlanta stands for the Atlantic 
Olympic Committee organizers, referred to by the impersonal pronoun.  
 
2.7. When Atlanta started bidding for the 1996 summer games, it found itself in  
a pair of expensive, no holds barred competitions.  
(COCA:1999.SPOK.ABC_Nightline) 
 
Thus, there is really nothing unusual about the high rate of association of it with the SA-UE 
category, once the antecedent and its semantics are delineated according to their function in 
use across a spectrum of genres and in sufficient number within context. 
 Another observation concerns the difference in frequency between the singular and 
plural first person pronouns, I and we. There is a much more balanced differential for SA and 
SA-UE in the singular than the plural, I instantiating 55% and 41.5% for SA and SA-UE, 
respectively. In contrast, for we, SA instantiated 17.5% compared to 78% for SA-UE, a 60.5% 
difference. The results of this are significant (p=0, p<.05)12. The motivation for this can be 
proposed again here as the awkwardness of construing SA with anything other than a singular, 
first person experiencer. However, when the experiencer is the first person singular, the 
likelihood of instantiating SA vs. SA-UE is almost equal. 
As with much data-based research, there are anomalous results in the present data as 
well. Specifically, the third person masculine pronoun shows a higher association with SA-UE 
                                                
12 Contingency table: Categories=SA, SA-UE; Groups=I, we. 
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construal, while the feminine associates with the SA construal at a higher rate, the difference 
being significant for the Fisher Exact test (p-value=.0000001, at p<.05)13. This is perhaps, at 
first sight, a counter-intuitive result. Why would masculine and feminine pronouns display 
significant differences for the two types of Self-Aware events? A few examples help clarify 
this: 
2.8. For decades, he found himself at the center of the nation's biggest crises  
and most perilous challenges…  (COCA:2015:NEWS.USAToday) 
 
2.9. Morrissey is a product of the political climate he finds himself in, a period of  
the reformist Left…    (BNC:CAE.W_pop_lore) 
 
2.10. …that mystical source of everything Claire held true. In weaker moments,  
she found herself thinking, “What if it wasn't real?”   
(COCA:2015.FIC.Bk.FirstFrost) 
 
2.11. Her patience in equally short supply, she found herself exasperated, not for  
the first time, by Peony's snide tongue.  (BNC:A0D.W_fict.prose) 
 
A possible motivation for the feminine vs. masculine SA-UE results, shown in the prototypical 
examples above, derives mainly from social, gender-biased stereotypes, where male-dominant 
models control business, politics and financially-oriented paradigms. As such, they often 
describe external situations (i.e., the SA-UE construal). On the other stereotypical side of the 
fence, so to speak, is the feminine model, one of introspection and emotion, often describing 
thoughts and feelings, and thus, the high frequency of the more internal and perception-based 
SA-type construal. This proposal is based on the present data, not on sociolinguistic theory. 
But linguistic and/or social gender bias is not a novel concept. It is plausible, and indeed very 
likely, that this kind of social gender bias is reflected in language and the mass media that 
disseminates the language. Sociolinguistic analysis, however, not being the focus of the present 
research, will not be discussed at length. The issue is raised here only as one likely explanation 
for the discrepancies in the third person masculine and feminine pronoun data. Although the 
data cannot cover all possible language registers and scenarios, it would be an interesting 
                                                
13  Contingency table: Categories=SA, SA-UE; Groups=he; she.  
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(albeit monumental) undertaking to discover to what extent these results change (if at all) when 
a wider variety of registers and regional varieties of English are included.  
   
2.5.1 Fuzzy construals within [p*][find][ppx*] 
 
It was sometimes difficult at first to determine whether an event construed self-awareness of 
an embodied perception (SA) or the experiencer’s awareness of being unexpectedly involved 
in an external situation (SA-UE), especially for plural and impersonal pronouns. This was due 
to the various types of metonymic antecedents that were predicated, e.g., animal(s), groups of 
people, company(s), government(s), etc. However, even though many of these pronouns were 
metonymic in their mapping, the main criteria for determining SA and SA-UE categories 
remained unchanged. For SA Events, the direct perceptual involvement in the action centers 
the action within the perceiver/experiencer, in contrast to SA-UE events in which the focus of 
the construal is an external event, the experiencer’s internal, embodied perceptions only 
playing a relatively minor part in the event action. The FoA, i.e., the immediately relevant 
object of the construed awareness, is a critical factor for resolving the ambiguity between SA 
and SA-UE. For example, in the sentence below, even though two people are involved in the 
event, (which often takes the SA-UE construal due to the difficulty of simultaneously 
expressing two people’s embodied perceptions), the following example was determined to be 
SA due the direct perceptual content of the action (i.e., screaming and having intercourse) as 
well as the emphasis on each subjects’ perceptual awareness of those actions.  
 
2.12. …they almost always found themselves either screaming at each other or  
back in bed where words were rendered meaningless… (COCA:2004.FIC.Iris)  
 
An SA-UE event, on the other hand, construes a situation that is external to the experiencer. 
In these cases, the experiencers are construed as having little control over their situations; they 
are circumstantial participants in an unfolding event that is, often suddenly, brought to their 
attention. 
2.13. What adolescents say they will do may be very different from what occurs  
when they find themselves in the middle of an emotionally charged situation.  
(COCA:2007.ACAD.SocialWork) 
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In contrast to prototypical SA-UE events, however, the word situation is used in the example, 
and therefore seems at first sight to be an SA-UE construal, the supporting context adolescents 
say they will do (construing an internally initiated action) as well as them being in the middle 
of an emotionally charged situation (construing feelings of the experiencers in the present 
moment) creates ambiguity for its categorization. Ultimately, the example was marked SA due 
this contextual evidence. 
Another issue concerns the first-person plural pronoun we, which is used both for two 
or more individuals as well as for a group of people. The same criteria were used here as with 
impersonal pronouns discussed above. If the experiencer displayed metonymic and/or 
metaphoric properties, and the FoA related an awareness of some embodied self-perception, it 
was marked SA Event. In the sentence below, for example, both experiencers (plural and 
therefore prototypically SA-UE) are sharing the action of ringing the bell. The physical action 
is originated and completed by the experiencers, (perhaps construed as shared performers of 
the action), and they are both perceptually aware of themselves performing that action (i.e., 
ringing the second bell).  
 
2.14. But surely hotels are open to guests? It seems not. On arrival we find ourselves 
ringing the second bell.     
 (BNC:AHC.W_newsp.brdsht_nat_misc)  
 
If the FoA were an externally-conceived event, as in the psychodynamic force (Gilquin, 2010; 
Talmy, 2001) example below (i.e., unable to do something is an external preventative force), 
then it was marked SA-UE.  
 
2.15. …the South of England in particular, whose support we need.' If we find 
ourselves, as we did, unable to campaign, to argue, to debate…  
(BNC: W_newsp_brdsht_nat_misc)  
 
One example of how complicated the event construal can be, is the following:  
 
2.16. We found ourselves in the kitchen where a well-groomed girl was  
washing up…     (BNC:A2C.W_newsp_brdsht_nat_social)   
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When only the token is considered, this seems to be an SA type, relating to the internal, 
perceptual awareness of the Self in some physical space. However, upon examination of the 
expanded context (below), this example is revealed to be a film review. The pronoun we is 
used as a general reference, referring to all of the film’s viewers being shown a spatial location 
in the film, an externally-placed event. This is not in reference to any particular individuals’ 
perception, except for the visual experience happening on screen, the visual scene being 
external to all involved in the action. Because of these reasons, this example was marked SA-
UE.  
Expanded context: 
SOME months ago I saw a television documentary on hostels for young homeless 
people in London. The voice-over described the need for accommodation for the 
thousands of unemployed youngsters who pour hopefully into London every year, 
while the camera panned around the sparse but well-kept lodgings. We found 
ourselves in the kitchen where a well-groomed girl was washing up -one of the tasks 
for which residents were responsible in this co-operative household. As the narrator 
explained that' Jane would soon have to move on', because she was reaching the limit 
of her maximum stay in the council-owned hostel, we watched her rinse the sink, 
wipe the draining board and hang up the dishcloth. 
 
Thus, proper construal of an event is dependent on the context in which it is construed 
and predicated. To better understand the immediate context of [find x-self] (and other 
constructions discussed below), further delineation of the FoA is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.5.2 More about the FoA 
 
Descriptions of the FoA for SA Events show it to be a mandatory part of [find x-self], not 
optional nor adjunctive in its construal. The FoA can be considered the semantic linchpin for 
[find x-self] constructions. In previous descriptions, relatively simple FoA examples were 
provided for ease of explanation. As might be expected, though, conceptual transparency is not 
always the case. For example, there were instances where the FoA was itself metaphoric, 
leading to ambiguity of the conceptual status of the overall event. In these cases, concise 
mapping of the FoA construal as well as broader support contexts were necessary. Again, at 
the risk of repetitiveness, what this means is that taken together, the specific [find x-self] 
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construction, the FoA and the support context are often necessary conceptual components for 
appropriate meaning retrieval.  
 
2.17. …time and again, artists have found themselves in a barren field wondering how 
to revivify art.     (COCA:2010.ACAD.AmerScholar) 
 
In order to illustrate this, consider the sentence above. The FoA in a barren field is metaphoric, 
the SOURCE being insubstantial artistic production. Without knowing this, the literal meaning 
of the FoA may mistakenly be construed (i.e., the artists are literally in a barren field). Upon 
review of the expanded context below, the appropriate metaphoric construal can be resolved, 
i.e., that barren field refers to, or is mapped onto, a slump in artistic fervor or production, and 
the artists, experiencing this slump, are wondering how to renew their endeavors (i.e., revivify 
art). 
 
Expanded context (abridged): 
If their solution called for an immersion in culture, Caravaggio turned once again to the 
very careful study of nature. Such bursts of wonder seem inevitably bracketed by slumps: 
time and again, artists have found themselves in a barren field wondering how to revivify 
art. Moments of great fertility alternate with drought. Bursts of energy are followed by 
exhaustion. As our tour continues, the Baroque itself becomes conventionalized, and we 
wander disconsolate through acres of 18th- and 19th-century Italian art. Yes, little seeds 
can be found in the chaff, and " occasionally even full-blown glories like Tiepolo.
 (COCA: 2010.ACAD.AmerScholar) 
 
The FoA alone invites a choice of readings. One is the choice between literal vs. metaphorical 
(i.e., literally or metaphorically in a barren field). Another concerns the overall predication and 
the choice between a construed embodied perception (SA) vs. some externally initiated 
situation (SA-UE). In the above example, this reflects the difference, respectively, between the 
focus on each individual artists’ wondering vs. the focus on ‘the creative sterility of the artistic 
community’. There can be, of course, no ‘absolute’ determination. Even if consultation with 
each speaker/author were feasible, the reasons for a particular use of an expression might be 
subconscious, and reflection on the expression in afterthought might not be completely 
accurate. In the above example, an SA determination was deemed appropriate due to the 
awareness of the active, embodied, perceptual thought-emotion of the FoA, i.e., wondering 
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(about an artistic slump, metaphorically in a barren field).14  This kind of decision-making, 
based on contextual clues, is vital for the proper evaluation and calculation of data and their 
analyses. It also demonstrates how various subtleties and choices are available for the construal 
of a given expression and the importance of consulting expanded contexts for any detailed 
analysis of language, especially metaphoric expressions.  
As mentioned previously, the function and construal of the FoA in relation to the main 
event is critical for proper analysis. If one assumes that the FoA is only a prototypical adjunct 
(i.e., optional) to its related clause, what are the consequences of this with regard to Self-Aware 
Events? The result is that a different conception is construed, i.e., the True-Self Metaphor. 
Using the previous example, according to the meaning of the TSM construal, artists have 
become aware of their deep psychological or spiritual Selves, and this happens metaphorically 
or non-metaphorically in a barren field (perhaps a special field conducive to self-realization?) 
where they wonder about their art: 
 
 2.18. …time and again, artists have found themselves (in a barren field  
wondering how to revivify art).  (COCA:2010.ACAD.AmerScholar) 
 
Parentheses are used here so that the adjunct can be easily differentiated from the main clause, 
but the TSM event is easier to construe if the location is changed, as in the example below: 
 
2.19. …time and again, artists have found themselves (in a yoga ashram  
wondering how to revivify art.) 
  
This conception becomes even more clear once the FoA is deleted altogether: 
  
2.20. …time and again, artists have found themselves. 
 
In the original example, the FoA in a barren field is not conceptually adjunct; it is a crucial 
component that cannot be deleted or changed without changing the main event’s core meaning. 
Therefore, complete and relevant contexts must be considered when analyzing metaphoric 
                                                
14 in a barren field was analyzed as metaphorical due to the plural marking of the antecedent artists. It would be 
highly unusual (although admittedly, not impossible) to construe of many artists literally walking into a barren 
field just to wonder about their situation, especially since they would all be entering the same barren field due to 
the singular marking of the noun field. 
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examples; an interpretation within the boundaries of the token alone often cannot resolve the 
intended construal. Broader contextual clues guide the choice of construal and predication, and 
these must be incorporated into the analysis for proper denotation and delineation.  
Continuing on to a discussion of the types of construal expressed in the FoA for [find 
x-self], there often appear variations of the following: in a situation, in a position or location, 
involved in/with something, etc. Although perhaps counter-intuitive, the presence or absence 
of these terms alone was not complete verification of the SA vs SA-UE distinction. These 
needed to be analyzed carefully in order to distinguish between SA and SA-UE. For example, 
location in and of itself was not a definite determiner of SA-UE for the following:  
 
2.21.  As the crowd gathered around the elevators, a man in a blue maintenance  
coverall found himself next to a little black girl.  
  (COCA:1991.FIC.Bk:FromDuskTill)  
 
Even though this may be construed situationally as SA-UE, i.e., ‘the man realized his close 
proximity to a little black girl’, this case was determined to be an SA-type because the man is 
suddenly and unexpectedly aware of his physical, spatial perception, an internally-based 
experience. This is supported by the double-underlined context appearing in the clause before 
the metaphoric main clause, its temporal aspect (i.e., simultaneous actions, instantiated by the 
preposition as) perhaps priming the conception of sudden perceptual awareness. 
 
2.22. In the early ‘70s I found myself in Columbus, Ohio, at a church. 
(COCA:1992.FIC.Analog).  
 
On the other hand, the example above was marked SA-UE because the temporal event 
is spread out over a decade, making it difficult to construe a direct, embodied perception of a 
single experience. Here, there are two competing viewpoints within the conception; one at the 
time of the event and the other at the time of reporting of the event. Only supporting context 
can help verify the dominant construal of the token. 
 
2.23. SA: Last month, I found myself in an unknown place. No idea how I got  
there.      (BNC:HA0.W_fict_prose)  
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2.24. SA-UE: Next morning Lucy found herself seated alone at the corner table,  
and when Jean brought her breakfast... (BNC:HHB.W_fict_prose) 
 
Related to this, for FoAs that construe spatial locations, a distinction needed to be made 
between being proprioceptively aware of oneself in a location compared to being situationally 
aware of oneself in a location. Basically, this amounts to the same distinctions made thus far 
regarding the differences between SA and SA-UE, although more specific to spatial location. 
In examples such as those above, when deciding whether [[find x-self] + FoAlocation] was SA or 
SA-UE, conceptual premeditation, i.e., intention, was also used as a guiding factor. If the 
experiencer arrived at a location that was planned, foreseen or habitual, it was labeled SA-UE. 
If, however, the experiencer arrived at a location suddenly with no previous intentions, then it 
was labeled SA. The rationale for this decision is that the non-intentional event is comparable 
to a sudden awareness of proprioceptive stimuli in relation to one’s surroundings. To be in a 
planned, foreseen, or habitual location does not demand this kind of attention to spatial 
perception, unless some other new or noteworthy action occurs within that space. This 
difference adds credence to the Langackerian analysis from Module 2, where it was postulated 
that two meanings of find be proposed, an entailed ‘search’ construal (in which one searches 
for and finds an object), and a ‘non-search’ construal (in which one happens upon an object 
unintentionally). Lending support for this proposal are SA Events in which (un)intentionality 
or mirativity are overtly construed in the event, as in the example below: 
 
Expanded context: 
Mr-RUSH: It's true. Life had been kind of upside down for a little bit, and I'd just gone  
through a divorce and suddenly found myself living in Wyoming, to my astonishment,  
and I was in this little log house right next to the Snake River by the foot of the Tetons.  
SIMON: I mean, I have to ask. Did you just, like, stop the car 'cause you were cold and  
decided to live there? Or what do you mean, you found yourself in Wyoming  
to your surprise?  
Mr-RUSH: Well, there was this woman...  
SIMON: Oh, right. OK.  
Mr-RUSH:... who is now my wife. And she was involved, actually, with bringing the gray  
wolf back to Yellowstone.  
SIMON: Mm-hmm.  
Mr-RUSH: So I ended up in Wyoming and basically that's what the song is  
about.      (COCA:2000.SPOK.NPR_Saturday) 
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In the dialogue above, the meaning of the Self-Aware Event expressed by the interviewee, 
Simon, is confirmed by the interviewer, Mr. Rush. The interviewer specifically asks about the 
meaning of suddenly found myself living in Wyoming. Why would this need confirmation? 
Because under ‘normal’ circumstances, one usually plans a change of residence; it is an 
important decision that involves some intention and is rarely a surprise to oneself. To suddenly 
do this without intention needed further elaboration for clarity of proper meaning recovery. 
This example evidences the complexity and subtlety of the Self-Aware Event construal, but 
also shows that consultation of the full context can resolve many issues concerning ambiguous 
construal. 
 These conceptual ambiguities do not only stem from different conceptions of the verb 
and its metaphoricity and/or from nuances of the FoA. Conceptual variance also occurs due to 
the type of antecedent that is predicated, the topic of the next section. 
 
2.6 Nouns as Antecedents: [n*][find][ppx*] 
 
The aim of this section is to explore in more depth the components that make up the antecedent-
experiencer, specifically, the differences in the conceptual coding of nouns vs. pronouns when 
occurring within the find x-self construction.  
A search was conducted (see Appendix 4) in which the antecedent-experiencers were 
full nouns, not pronouns. The input search parameter was [n*][find][ppx*]. In the BNC, the 
search, sorted by lemma, yielded 111 tokens (n ≥5), instantiating 16 nouns, 75% of which were 
feminine names. Proper names hit at a rate of 29.7% and overwhelmingly displayed the SA 
construal type at a rate of 98.6%. The opposite result was yielded for all other types of nouns, 
where SA-UE dominated the data at a rate of 85.7%. This is statistically significant (Fisher 
exact; p=0 at p<.05). In other words, there is a positive correlation between proper names and 
SA construal, and ‘non-names’ and SA-UE construal, the two types of Self-Aware construal 
being strongly predictable in these contexts. Thus, it can be confidently stated that for British 
English, when the experiencer-antecedent is a proper name, the SA type will more likely be 
construed, and when all other types of nouns are predicated as the antecedent, it is highly likely 
that SA-UE will be construed. Although there is no way to test this prediction for all cases 
(spoken and written) in the language at large, the strength of the data here provides good reason 
to believe that this will be so.  
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One noteworthy result was the lack of masculine names. One possible reason for this 
may be a reflection of social gender bias, i.e., a scenario in which, within a male-dominated 
society, these types of construal reflect a lack of social control of female gender roles (there 
are many cases in the FoA in which women are following a man, moved by a man, staring at 
a man, in a man’s arms or embrace, etc.) Taken from the opposite viewpoint, another plausible 
explanation may be that this result indicates society’s perception of women as being endowed 
with enhanced or keenly developed mental and/or emotional self-awareness. In other words, 
women may be viewed and perhaps more encouraged socially for introspection of thought and 
emotion. Although intuitively plausible, due to space constraints, this kind of in-depth 
sociolinguistic analysis will have to be left for those specialized in such areas, but this is likely 
a productive area of future research. 
Having proposed possible motivations for the results of the SA data related to proper 
names, a note of caution is now timely. The retrieved data, coming entirely from the FICTION 
register, is limited in its applicability across the spectrum of language use throughout the whole 
of society, and may not represent the actual social environment nor attitudes of the general 
populace. More specifically, of the 12 female names (n = 70), 17 different sources were 
represented, many of them romance-type popular novels. This is hardly representative of the 
British fiction register in general, or the overall corpus data, thus this cautionary disclaimer. 
What can be stated here, without reservation, is the significance of noun types to SA Events in 
the respective data sets retrieved here for the search parameter [n*][find][ppx*]. 
Returning to the overall BNC data, there were no examples of TSM, PNS nor LIT, but 
there was one antecedent token that was not congruent with the predication’s true antecedent, 
and this was corrected for categorization and calculation. This example is presented below:  
 
2.25. Too many teachers of deaf people find themselves learning communication skills 
on the job -- a slow process…     (BNC:FPJ.W_ac_soc_science). 
 
In this case, the antecedent-experiencer is not deaf people, but teachers. This issue of noun 
accuracy was an overall point of concern, for obvious reasons, and was specifically addressed 
in the methodological procedures used for this research (see section 1.2, procedural step 2). 
There were tokens in which the antecedents were actually part of larger, complex antecedent-
experiencers, and the tagged ‘nouns’ were actually adjectives. For example, in the COCA 
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example below, the retrieved antecedent was countries, e.g., …countries found themselves…, 
but the actual experiencer was junior diplomats.  
 
2.26. …junior diplomats from both countries found themselves …  
(COCA:2012.MAG.HistoryToday).  
 
For all of these cases, the noun-experiencer was amended and categorized appropriately for 
analysis.  
In the BNC, all cases of experiencer proper names construed the SA-type, with one 
exception (shown in the first example below), and all are of the register [W_fict_prose], except 
one from the register [W_biography] (shown in the second example below, categorized as an 
SA-type). 
 
2.27. SA-UE: Guido and Agnese had so much to talk about, and Ronni found herself 
included with perfect ease.    (BNC:JXT.W_fict_prose) 
 
2.28. SA: But it was a haste they paid for dearly in emotional terms. Laura found 
herself repeatedly hurt by accusations in the press that they had become tax exiles…
       (BNC:GU9. W_biography) 
 
 Table 4. Contingency table (integer values) for SA vs. SA-UE and fiction vs. non-fiction in the BNC. 
 SA SA-UE 
[W_fict_prose] 70 1 
all other registers 3 33 
 
It is timely to comment briefly on what was and will be shown throughout the 
discussion to be the high frequency of tokens in the fiction register in the data (labelled FIC 
and fict in the COCA and BNC, respectively) for the SA-type construal, and vice versa for non-
fiction and SA-UE data. The data can be analyzed along these four parameters, namely, SA vs. 
SA-UE and fiction vs all other registers, shown in Table 4. The BNC values are significant (p-
value=0, at p<.05), meaning that the relationships between fiction and SA, and between all 
other registers and SA-UE are dependent. In other words, the likelihood of SA occurring in 
the fiction register is more than chance. One reason for this relates to discourse point of view, 
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[n*][find][ppx*] was entered (n = most frequent 100), and the total number of tokens was 837 
in the COCA and 305 in the BNC (see Appendix 5). The most frequent construction in both 
corpora was [people find themselves] (COCA: n=63 (7.5%); BNC: n=21 (6.9%)). Here, similar 
to the lemma sorting query, the BNC had many more proper name tokens (77%) than the COCA 
(25%).  
Analyzing the data with respect to past and present verb tense (N + findpast/present Prorefl), 
there was only a marginal difference (4.9%) in the COCA between the past and present tense, 
(present= 439 (52.4%); past= 398 (47.6%%); discrepancy ratio=4.8%)). However, there was a 
large discrepancy in the BNC (present= 71(23.3%); past= 234 (76.7%); discrepancy ratio= 
53.5%)). The values in the BNC are significant (p= 2.3E-05 at p < .05). Although at this time, 
precise motivations for this are unclear and are tentatively attributed to regional variation, it 
can be stated confidently that in British English (or at least, within the texts representing this 
corpus), the past tense is likely to occur in this collocational environment whereas in American 
English there seems to be no likely relationship between past-present tense and find x-self when 
the antecedent is a noun. 
Perhaps more telling is the relationship between verb tense and antecedent number. In 
both corpora, there are significant dependencies between these categories, (p=0, p <.05) (see 
Table 7). In other words, for [n*][find][ppx*], there is a greater likelihood that a singular 
antecedent and past tense verb occur together, and conversely, that a plural antecedent and 
present tense verb occur together. Here, too, motivations for these attractions are unclear. 
However, when the results are added to the previous results that found singular nouns more 
often construing SA-type events (and vice-versa), the overall findings add empirical support to 
the claim that meaning and form cluster together into collocational patterns and that those 
patterns have meaning (Deignan, 2007; Hunston & Francis, 2000; Stefanowitsch & Gries, 
2007), even if motivations for those patterns are not immediately evident. 
Turning attention again to the type of metonymy of the antecedent, in the COCA there 
were many more metonymically-construed antecedents (n=219, 26.2%) than in the BNC (n=25, 
8.2%). The metonymic antecedents (in alphabetical order), their singular/plural frequencies, 
and present/past tense frequencies in the COCA and BNC are shown in Tables 8 and 9, 
respectively. 
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specifically that of the narrator/author in relation to the main character within the text. For the 
fiction register, because the author is the character (in reality), it is quite easy for the author to 
be mentally inside the psyche of the character, where he/she may then express that character’s 
perceptual self-awareness, using the literary voice of the narrator while utilizing the third 
person noun antecedent. This is rare in ‘real’ discourse. To assume knowledge of another 
person’s perceptual awareness is perhaps an intimate step too far. Although it is presumptuous 
to assume to intimately know the internal mental state of another person with which one is 
linguistically engaged, this is easily attained in the fiction genre due to the intimacy of the 
author with the character(s) in the text. Again, this proposal is borne out of the results of the 
data.  
The same search parameter in the COCA corpus, i.e., [n*][find][ppx*] (sorted by 
lemma, n ≥10), yielded 678 tokens and 43 noun lemmas. In this data set, however, only one 
token was a feminine name, Mary, (n=12, 1.8%), and two were masculine names (n=31, 4.6%), 
these names being the former U.S. Presidents Bush and Clinton. In total, proper names hit an 
average of 6.3%, differing from the BNC by 23.4%. In the COCA, Mary instantiated an SA-
type rate of 83.3%, somewhat similar to that of the BNC (= 98.6%). There is no BNC data to 
compare for masculine names, but within the COCA data, the tokens had different construal 
profiles from each other. President Bush instantiated an SA-type rate of 31.6% while the SA-
type rate for President Clinton was 45.5%. This result is likely due to register difference. When 
analyzed by individual register, the correlations are weak; however, it was determined that all 
registers (i.e., SPOK, MAG, NEWS) be tallied as a set, as everything presidents say and do, 
due to their wide-ranging clout and influence, is fodder for all forms of mass media. Supporting 
this decision is the fact that there are zero hits for the FICTION register. Thus, calculating the 
amalgamated register group (i.e., SPOK + MAG + NEWS), the frequency ratios comparing 
SA to SA-UE are 36.7% and 60%, respectively, revealing a roughly twofold preference for the 
SA-UE-type construal when the antecedent-experiencers are American presidents. This now 
seems logical or even obvious, because high-profile politicians are often thrust into various 
externally-initiated situations that they might not have foreseen. Only by engaging in corpus 
research is one able to uncover these types of distinctions and make claims with any degree of 
reliability. 
Another pattern revealed from the analysis of the COCA data is the number and type 
of metonymically-construed experiencers. Although the literally-construed plural noun people 
was the most frequent (n=81; 11.9%), and other plural or general nouns were the majority (e.g., 
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woman, man, child, family etc.), metonymically-construed experiencers were a prominent 
factor in the data, the frequency ratio of metonymically-construed nouns being about 25%. 
Total frequencies and ratios as well as SA and SA-UE ratios of metonymic experiencers are 
shown in Table 5.  
Within the metonymically-construed experiencer category, the SA-UE to SA ratio is 
roughly 3:1, dominated by the conceptual metonym ORGANIZATION STANDS FOR THE 
PEOPLE IN THE ORGANIZATION, similar to the conceptual metaphor ORGANIZATIONS 
ARE PEOPLE (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Due to the reflexive construction, sentience of 
the antecedent-experiencer is necessary in order for the find x-self metaphor to be appropriately 
construed (how can a non-sentient object be aware of oneself?), and so the antecedent-
experiencers are construed in sentient terms. References to individual people in an organization 
are replaced by the name of the organization itself. As such, in these types of examples, due to 
the specific metonymic mapping of the antecedent-reflexive pronoun pair and not the overall 
metaphor and its reliance on the metaphorically-construed verb, the terminology used here for 
this is conceptual metonym. 
 
 Table 5. COCA data for [n*][findv][ppx*]: Frequencies and ratios for SA and SA-UE-types for 
metonymically construed experiencers.  
Metonymically-construed experiencer + (prorefl) FREQ,  ratio SA SA-UE 
State (itself) n=40,    5.6% 15% 85% 
Government (itself) n=25,    3.5% 24% 76% 
Administration (itself) n=21,    2.9% 27.3% 71.4% 
Church (itself) n=18,    2.5% 44.4% 66.7% 
Company (itself) n=15,    2.1% 13.3% 86.7% 
Industry (itself) n=15,    2.1% 33.3% 66.7% 
U.S. (itself) n=12,    1.7% 16.7% 83.3% 
Country (themselves) n=11,    1.5% 9.1% 91% 
Country (itself) n=11,   1.5% 27.3% 72.7% 
Total ratio (average)  23.4% 77.7% 
 
For cases in which the antecedent-experiencer is metonymically construed, the SA-UE 
type is 54.3% more frequent. The likely reason for this concerns the nature of the metonyms’ 
mappings. Because the metonyms in this data are politically and/or financially related, they are 
more likely to be mapped onto situations in society, not on an individual’s mental state per se, 
but on the experiencers’ realization of some surprising or unexpected external situation. We 
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can calculate these registers using the same parameters used previously for the BNC data, i.e., 
the aggregate set: [SPOK + MAG + NEWS], and compare it with the FIC register. About double 
the frequency ratio (53.8%) for the aggregate set than the FIC category (27.7%) is shown in 
Table 6. When specifically looking at the SA-type construal for each of these metonyms (from 
Table 5), none of the 47 SA-type tokens are from the FIC register, further supporting this 
situational hypothesis for metonymic experiencer-antecedents. 
 
Table 6. COCA search [n*][find][ppx*] : Frequencies and per million totals by register. 
 FREQ PER MIL ratio (%) 
SPOKEN 575 5.3 10.3 
FICTION 1479 14.1 27.7 
MAGAZINE 1225 11.1 21.9 
NEWSPAPER 1166 11 21.6 
ACADEMIC 976 9.4 18.5 
Total 5421   
 
Lastly, all of the metonymically construed nouns pair with the singular impersonal 
pronoun itself, except for Country, which is construed as both plural (i.e., countries find/found 
themselves…) and singular (i.e., country finds/found itself…). The frequencies and ratios here 
are noteworthy. Whereas the plural form expresses the SA-UE type construal 91% of the time, 
the singular form construes SA-UE at a ratio of 72.7%. Conversely, the SA-type construal is 
more frequent at 27.3% when the antecedent-experiencer is singular than when plural at 9.1%. 
This is significant (p-value= 0.001494 at p < .05) and adds support to the claim made in section 
2.2, i.e., that it is more common and natural to construe the SA type for a single experiencer 
than it is for multiple people or a group of people. This has to do with the nature of perceptual 
self-awareness being a highly intimate mental state. It is therefore easier to express a single 
entity’s perceptual awareness than it is to generalize about a number of individuals or group. 
 
2.6.1 Nouns as Antecedents: sorted by ‘word’ 
 
Due to limitations of mining certain aspects of the data in the above lemma-based search such 
as tense, aspect and number, another search was conducted in which tokens were sorted by 
word in order to test whether other collocational patterns (Hunston & Francis, 2000; John 
Sinclair, 1991; Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2003) would emerge. The input search parameter 
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Table 7. Frequencies of [n*][find][ppx*] according to tense and subject number. 
COCA present past TOTAL 
singular 134 233 367 
plural 315 148 463 
BNC    
singular 14 240 254 
plural 59 4 63 
TOTAL 522 625 
singular total = 621 
plural total= 526 
   
Table 8. COCA search [n*][find][ppx*]; metonymically construed antecedents, sorted by word. 
 singular plural  present tense past tense 
administration 21 - 13 8 
allies - 5 - 5 
America 6 - 6 - 
church 17 - 10 7 
city 5 - 5 - 
company 15 - 6 9 
countries - 14 7 7 
country 9 - 9 - 
families 10 - 5 5 
family 8 - - 8 
government 25 - 11 14 
groups - 5 5 - 
industry 11 - - 11 
Iraq 5 - 5 - 
police - 5 - 5 
president 17 - 10 7 
states - 30 15 15 
U.S. 7 - 7 - 
universities - 7 7 - 
world 7 - 7 - 
TOTAL 163 63 128 101 
 
In the COCA, metonymic singular antecedents are twice as frequent than the plural 
forms (n=14 and n=7, respectively). When this is combined with the data on tense, however, 
no significant relationship 15  is found (p=0.254109, at p<0.5). Similarly, for the BNC, 
metonymic singular antecedents are slightly more than twice as frequent (n=7 vs. n=3, 
                                                
15 For this and the next calculation, integer frequency values were used in the Fisher Exact contingency tables. 
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respectively), and here as well, this is not significant when a relationship to tense is tested 
(p=0.057308 at p<0.05). Thus, even though use of the past and present related to antecedent 
number is significant for the data set [n*][find][ppx*], when the antecedent is construed 
metonymically, no significant relationship is found, except on a single axis, i.e., the antecedent 
is about twice as likely to be singular, regardless of tense. Further, the present tense is more 
than twice as likely than the past tense, regardless of antecedent number. These findings occur 
in both corpora and differ from the data for the more generic [n*][find][ppx*] search, where 
[singular + past tense] cases are 20% more likely. This reveals just how complex and subtle 
metaphoric data can be. Why do these results differ when the antecedents are metonymic? The 
singular antecedent is the easier of the two to explain, namely, that many of the antecedents 
are construed as collective nouns, i.e., singular entities that contain within them the individual 
people, e.g., administration, America, family, police, etc… Although this is fairly 
straightforward, the difference in verb tense ratios still remains an enigma. Why should the 
present tense be more frequent when the noun is metonymic? The analysis here has not revealed 
any identifiable pattern, and so, at least for the moment, this point remains unresolved. This 
uncertainty leads into the next section concerning the analysis of ambiguous metaphoric 
construals for full noun-antecedents. 
 
Table 9. BNC search [n*][find][ppx*]; metonymically construed antecedents, sorted by word. 
 singular plural present tense past tense 
BBC 2 - - 2 
Britain 2 - - 2 
council 6 - 6 - 
family 2 - 2 - 
Germany 2 - - 2 
house 2 - 2 - 
institutions - 2 2 - 
Korea 2 - - 2 
police - 2 2 - 
schools - 3 3 - 
TOTAL 18 7 17 8 
[COCA+BNC] TOTAL 181 70 145 109 
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2.7 Fuzzy construals for [n*][find][ppx*] 
 
In the present era and with the technology we now possess, description of language conception, 
construal, and predication is an imprecise business, and so the utmost effort must be made for 
transparency and reliability (and repeatability) of the data and its analysis. Thus, along with 
uncovering systematic consistencies that explain much of the data, the importance of revealing 
and delineating ambiguous cases cannot be overstated. SA Events are verifiable with few 
exceptions, proving to be a reliable conceptual paradigm for [find x-self]. However, there are 
vague examples whose categorizations are not easily made. The discussion in this section 
describes this decision-making process and challenges related to such cases. 
When antecedent-pronoun pairs are metonymically construed, there were some 
instances where the difference between SA and SA-UE were difficult to distinguish.  
 
2.29. SA: The Alberta government found itself trying to battle a tax it had  
vigorously objected to during the summer…  
(COCA:2004.ACAD.CanadianStud) 
 
2.30. SA-UE: …that the federal government found itself wasting taxpayer  
dollars that were supposed to be helping young people go to college…  
(COCA:1995.MAG.WashMonth)              
 
As explained thus far, the criterion used to distinguish between SA and SA-UE-types of 
construal was being able to construe (or not) an internal perceptual awareness for the 
metonymic entity. In the SA example above, the Alberta government is construed as a sentient 
being (i.e., conceptual metonymy = GOVERMENT STANDS FOR GOVERMENT 
EMPLOYEES), which is trying to battle a tax (i.e., conceptual metaphor = ARGUMENT IS 
WAR). Trying to battle is construed as an internally based action and its perception, the force 
of the struggle (i.e., trying to battle) is being viscerally felt by the metonymic experiencer. This 
is supported by the double-underlined, emotionally-charged context, vigorously objected to. 
These pieces of contextual evidence reinforce an SA-type analysis. In the next SA-UE example, 
on the other hand, even though the federal government is construed metonymically as a 
PERSON, wasting taxpayer dollars does not correspond to any internal perception on the part 
of that metonymically construed entity. The construed action of wasting here is involuntary (it 
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would, after all, be extremely rare for a government to admit its purposeful wastefulness) and 
thus, this action is considered based outside the realm of direct and embodied perception, an 
SA-UE-type construal.  
As explained earlier, one other criterion for supporting the decision of SA or SA-UE 
was whether the experiencer was specific or general. When the experiencer referred to a 
specific person or people, and their internal perceptions were described in an immediate and 
direct context, the event was labelled SA. In the example below, it was noticed (after reviewing 
the expanded text) that the antecedent refers to a particular family having ten individually-
construed children, and that the event takes into account each of their personal experiences in 
the social welfare system. Thus, the direct perceptual experiences of these children as 
individuals (as well as a group) added weight to an SA determination for this context. 
 
2.31. SA: The children found themselves in a foster care system the state itself  
acknowledges is overwhelmed…   (COCA:2003.SPOK.NBC_Dateline)  
 
This is contrasted with the following SA-UE example in which children in general are aware 
of some external situation:  
 
2.32. SA-UE: …something must be done to improve the settings in which the vast  
majority of children find themselves for at least part of the day.  
(COCA:2004.ACAD.CanadianStud)  
 
It was mentioned previously that phrases such as situation, position, etc. may influence the 
type of construal, but that it was not the sole determiner. In cases as the above, and for most 
experiencers, when nouns in general are referred to, an immediate, direct awareness of 
perceptions is difficult to justify, and therefore they are more likely to be construed as SA-UE, 
as in the example above with its situational cue settings. But again, these need to be examined 
on a case-by-case basis, carefully considering the FoAs along with their expanded contexts. 
 
2.33. SA: …the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, the  
United States found itself engaging in reactive transformation…  
(COCA:2009.ACAD.ForeignAffairs)      
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2.34. SA-UE: By the end of the 1960s, the United States found itself engaged in  
what political scientist Robert Justin Goldstein called " a cultural war…  
(COCA:2007.MAG.MilitaryHist)  
 
Examples 2.34 and 2.35 are further explicate the difference between SA and SA-UE 
events and the conceptual subtleties involved therein. In the first SA example, the United States 
is a metonym for the members of the United States government, and the metonym construes 
those members as though they are a single, sentient being. As such, they may undergo the same 
kinds of direct experiences as any singular sentient being. The internally-initiated activity, 
engaging in reactive transformation, along with the support context of self-initiated invasions, 
encourage an SA categorization. Although the second, SA-UE example seems similar to the 
first, it is categorized differently due to the metonymic experiencer’s awareness of being 
involved in an external, unexpected situation, one that the experiencer is much more passively 
involved. The double-underlined, supporting contexts for both examples reinforce these 
differences. In the first example, the experiencer takes the action initiation of invading, whereas 
in the second example, there is only an indefinite time-frame, by the end of the 1960’s, to bind 
the conception. Here, the FoA verb tenses (engaging vs. engaged) are related to this conceptual 
difference. Although tense of the main verb sometimes plays a functional role in conception, 
as discussed earlier in section 2.5.1., this difference is not statistically significant, and therefore 
cannot be said to play any major role in the overall analysis and results. However, because 
FoAs have such a strong influence on the main metaphor’s construal, each FoA must be 
analyzed critically. In the examples above, both main verbs are in the past tense, but the tenses 
of the FoAs guide the reader/listener into conceptions in which the experiencer is more actively 
participating and initiating action in the first event but is a more distanced and more passive 
participant in the second. 
Another example showing how the FoA guides the conceptual differences between SA 
and SA-UE is the following:  
 
2.35. The Bush administration found itself attacking Iraq militarily after  
years of supporting it financially.   (COCA:1992.SPOK.ABC_Nightline)   
 
An SA-type analysis would consider the FoA verb attacking as an internal, directly perceived 
activity of the experiencer. On the other hand, under an SA-UE-type analysis, a group-oriented 
	 57	
decision would strongly be taken into account, where the action is not solely based within a 
single metonymic experiencer Bush administration. Here, the metonym is more loosely 
interpreted, and members of the administration share in the decision-making process, thus, not 
strictly an internally initiated action and awareness. But along with these kinds of issues, other 
points need consideration as well for this analysis, such as the nature of the corpus register, in 
this case Spoken: TV news program, as well as other contextual clues (double-underlined) 
found throughout the expanded context (see below). Taken together, the data suggests an 
internally-construed event, i.e., SA, for the above example. Interestingly, the fourth line of the 
expanded context includes another case of find x-self, but in this case, SA-UE is determined 
due to the externally-initiated action of accusations of criminal actions (by the Democratic 
party) to which the President and his advisors are suspected. Thus, a variety of contextual clues 
given by way of the FoAs and other related context assist in appropriately interpreting the 
experiencer’s activity/passivity in the event, and thus the quality of their Awareness of that 
event. 
 
Expanded context (abridged): 
When the United States and its Arab allies drove Iraqi troops out of Kuwait less than 18 
months ago, it ended a bizarre turnaround in American foreign policy. The Bush 
administration found itself attacking Iraq militarily after years of supporting it financially. 
Now the President and his advisers, find themselves suspected, not only of bad judgment, 
but of possible criminal actions. For months, Democrats in Congress, have been exploring 
what they see as the policy mistakes, and George Bush's role in them.  
 (COCA:1992.SPOK.ABC_Nightline)   
 
Further complicating decisions about ‘fuzzy’ examples are tokens in which the FoA is 
itself metaphorical:  
 
2.36. SA-UE: Bush finds himself swimming in similar historical tides, forging his  
own alliances…     (COCA:2002:NEWS.Atlanta)  
 
In this example, the FoA is metaphorical (e.g., swimming in similar historical tides) and 
denotes Bush’s awareness of himself being in situations which are comparable to historic 
events. Even though the FoA verb swimming is a self-initiated action, it is metaphoric, and thus 
here, the SOURCE loses its literal sense of physical self-propulsion but keeps its sense of being 
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surrounded by liquid. This is supported by the metaphoric word tides that construes an image 
of strong currents over which floating objects have little control. Thus, Bush had little personal 
control over his external situation, a prototypical SA-UE construal. 
On the other hand, an example where SA is warranted for a metaphoric (metonymic?) 
FoA is the following:  
 
2.37. SA: As the week went on, Bush found himself saying in one breath that he  
wants to change the tone in Washington and work across the aisle, and in the  
next, laying into Gore for seven and a half years of failure.  
(COCA:2000.SPOK.NPR_Saturday)  
 
Saying in one breath…and in the next is a fairly idiomatic (i.e., non-compositional) FoA, but 
the construal is considered an SA-type due the actual physical verbalizations of the experiencer 
and his awareness of those physical perceptions. Granted, this is a borderline case, and an SA-
UE interpretation is also possible, e.g., one where Bush had uttered contradictory statements, 
but his awareness of those contradictions occurred at a later date and so they were unexpected 
and surprising even to him. However, in this case, due to the likely and very real possibility of 
the experiencer’s direct perceptual awareness of his first utterance, immediately followed by 
his second verbal assault on Gore, the SA-type categorization was determined. 
Another fuzzy example is the following:  
 
2.38. SA: Bush finds himself under attack from both sides on abortion.   
(COCA:1999.NEWS.Atlanta)  
 
This example, perhaps contrary to expectation, has been categorized as SA, because even 
though under attack from both sides implies the experiencer’s unexpected involvement in the 
attack, it is proposed here that being under attack is the direct physical and/or psychological 
perception of being attacked. Again, in this and all fuzzy cases, event construals need to be 
analyzed on individual bases. In this example, under attack is a conceptual metaphor (i.e., 
ARGUMENT IS WAR) that construes a situation in which the experiencer is surrounded by 
arguments from two sides. The FoA is the experiencer’s awareness of the direct stimulus of 
that attack, a condition deemed within the experiencer’s realm of immediate, internal 
perception, and as such, an SA-type construal. The expanded context corroborates this analysis. 
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Here, Bush’s many controversial decisions are described, decisions that he directly instigated 
and initiated, and therefore he had direct knowledge and awareness of them and of their 
consequences, incongruent with an unexpected event analysis. 
 
Expanded context: 
He signed a bill, over the objections of many Texas police chiefs, allowing Texans with 
permits to carry concealed weapons. " I don't imagine that any governor could have gone 
against the Legislature on concealed weapons, " Rostow said. # This year, he outlawed 
lawsuits by local governments against gun manufacturers -- although no Texas municipality 
was known to be considering such a lawsuit. # ABORTION # Bush finds himself under attack 
from both sides on abortion. # He incurred the wrath of pro-life leaders this year when he 
declared that abortion would not be a litmus test in his choice for vice presidential running 
mate or judgeships. # Along with other mainstream Republican candidates for president, the 
governor has sought to play down the abortion issue in his campaign. # But the National 
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League has tried to remind voters in key primary 
states that Bush has a long record of opposition to abortion rights… 
(COCA:1999.NEWS.Atlanta)  
 
In similar examples where total context is indispensable for appropriate construal, the 
words situation and caught up in, as part of the FoA are, in general, labeled SA-UE due to the 
construal of an external stimulus. However, in the following case, the experiencer is construed 
as more active in the embodied perceptions, evidenced both by the adverbials preceding the 
experiencer (i.e., shocked, scared) and by the psychological addendum (overwhelmed, double 
underlined) in the sentence following the event. Therefore, in this case, the example is 
considered an SA event construal. 
 
2.39. SA: …no one has made a plan for this situation, and shocked and scared  
family members find themselves caught up in a maze of choices. They're  
overwhelmed.      (COCA:2013.MAG.SatEvenPost).  
 
In another example of this type, the immediacy of the perceptions along with the focus on the 
experiencers’ physical struggles facilitate an SA marking.  
 
2.40. SA: Luckily, within moments the boat rolled upright again. But crew members  
found themselves caught in a maze of twisted rigging and ropes, struggling  
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to get free…      (COCA:1999.SPOK.NBC_Dateline) 
 
Examples containing to face something or face to face with something as part of the FoA were 
categorized as SA due to the metonym/metaphor face, suggesting a more direct physical 
construal. 
 
2.41. SA: Scrooge finds himself face to face with a strange-looking being.  
(COCA:2006.FIC.Read)            
                             
2.42. …districts already facing the difficulty of supporting teachers in high- 
poverty schools find themselves with the extra burden of providing extensive  
in-service training…     (COCA:2013.ACAD.RuralSpecEd)   
 
 
2.43. But a company finding itself in a crisis today faces pressures far different in  
a landscape much more treacherous…  (COCA:2007.MAG.Fortune) 
 
Cases in which an externally-based force-dynamic construal was part of the FoA were 
marked SA-UE. This is due to the origin of the force being extrinsic to the Self, as previously 
discussed. This can be demonstrated by the following example:  
 
2.44. SA-UE: When I found myself having to learn French, to memorize maps of  
Montreal, I had to quit the club.    (COCA:2010.Bk:GhostsDoingOrange)  
 
Having to learn expresses an unwanted situation that one was perhaps not in control of, as far 
as the self-initiated action of learning is concerned. The extended context below supports this 
by evidencing the lack of control the experiencer felt. 
 
Expanded context (abridged):  
Once, when New York City was still New York City, I'd belonged to a squash club on 
Fifth Avenue. Someone I played with got it into his head that I was Canadian, 
introduced me to someone else - I let it go. It seemed impolite to insist. Within weeks 
I was tangled up in explanations, recriminations, and invented histories. When I 
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found myself having to learn French, to memorize maps of Montreal, I had to quit the 
club.  
 
In most cases, modal auxiliary verbs16 (see Appendix 6), which express various states 
and levels of necessity and/or possibility, contribute a more indirect, externally-construed 
awareness of an event, and as such, in general, the SA-UE marking was determined appropriate, 
as in the examples below.  
 
2.45. SA-UE: She’d find herself alone on the savannah, a fine treat for a bunch of  
lions.      (COCA:2013.MAG.NewRepublic)  
 
2.46. Could she, Colene, find herself trapped in this towerlike edifice?  
(COCA:1992.FIC.BkSF:FractalMode)  
 
In these examples, the events are not yet actualized (i.e., real) and this lends a conceptual 
quality that is not-yet-perceptually-embodied and/or more distanced from the experiencer’s 
point of view. On the other hand, sometimes even with a modal auxiliary, the actions have been 
actualized (at some point) or are a very real possibility, and therefore the experiencer can be 
immediately and perceptually aware, as in the SA examples below. 
 
2.47. SA: And every once in a great while, I might find myself peeling away a  
worthless canvas to find a Ver-meer beneath.  
(COCA:2013.FIC.Bk:AppleOrcahrd) 
  
2.48. …you may actually find yourself getting weaker because your muscle will  
constantly be in the broken-down phase…  
(COCA:1993.Mag.MensHealth) 
 
Due to the possibility of either the SA-UE or SA event being construed, each token was 
analyzed individually and given a designation based on the general guidelines for all [find x-
self] cases discussed in previous sections. 
                                                
16 In a search with parameters [ _vm* [find][ppx*]] (i.e., [modal + find + any reflexive pronoun]), sorted by 
lemma, there were 1942 tokens in the COCA (n ≥10) and 535 in the BNC (n≥5). 
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One last example concludes this section.  
 
2.49. …some staffs over-schedule, one reason patients often find themselves waiting. 
       (COCA:1990.NEWS.WashPost)  
 
Is the FoA verb waiting used from a personal, direct perceptual point of view (the experiencer 
waiting) or from a more external and situational point of view (the situation of waiting)? After 
examining the expanded context, shown below, the overall topic of that news article was found 
to be, “The question your doctor doesn’t ask: Are you satisfied?” This article refers to an 
overall situation of health care and to a group of people who, according to the writer, probably 
share similar unpleasant situations to whom the writer then gives advice. The writer is not 
describing the awareness of a single individual’s direct perception of waiting. Furthermore, as 
discussed in the previous section, plural and group antecedent-experiencers often take the SA-
UE construal due to the difficulty of assigning the awareness of a direct perception onto more 
than one individual. For all of the above reasons, the example was marked SA-UE. 
 
Expanded context (abridged):  
We ask a lot of doctors. Patients must equally ask themselves: If I want to be satisfied with 
my care, what can I do? # I would say: # Show up on time for appointments. If you can't, 
phone as early as possible. " No shows " -- too frequent -- make some staffs over-schedule, 
one reason patients often find themselves waiting. # Know what you want to ask or learn 
well before you enter the doctor's examining room. 
 
2.8 Chapter Conclusion  
 
What are the implications of the results discussed in Chapter 2? First and foremost, 
collocational evidence strongly points to the mental state of Self-Awareness as the fundamental 
conception for the majority of [find x-self] data. That being the case, Self-Awareness is thus 
most likely functioning as an image schema (aka basic domain), as defined in Chapter 1. This 
is no trivial point, considering the limited amount of corpus data used as evidence for many 
theoretically-based discussions on the matter. It is suggested here that self-awareness is the 
embodied foundational mental function for Self-Aware Events, containing two sub-types of 
construal; the Self-Aware type, in which awareness of an experiencer’s internally-based, direct 
perception(s) is described, and the Self-Aware Unexpected Event type, which describes the 
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experiencer’s awareness of an externally-initiated, unexpected situation. The discussion above 
provided numerous and varied accounts of these phenomena, and discussed fuzzy cases and 
their possible resolutions.  
Second, the method implemented for delineating metaphor and metonymy of these 
predications was created out of pragmatic necessity. The combinatory use of the fundamental 
tenets of MIPVU (i.e., objectively identifying metaphors), followed by in-depth corpus 
analyses of selected metaphors within the reflexive construction, created a unique and 
transparent methodology. Each of these steps were deemed essential for objectivity of the data-
based collocational core upon which successive steps of the inquiry could proceed. Although 
no research can be one-hundred percent objective, by eliminating as many intuitive 
assumptions and statements in the first stages, in-depth analysis was able to proceed with as 
little noise in the data as possible.  
Finally, the corpus-based inquiry for [find x-self] revealed four metaphorical senses; 1) 
Self-Aware Events, 2) Self-Aware Unexpected Events, 3) True-Self Metaphors, and 4) Picture 
Noun Schemas, as well as literal meanings. This is impressive on two counts; first, it takes into 
consideration only one verb contained within a narrowly defined construction, i.e., find within 
the reflexive construction, and from this, five independent senses are construed and predicated. 
Second, it presents strong evidence that collocation plays an important role in semantics. That 
such a restricted construction can have this many possible conceptions is both daunting and 
freeing. It is daunting because it forces one to reevaluate previously held notions about the 
relations between grammar, context and meaning. It is freeing because once the data are viewed 
from relatively unbiased perspectives, one needs only to employ appropriate methodology to 
uncover various patterns within that data and to describe them with efficiency and clarity.  
One study that illustrates these points comes from comparative research on a parallel 
corpus. Analyzing English and Norwegian text translations from the English Norwegian 
Parallel Corpus (ENPC+), Ebeling and Ebeling (2013) compared the use of found REFL (i.e., 
found x-self) in original English text sources to their Norwegian translations. It was shown that 
where the English glosses used found x-self, there were various Norwegian verbs that were 
used as translations. The sample size was limited and they retrieved only significant 
frequencies for the past tense found along with three pronouns, himself, herself, and myself 
(although they included themselves to increase the sample size). However, they conclude that 
a colligational approach to these translations is beneficial. Analyzing the colligations that occur 
after the reflexive pronoun (i.e., the FoA), three patterns are focused on, based on the entry for 
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find in the Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. By separating and analyzing each 
of the post-REFL colligations as individual meaningful units, the researchers were able to 
roughly correlate the translation glosses. 
Their first analyzed pattern, [found REFL (NP)dO (direct object)], which was noticed 
to be indicative of the non-reflexive use of the anaphoric pronoun, has a mainly benefactive 
meaning; 
 
2.50. He himself crawled into his lair, found himself a back to lie against, doubled  
up and fell asleep. (KAL1T) 
 
This pattern yielded the highest ratio of congruent (word-for-word) translations (Norwegian, 
BEFINNE REFL), and will not be commented upon further here due to the non-reflexive nature 
of the construction.  
The other two main post-REFL patterns that were instantiated were found PP/Adv. and 
found V-ing. These glosses are mostly non-congruent. It was shown that by separating the two 
colligational types, the translations were more semantically consistent.  “… we concluded that 
the same pattern (i.e., found REFL) is used in two different extended units of meaning. When 
followed by V-ing the semantic prosody is neutral, suggesting that the subject found out that 
he/she was doing something by accident; similarly, when followed by a PP, the semantic 
prosody is also fairly neutral, suggesting that the subject found out that he/she was situated 
somewhere by accident” (ibid., p. 150, my parenthesis).  
 
 2.51. found V-ing: “Yes,” she found herself saying. (AnCl1E) 
 
 2.52. found PP: A quarter of an hour later they found themselves in a darkened  
bomb crater of a street. (JoNe2TE)  
        (ibid., p. 136) 
 
As for the meaning of these post-REFL patterns themselves, the results of the study 
only really differentiate between the function of predicates and prepositions in general, viz. to 
describe actions and to describe the relationship between two things, respectively. The only 
difference they note is in the added conception of discovery or unintentionality. Furthermore, 
and more importantly, their English source examples included a variety of construal types, and 
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even on one page, SA, SA-UE, and PNS construal types17 were exemplified, complicating the 
analysis. In other words, the research did not distinguish between the different metaphorical 
meanings of found x-self, as shown in the present research. By examining and categorizing the 
English source texts in this way, many of the inconsistencies of verb-to-verb glosses may be 
resolved. For example, sentences 10.27 through 10.29 from that research all instantiate found 
REFL as the construction, glossed by three different Norwegian verbs. Upon examination from 
the viewpoint suggested here, however, the English source texts construe three different 
meanings of found x-self, PNS in 10.27, SA in 10.28, and SA-UE in 10.29; 
 
2.53. (10.27) …and found himself reduced to a detail in oil paint in a garish  
illustration… (JH1)  
 
2.54. (10.28) The carriage was hot, and several of the people he found himself  
crushed up against clearly hadn’t bathed that morning. (PeRo2E) 
 
2.55. (10.29) So Perez found himself sat at a table with Willy…(AnCl1E) 
         (ibid., p. 143) 
 
Thus, although in general agreement with regard to the importance of the post-REFL elements 
(i.e., the FoA) for appropriate construal of an event, questions arise due to the lack of semantic 
categorization of the events’ most distinguishing elements, i.e., the different metaphoric senses 
of found x-self. Focus only on the syntax of the FoA may account for specific and limited 
translation glosses, but it does not address the fundamental conceptions of find x-self, now 
known to be essential for proper construal, and thus, translation. That being said, the authors 
do acknowledge the importance of this polysemy, as they state, “The contrastive analysis has 
revealed that the pattern found REFL is highly versatile and is used in a number of different 
contexts…it could be argued that found REFL is polysemous, and as such gives rise to two 
different extended units” (ibid., p. 150). The present research has shown that the construction 
gives rise not only to two extended units, but four metaphorical senses and one literal sense 
that are involved intricately with their respective FoAs, ipso facto complicating the accuracy 
and efficiency of translations. Although the present research does not directly deal with 
                                                
17 The authors state that they could find no examples of the ‘deeper-self’ (i.e., TSM) in the ENPC+ nor in the 
BNC, although it has been shown here that there are, in fact, a few examples of this in the BNC. 
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comparisons across languages, it does discuss comparisons between British and American 
English as well as different corpus registers, and thus, relates to translations studies in a 
methodologically important way.  
Having shown that the methodology implemented here for find x-self is beneficial for 
uncovering various semantic and collocational patterns as well as idiosyncrasies, it is now 
timely to find out if this method is useful with other verbs that appear in the reflexive 
construction. Corpus analysis, results, and discussion of the lose x-self construction will follow 
in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LOSE X-SELF 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous section, metaphorically construed find x-self was discussed in detail. This 
construction construes different meanings depending on context. Four of these meanings are 
metaphorical, two of which contain perceptual Self-Awareness as an image schema used for 
the metaphorical construal. The purpose of this chapter is to show that the verb lose is also 
metaphorically construed, has Self-Awareness as its conceptual image schema, and that these 
are verifiable by contextual evidence through corpus analysis.  
 To begin this section, the following quotation is offered: 
 
From our tour of the metaphor system for the Self, we will find that, first, we do 
conceptualize a single person as divided. Second, the divisions are not consistent with each 
other. That is, we have a system of divisions that don’t fit together into a simple general 
scheme. Third, we reason and talk about these internal divisions in terms of relations 
between external individuals (G. Lakoff, 1996, p. 101). 
 
The phenomenon described above is called the Divided-Person Metaphor, discussed in detail 
in Module 2. The ‘Divided Person’ metaphor is the basis for different metaphors that concern 
the Self. Among those outlined by Lakoff are the following: Objective-Subject, Loss-of-Self, 
Split-Self, True-Self, Real-Me, General Inner-Self, True-to-Yourself, Absent-Subject, 
Scattered-Self, Self-as-Companion, Self-Sacrifice Complex and Self-Control-Is-Up (ibid.) 
Although instances of these are found throughout English, only two of these are of immediate 
concern for the topic at hand. These are Loss-of-Self and True-Self. The discussion here 
proposes that the underlying conception of Divided Person may not be the most efficient 
conceptual categorization for the verb lose when predicated within the reflexive construction. 
The results of the data analysis suggest that the notion of Self-Aware Event accounts for more 
data, more efficiently and with fewer exceptions.  
A brief view of what Lakoff (1992, 1996) calls the “Loss-of-Self” metaphor is provided 
below. He defines this as follows: 
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What does it mean to lose yourself in some activity? It means to cease to be in conscious 
control and to cease to be aware of each thing one is doing…In the Loss-of-Self metaphor, 
conscious control is conceptualized as position of the Self by the Subject, and ceasing to 
be in control is loss…The Loss-of-Self metaphor is thus a way of conceptualizing a wide 
range of very real experiences, both positive and negative (1996, p. 103). 
 
According to this definition, to lose yourself in some activity means (1) to cease to be in 
conscious control. This is conceptualized as position of the Self by the Subject, and ceasing to 
be in control is loss, and (2) to cease to be aware of each thing one is doing. Lakoff merges 
these two definitions, but what will be shown in the analysis below is that the most common 
type of construal is that in which one ceases to be aware of anything, with one caveat, that 
awareness is lost for all but that which is focused upon. Lakoff’s definition deals primarily 
with lack of control (of Self), and his use of aware in line 2 occurs only with respect to this 
control. In contrast to this, the definition presented here deals primarily with awareness as a 
perceptual mental state, where the conception of lose x-self is the lack of awareness of anything 
but the Focus of Awareness (FoA). Lakoff’s use of the concept of control is a natural one in 
the overall Divided Self paradigm, and the metaphorical use of the word lose in the metaphor 
seems to instantiate that. After all, to lose a thing once possessed is to lose control of that thing. 
To demonstrate this, Lakoff (ibid, p. 104) maps the ‘Loss-of-Self’ metaphor, shown below:  
 
(i) The Self is possession of the Subject 
(ii) Control of the Self by Subject is possession 
(iii) Loss of control is loss of possession 
 
Knowledge Mapping:  
Source Domain Knowledge: if a possession of yours is taken, then you no longer have it. 
Target Domain Knowledge: if something takes control of you, you no longer have control. 
Subcase 1: Positive loss of Self: freedom from normal concerns 
Examples: I lost myself in dancing. Only in meditation was she able to let go of herself. 
She let herself go on the dance floor. 
Subcase 2: Negative loss of Self: emotional and demonic possession 
Examples: I don’t know what possessed me to do that. I was seized by a longing  
for her. I got carried away. He’s in the grip of an intense hatred. He was possessed by 
the devil. He’s in the grip of his past. 
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We see here the focus on control of the Subject over Self in the mapping, based on the Target 
Domain Knowledge required to understand this metaphor. Lakoff’s interests here are to show 
that Loss-of-Self metaphors exist as Conceptual Metaphors. This goal differs from the main 
purpose here, which is to show how and to what extent the lose x-self construction is 
metaphorically construed and predicated in language use by employing data-based 
methodology as a way to define collocational patterns and semantic categorizations that may 
arise from this data. When this methodology is adhered to, the result is surprising. The Loss-
of-Self metaphor does not express itself in the data. This does not mean they do not exist in 
other constructions, or in other corpora. However, Lakoff’s use of the first example in Subcase 
1 from above, i.e., I lost myself in dancing, and similar such examples, are shown not to be 
based on loss of control, but on the intensity of concentration on a single object to the detriment 
of general self-awareness. The evidence for this is twofold as discussed in Module 2: 1) the 
metonymic referent of the reflexive pronoun is the mental state of Self-Awareness, and 2) the 
contextual FoA is essential for proper construal. When these points are taken into consideration, 
the Self-Aware Event emerges as a simple and efficient explanation for most of the data. 
 The other conceptual metaphor proposed by Lakoff is the True-Self Metaphor, 
discussed in Section 2. However, it takes on a slightly different meaning when instantiated in 
the lose x-self construction. For find x-self, it referred to the realization of a deeper, more core 
Self which is realized. For lose x-self, it refers to the (temporary) absence of this innermost 
Self, usually due to some psychological trauma or experience. It will be seen that, contrary to 
opinion (G. Lakoff, 1996), lose x-self and find x-self can thus construe opposite meanings. 
Considering the frequency of the True-Self Metaphor in the data, however, the prototypical 
categorization for the lose x-self construction is proposed as the Self-Aware Event. Again, 
although frequency itself does not directly instantiate entrenchment within a language 
community, it does provide a litmus test for commonness in use, and thus the more likely it is 
to be entrenched. What is immediately of concern here, methodologically, is the direction in 
which the data points. In order to explore this, an effective method for data retrieval and 
analysis needs to be elucidated. 
 
3.2 Method 
 
The initial steps of metaphor identification and categorization for lose x-self are the same as 
those described in the previous sections. However, based on the data for lose x-self, analyses 
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revealed idiosyncrasies that did not appear in the find x-self data. Compared to find x-self, it 
was much more difficult to delineate many of the tokens for lose x-self, and expanded contexts 
needed to be consulted numerous times for accuracy. There were a few examples where 
categorization was impossible to determine absolutely, and/or in which two or more construals 
were ultimately plausible. These cases were marked ‘?’. 
According to the data retrieved from both corpora, one semantic categorization change 
from find x-self concerns the literal (LIT) category. There were three meanings that were 
grouped together under this label18, although admittedly, the third one is not literal in the strict 
sense. The decision to include this in the LIT category was based on the meaning of LIT 2, to 
be unanimous amongst a group of people or objects. With this in mind, LIT 3 sense construes 
the main topic of conversation getting lost amongst other topics and trains of thought. The 
three LITERAL subcategories are: 
 
LIT 1: to be lost in a location:  
3.1.…he had accepted the same invitation, stepped through the entrance and 
within three minutes lost himself helplessly in a second-floor cul-de-sac. 
Kaldren had taken half an hour to find him.  
(COCA:2014.FIC.WestHumRev) 
 
LIT 2: to be unidentifiable amongst a group of people or objects:  
3.2.It had the cunning of the vole. Like the owl, it could lose itself in the 
forest.      (BNC:HTM.W_fict_prose) 
 
LIT 3: to get off topic in one’s narrative: 
3.3.…were packing up wholesale (pause) so (pause) erm (pause) I've lost 
myself a little bit now.  
(SP:PS08Y) No, you were talking about er (pause)…    
(BNC:KC0.S_conv) 
 
There were three metaphoric senses that were either very narrow in their conception, were non-
compositional, i.e., their meanings were fixed and components were mostly non-
                                                
18 When analyzing the data, each type of LITERAL and IDIOMATIC case was individually marked, i.e., LIT 1, 
2, 3 and IDI 1, 2, 3, respectively. 
	 71	
interchangeable, and/or had extremely low frequency. I have thus considered these idiomatic 
cases. They are marked IDIOM (IDI).  These three idioms are: 
 
IDI 1: to have sexual intercourse: 
3.4.…and let her see how human he was as he merged with her 
and lost himself inside her.  (BNC:JYD.W_fict_prose) 
 
IDI 2: to die: 
3.5.…she realized we were kindred spirits, or knew in her final moments 
that in losing herself, she saved me.  (COCA:2006.FIC.Analog) 
 
IDI 3: to abruptly leave or go away: 
3.6.Candace gave her little brother a cutting worldly look. " Go lose 
yourself." # Stefan began to retreat, gladly.  
(COCA:1996.FIC.FantasySciFi) 
  
For the lose x-self data, there were no examples of the SA-UE category. The reason for 
this is inherent in the meaning of the metaphoric sense, i.e., although the circumstances causing 
or surrounding one’s loss of self-awareness are varied (i.e., internally or externally initiated), 
only the resultant, internally-perceived mental state (i.e., the loss of awareness) is reported.  
 
3.7. When he could, he enjoyed losing himself in research.  
(COCA:1995.FIC.Bk:HarmonyFleshBlack) 
 
3.8. …he will get relaxed, perhaps playing a little PlayStation Vita. Then he  
will lose himself in rap songs by Waka Flocka Flame or Machine Gun Kelly… 
      (COCA:2012.NEWS.Denver) 
 
Even though unexpected external events may have triggered the loss of self-awareness and are 
sometimes the loci for the focused attention, they are never construed from the viewpoint of 
that external loci. The event is always construed from the resultant internal, loss of perceptual 
awareness, and as such, they are construed and marked as the SA-type construal.  
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One last point concerning the methodology specific to categorizations of lose x-self is 
that there were more than an average number of non-reflexive, i.e., ‘X’ category tokens for the 
second person pronoun yourself (n=6). This was due to the instantiations of the song title by 
the rap artist Eminem named, ‘Lose Yourself’. These were excluded from the data set. 
 
3.2.1. Complexities and Subtleties 
 
It was sometimes difficult to decide whether a token was a LIT or SA category, for example:  
 
3.9. To brush up on your Southern authors, head north to Blue Bicycle Books,  
owned by local scribe Jonathan Sanchez, to lose yourself in the narrow aisles.  
(COCA: 2012.MAG.NationalGeographic)  
 
At first glance, lose oneself in the aisles suggests a LIT (1) categorization. However, the first 
part of the sentence contains the support context (double-underlined) for the FoA in the 
construal, in which the ‘reading of books’ is the action performed in those narrow aisles, and 
thus, losing oneself in the reading of books, is the proposed meaning. This token was thus 
marked as an SA-type construal.  
 
  3.10. …with garden and sea views, and a stone fireplace. You can lose yourself in  
these surroundings as at no other place in Ravello.  
(COCA:2001.MAG.TownCountry).  
 
In a similar example, given above, the token alone suggests a LIT (1) or LIT (2) 
construal; however, the FoA along with the support context contains the reference for the event, 
getting totally absorbed in the scenery, thus construing an SA Event (i.e., being totally focused 
on the scenery to the detriment of other perceptions). 
These types of tokens were also found in cases that were initially ambiguous between 
the TSM and SA categories:  
 
3.11. If you lose yourself to rage in the complexity of battle, you are going to be  
lost…       (COCA:1997.MAG.PsychToday).  
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In this case, due to the internal emotional state of rage along with the meaning of the FoA and 
support context, an SA categorization seems appropriate here. However, the post-reflexive 
preposition to suggests a TSM-type construal. The difference can be understood by comparing 
lose oneself in rage and lose oneself to rage. These are two different conceptions; the former 
is one in which the experiencer is completely, mentally involved in his/her own rage (to the 
detriment of any other awareness, i.e., SA event). The latter is a construal in which one part of 
the mind is in a psychodynamic opposition to the emotion rage. The deeper Self is overpowered 
by the emotional Self, a TSM-type construal. The support contexts from the expanded context 
(see below) confirm the TSM-type analysis for the example above. 
 
Expanded  context: 
Instead, the information you're processing is that an incoming missile is 15 kilometers away, 
now 10 kilometers away, now 5 kilometers. You have to separate yourself psychologically 
from the fact that your mortal existence may well end. That is the ancient reality of war. PT: 
You've been in combat. What did you learn from your experiences? FRIEDMAN: The 
important thing is that there is an element of rage, but you must remain very distant from 
it. If you lose yourself to rage in the complexity of battle, you are going to be lost. The warrior 
must continue to make decisions in the face of extreme circumstances. He can not afford to 
get angry or frightened.  (COCA:1997.MAG.PsychToday) 
 
Another example of the subtleties involved when analyzing these kinds of data is the 
following:  
3.12. …and comedy is the only way that we can feel present and lose ourselves.  
(COCA:2014.SPOK.NPR) 
 
Discussed in Module 2, most cases of clause final find x-self constructions are an indicator of 
TSM because they lack an FoA in which Self-Awareness is to be focused. This is valid here as 
well. In this case, however, comedy is the event’s FoA for lose x-self, and thus can be rephrased 
as lose ourselves in comedy, an SA-type construal because our complete awareness is not on 
our everyday, mundane problems but on the comedy happening at the moment. Further 
evidence of this is the predicate feel present, which describes a situation in which one is 
completely focused on the present moment; our minds do not wander off in ruminations nor 
are aware of other perceptions. And when the mental state of totally feeling present is achieved, 
	 74	
one is completely, mentally concentrated on that single moment, in other words, lost in the 
moment, a prototypical SA Event. 
 Having laid the categorical groundwork for lose x-self and shown examples of some of 
the challenges involved in the data and their delineation, the next section discusses the results 
yielded for lose x-self data in the COCA and BNC. 
 
3.3 Results: find and lose 
 
Theoretically, it is unreasonable for there to be a large frequency difference between lose and 
find, being that in the real world, things should be found just as (or almost as) often as they are 
lost. According to the results of the corpora search shown in Table 10, however, this is far from 
the case.  
 
Table 10. Frequencies and ratios for losev, findv, lose x-self, and find x-self; COCA and BNC. 
 [lose]  [find]  lose : find 
COCA 44,647 223,828 19.9% 
BNC 6,102 40,455 15% 
TOTAL 50,749 264,283 19.2% 
 
Table 11. Frequencies and ratios for lose x-self and find x-self in the COCA and BNC.  
 [lose] [ppx*] [find] [ppx*] lose [ppx*] : find [ppx*] 
COCA 1001 27,188 3.7% 
BNC 124 5,064 2.4% 
TOTAL 1125 32,252 3.5% 
 
In the COCA, find hit 223,828 times and lose hit 44,647 times; in the BNC, find hit 40,455 
times and lose hit 6,102 times. When converted into relative ratios, lose instantiates 19.9% of 
find, while in the BNC the ratio of lose:find is 15%. In other words, things are lost almost one-
fifth of the time less often than they are found, regardless of type of lost object, syntax, 
metaphorical use, etc. This inequality is even more pronounced when the verbs are placed 
within the reflexive construction, shown in Table 11. The relationship [lose x-self : find x-self ] 
yields 3.7% in the COCA and 2.4% in the BNC. The Fisher Exact results for lose:find (p=0, p 
< 0.5) as well as lose x-self : find x-self (p=1.1E-05, p < 0.5) are significant for each corpus. In 
other words, things are found much more often than they are lost, and this trend is even more 
pronounced when the verbs occur within the reflexive construction. The reason for this with 
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non-reflexive use is unclear at the present time, but for cases occurring within the reflexive 
construction, one possible motivation is that it may be more common or ‘normal’ to become 
suddenly self-aware during one’s daily activities and experiences, i.e., the SA Event-type of 
find oneself. Conversely, being totally focused on one activity or perception to the point of 
temporarily lacking awareness of other self-perceptions, i.e., SA-type lose oneself, is a 
relatively uncommon experience, although desirable on occasion, e.g., ‘being in the zone’, for 
activities such as sports, work efficiency, yoga and meditation, etc. A more detailed 
investigation of all social and pragmatic contexts for find and lose is needed for more 
conclusive results, but the initial results obtained here do suggest that lose is significantly less 
common than find in both the British and American corpora, and probably for language use in 
society at large. 
Turning attention specifically to the initial search for lose x-self (i.e., [lose][ppx*]) in 
the COCA (sorted by lemma, reciprocals deleted, n≥10), there were 1001 total tokens 
instantiating seven reflexive pronouns: myself, yourself, himself, herself, ourselves, themselves, 
and itself. In the BNC, there were 124 hits (lemma sorting, no reciprocals, n≥5) with the same 
seven pronoun categories. Frequencies are shown in Table 12 (frequency ratios in parentheses). 
Cross-corpora frequency ratios are comparable for each of the reflexive pronouns, except for 
the feminine third person, herself. In the BNC, herself assumes most frequent position at a 25% 
hit rate compared to the COCA in which herself instantiates 18.6%, yielding a differential of 
6.4%. The results for the differential in the masculine himself is not nearly as pronounced, at 
1.3%. To ascertain significance, these frequencies are input into a Fisher Exact contingency 
table. The result is not significant (p=.214098, p < .05).  
There is also a noticeable difference between the frequencies of the first-person singular 
myself and plural ourselves. In a cross corpora ratio comparison, myself instantiates 18.2% and 
12.1% in the COCA and BNC, respectively, for a cross-corpora average of 15.2%. For 
ourselves, the ratios are 4.8% and 4%, respectively, yielding a 4.4% cross-corpora average. 
Explanation for the 10.8% frequency differential can be attributed to the conceptions for lose 
x-self. In all three semantic categories, i.e., SA, TSM and LIT (see Figures 3-5), the construal 
lose ourselves seems awkward because it expresses the intimate knowledge of another person’s 
conscious state, i.e., the loss of general self-perception. Although it is instantiated occasionally 
in the data, especially for TSM in the COCA (see Fig. 4) and SA in the BNC (see Fig. 5), the 
low frequency perhaps suggests its awkwardness. 
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Table 12. Frequencies and frequency ratios (in parentheses) for [lose x-self]; COCA and BNC. 
[LOSE][ppx*] COCA BNC TOTAL 
[LOSE] [HIMSELF] 247 (24.7%) 29 (23.4%) 276 (24.5%) 
[LOSE] [HERSELF] 186 (18.6%) 31 (25%) 217 (19.3%) 
[LOSE] [MYSELF] 182 (18.2%) 15 (12.1%) 197 (17.5%) 
[LOSE] [YOURSELF] 165 (16.5%) 17 (13.7%) 182 (16.2%) 
[LOSE] 
[THEMSELVES] 
123 (12.3%) 18 (14.5%) 141 (12.5%) 
[LOSE] [ITSELF] 50 (5.0%) 9 (7.3%) 59 (5.2%) 
[LOSE] [OURSELVES] 48 (4.8%) 5 (4.0%) 53 (4.7%) 
TOTAL 1001 124 1125 
 
Figure 3. Frequency ratios for [lose][ppx*] by category in the COCA and BNC. 
 
Category abbreviations: SA=Self-Aware Event; TSM=True-Self Metaphor; LIT=literal meaning; 
IDI=idiomatic meaning; X=non-reflexive use; ?=indeterminate; DUPL=duplicate token in corpus. 
 
Cross-corpora categorizations and frequency profiles for lose x-self are shown in Figure 
3. Similar to the find x-self data, the SA-type had the highest frequency ratio (avg.= 43.7%); 
however, in contrast to the find x-self data, the categories TSM (avg.=19.5%) and LIT 
(avg.=30%) both yielded relatively high frequencies. Thus, although the data for find x-self 
revealed four metaphorical types and lose x-self instantiates only two, SA and TSM frequency 
ratios are more evenly balanced here. 
Figures 4 and 5 show lose x-self frequency comparisons by corpus, according to 
reflexive pronoun. Cross-corpora frequency similarities are noticeable in the SA category for 
herself (57% and 66.7% in the COCA and BNC, respectively), and himself (55% and 44.8%, 
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respectively). As claimed for the find x-self data, this is likely due to the narrator/author point 
of view in which the author and character are one and the same entity (in reality), and thus, the 
author can assume to know the character’s internal perceptions. This is supported by the high 
number of tokens in the FICTION register (see Figure 19). 
Another noteworthy result is the high frequency of the LIT category occurring with 
itself.  
3.13. And his prominent chin, the symbol of his force and his will, was losing  
itself among the folds of an indiscreetly fat double chin. (COCA:2011.FIC.Callaloo) 
 
3.14. Tyres. Just tyres. He stopped the car where the road lost itself in sand and  
got out.      (BNC: C86.W_fict_prose) 
 
Figure 4. COCA frequency ratios for lose x-self by pronoun for all semantic categories. 
 
 
  Figure 5. BNC frequency ratios by pronoun for all semantic categories. 
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This can be explained as a type of Virtual Reflexive Alternation (VRA), where “the subject 
bears the same semantic relation to the verb as the object does in the typical transitive use of 
the verb. However…the verb does not change transitivity but instead takes a reflexive pronoun 
as object” (Levin, 1993, p. 84). Of note is that the verb lose does not appear in the list of verbs 
provided by Levin. The number of tokens instantiated in both corpora here suggests that the 
VRA may not be as restricted as claimed, and that other verbs may also instantiate VRA-type 
semantics. 
One difference between the corpora pertains to the plural first person reflexive pronoun 
ourselves. In the COCA, usage is spread mostly across three categories, TSM, SA, and LIT, in 
respective frequency order. However, in the BNC, 80% of the tokens instantiate the SA 
category, with the remaining 20% instantiating the LIT category. There were no instances of 
the TSM-type. Similarly, in the COCA, the first person singular pronoun myself shows a 
relatively smooth frequency cline from SA àTSM à LIT. In contrast to this, in the BNC, SA 
and LIT categories have the same relatively ratio (40%) whereas the TSM-type yields a low 
frequency (13%). Regional variation is proposed for these profile differences, where TSM is 
more common in American English, shown in the first example below. These occur only rarely 
in British English, the solitary example provided in the second sentence below.  
 
3.15. We're all in constant danger of losing ourselves, losing our identities.  
It's a daily struggle…   (COCA:2012.MAG.NatGeog) 
 
3.16. I lost myself. I tried to focus on my interior but there was nothing to focus on…  
(BNC:FAT.W_fict_prose) 
 
Table 13. Frequencies of clause-final TSM and non-clause-final TSM for [lose x-self]; COCA and BNC. 
 (a)  clause-final TSM (b) non-clause-final TSM 
COCA 46 41 
BNC 11 4 
TOTAL 57 45 
 
As an example of the benefits of using corpus analysis, it was stated in Module 2 and here 
that clause-final position was a general tendency for the TSM construal for lose x-self. 
According to the current data, however, this claim cannot be statistically verified. In Table 13, 
the TSM frequencies (outlined in bold) were used as the input values for a Fisher exact test and 
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the result is not significant (p = .16815 at p<.05). Therefore, clause-final position is not a 
dependent variable for TSM for lose x-self. However, although this takes into account 
collocational evidence, it does not consider the FoA and its semantic function. When the 
semantic content of the FoA is analyzed, it is found to be a nonessential part of the metaphor. 
For the 45 non-clause-final cases of TSM in the COCA and BNC (n=41 and 4, respectively), 
all FoAs are adjunctive to the meaning of the main metaphor; i.e., the FoAs can be deleted 
without change in main construal meaning, as shown below, and supported by the expanded 
context. 
 
3.17. But it was definitely dangerous. # " You can(sic) lose yourself in utterly  
groundless fantasies, " I sternly cautioned Hideko.  
(COCA:1996.FIC.LiteraryReview) 
Expanded context (abridged): 
" I think she has a hard time distinguishing between fantasy and reality. Sometimes you find 
those types among those who want to be actresses. " # Not that I didn't understand what was 
going on in her head -in the course of dreaming of the glorious life of an actress, she had 
come to feel that it had already opened up before her eyes, and ended up lying about it to 
others. But it was definitely dangerous. # " You can (sic) lose yourself in utterly groundless 
fantasies, " I sternly cautioned Hideko. " You've got to spend each day in solid, practical 
effort. " 
 
And 
3.18. Lucas van Leyden is an artist of frailer calibre than Drer, and prone  
to lose himself in imitation of stronger men… (BNC:A04.W_ac_humanities) 
 
Expanded context: 
In discussing Drer, he treated him as the most versatile artist of a triumvirate, whose other 
members were Marcantonio Raimondi and Lucas van Leyden. Of the latter he wrote,' Lucas 
van Leyden is an artist of frailer calibre than Drer, and prone to lose himself in imitation of 
stronger men, each of his contemporaries in turn dominating his style.' Another book about 
the age of Drer, but on a different topic, is The Limewood Sculptors of Renaissance Germany, 
by Michael Baxandall, published in 1980. The author started his career in the Victoria and 
Albert Museum, where there is an important group of this sculpture; his book had a double 
origin in a museum exhibition and a series of lectures.  
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In all cases such as those above, although the FoAs provide further information about the True-
Self Metaphor, they can be deleted without semantic consequence to the main metaphoric 
conception. This is not so with SA Events, as seen below. The FoAs here are the obligatory 
object of the experiencer’s total and complete awareness, without which the expression is 
misconstrued as a TSM-type construal. 
 
3.19. The only way he could escape from the harsh realities of life was to lose himself in 
books, allowing his imagination to take over…   (BNC:B1X.W_fict_prose) 
 
3.20. …the old horror genre is coming to TV, inviting us to lose ourselves in evocations of 
our deepest fears.      (COCA:2014.NEWS.Denver) 
 
Methodologically, then, although statistical analyses of collocations are useful in a variety of 
situations and reveal insights not gleaned easily without their help, broader semantic contexts 
of metaphorical expressions still need careful inspection for accurate data collection and results. 
Another interesting comparison (although not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1827 at 
p < .05)) can be drawn for himself and herself. The masculine pronoun is more frequent in the 
COCA, yielding an 11% difference between it and the BNC (see Fig. 5 and Table 13), but the 
feminine pronoun shows the opposite occurrence at the same frequency differential 
(contingency table: Groups= COCA, BNC; Categories= masculine, feminine). Comparisons 
between feminine and masculine pronouns within each of the corpora yields a 2% difference 
between himself and herself in the COCA, but a 22% difference in the BNC. As with the results 
for find x-self previously discussed, one plausible explanation for this difference may be due 
to social gender biasing in the British media. However, considering that a large amount of the 
data collected for lose x-self is from the FICTION register, this explanation is more weakly 
stated here compared to find x-self, the values between the FICTION and the non-FICTION 
amalgamated group not being significant (p-value= 1 at p < .05). Shown in Table 14, the lose 
x-self frequencies yield cross-corpora similarities for most (common) registers (per million). 
The high ratio of occurrences in the FICTION register is attributed, as it was previously for 
find + x-self, to discourse point of view, specifically with regard to the ease with which the 
narrator/writer can intimately know and convey another person’s perceptual awareness, being 
one and the same person as the character. One frequency difference between the two corpora 
is the lack of tokens for the NEWSPAPER in the BNC. Reasons for this are difficult to 
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postulate at this time, considering that the COCA results show that NEWSPAPER has a 
relatively high frequency ratio per million. 
 
Table 14. [lose][ppx*] (n=500, sorted by lemma), according to register; COCA and BNC. 
COCA FREQ PER MIL BNC FREQ PER MIL 
SPOKEN 67 0.61 SPOKEN 6 0.6 
FICTION 573 5.46 FICTION 80 5.03 
MAGAZINE 220 2 MAGAZINE 13 1.79 
NEWSPAPER 96 0.91 NEWSPAPER 0 0 
ACADEMIC 92 0.89 ACADEMIC 7 0.46 
   NON-ACAD* 10 0.61 
   MISC 19 0.91 
* The order of NON-ACAD has been changed with ACADEMIC in the BNC to easily visualize cross-
corpora comparisons. 
 
A survey and brief corpus analysis of [lose x-self] was conducted and shown to reveal 
interesting insights into the data. A more detailed investigation will be conducted in the next 
sections to find out whether type of antecedent has any bearing on the semantics of this 
construction. 
 
3.4 [p*][lose][ppx*]: pronoun antecedents 
 
In Chapter 2, different collocational patterns were revealed for find x-self when antecedent-
experiencers are differentiated by noun and pronoun, and so a similar search with the parameter 
[p*][lose][ppx*] (n ≥5 19 , sort by word) was conducted here as well. Figure 6 shows the 
combined COCA and BNC frequencies by pronoun, according to conceptual category. 
Noticeably, the first person singular pronoun I was the most frequent for SA Events, and as 
discussed above for find x-self, this is now to be expected, the first person being a natural point 
of view from which to describe one’s own mental state. The next most frequent are the third 
person singular pronouns, both masculine and feminine, respectively. Again, the high 
frequency of tokens in the FICTION register (see Table 15) accounts for this, 3rd person SA 
                                                
19 Due to low number of tokens of lose x-self, the minimum hit count was set at ≥5 and sorted by word for both 
corpora. 
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Events being easily construed from the narrator/writer’s internal point of view of the fictional 
characters they create, described previously in Chapter 2 as well as 3.3.1. above.  
 
Figure 6. Frequency results in the COCA and BNC for [p*][lose][ppx*] by pronoun for each category. 
 
SA=Self-Aware Event; TSM=True-Self Metaphor; LIT= literal use; IDI=idiomatic use; ?=indeterminate; 
DUPL=duplicate in corpus 
 
Table 15. Frequency and frequency per million of [p*][lose][ppx*] : COCA and BNC. 
COCA FREQ 
PER 
MIL BNC FREQ PER MIL 
SPOKEN 15 0.14 SPOKEN 1 0.1 
FICTION 107 1.02 FICTION 9 0.57 
MAGAZINE 35 0.32 MAGAZINE 1 0.14 
NEWSPAPER 17 0.16 NEWSPAPER 0 0 
ACADEMIC 7 0.07 NON-ACAD 3 0.18 
     ACADEMIC 0 0 
     MISC 3 0.14 
 
According to conceptual category, SA Events are the most frequent, instantiating at a 
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at p < .05), lending support to the overall hypothesis of this research that if a construction is 
[find x-self] or [lose x-self], it is likely to construe Self-Aware Events. That being said, what is 
it about lose x-self that motivates the 24% higher ratio of the TSM construal compared to find 
x-self?  
 
3.21. I'm afraid I mean that literally. He's lost himself - his identity. He has no  
understanding of who he is.    (COCA:1998.FIC.Mov:DarkCity) 
 
3.22. …but as I wondered the subject faded, my mind wandered... I lost myself.  
I tried to focus on my interior but there was nothing to focus on…  
(BNC:FAT.W_fict_prose) 
 
General anthropo-/sociological support for the high TSM frequency for lose x-self, albeit 
anecdotal, can be seen by the reverence many societies pay to those people who have found 
themselves (in the TSM sense), i.e., prophets, saints, enlightened beings, whatever their title or 
religious affiliation. Because of their rarity, societies consider these people special, treasures, 
jewels, etc. On the other hand, losing oneself (in the TSM sense) is so common that many 
societies have an ever-increasing number of gurus, therapists, cults, hospitals and new-age 
remedies for finding our lost Selves. In other words, it is speculated here that because the actual 
number of people who have lost themselves is higher than the number of people who have 
found themselves, this is reflected in the data. It is unfortunate that a statistical survey of this is 
impractical (how would this be confirmed?) Therefore, this tentative explanation should be 
considered a ‘working hypothesis’ and not meant as hard evidence. 
 
3.4.1 Fuzzy construals for [p*][lose][ppx*] 
 
There were examples in the data which were able to be construed in multiple ways, with little 
convincing evidence for determining one type of construal over another. For example, in the 
sentence below, a few interpretations are possible, depending upon the context.  
 
3.23. "A man like Lipsky could have lost himself at a hundred tracks." Jamison 
looked back at the colt.     (COCA:1995.FIC.Bk:TrueBetray) 
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Expanded context (abridged): 
“Nobody thinks it was suicide? " Jamison shot Gabe a look and stepped out of the box. " 
Nobody that knew him. " " He could have gotten his hands on some acepromazine, " Matt 
reminded Jamison. " He'd have known what it would do. Surely he had to know the 
authorities would catch up with him eventually. " " A man like Lipsky could have lost 
himself at a hundred tracks. " Jamison looked back at the colt. He was dressing the wound 
himself, as penance for his part in it. " I should have fired him months ago. Everything 
might've been different then. " And Mick might have been alive. " That part's done, " Gabe 
said. " But it's not over. Whoever gave Lipsky that last drink is part of it.”  
 
One interpretation construes lose x-self as a LIT (2)- type, where the experiencer named Lipsky, 
in his attempt to hide from the authorities, loses himself amongst the populace, i.e., he becomes 
anonymous among the masses. The FoA at a hundred paces construes a spatial distance, most 
likely the distance needed from the authorities to make his anonymity successfully. However, 
looking at other evidence in the expanded context such as the possibility of suicide from line 
two, one might construe the expression to mean that Lipsky could have killed himself (lost 
himself = die), quite quickly and efficiently before the authorities could catch him (at a hundred 
paces), in which case the construal would be categorized as an IDI (2)– type. This is not quite 
convincing either, however, due to line seven in the expanded context, where another character, 
named Mick, is introduced for the first time as deceased. Is it possible that Lipsky killed himself 
after being accused of Mick’s murder? Evidence for this comes in the last sentence in the text, 
where one of the characters says, “Whoever gave Lipsky that last drink is part of it.” For this 
type of construal, someone killed Mick, and also perhaps Lipsky, or perhaps one was a murder 
and one was a suicide? Either way, that last drink has something to do with it. Still, a confident 
decision about construal is difficult to make even given the contextual clues in the expanded 
context. Because of this ambiguity, the token was marked ‘? ’.  
 Another ambiguous example and its expanded context is the following: 
  
3.24. Though she always feels like a tourist and not a traveler, she can lose  
herself anyway.    (COCA:1997.FIC.Bk:PassionDreamBook) 
 
Expanded context (abridged): 
Her adoration continues uninterrupted, yet somehow, for them, love suffers under such an 
uneven arrangement. Maybe she is wrong about fate, and love lasting. Her response is to 
	 85	
continue to travel. Though she always feels like a tourist and not a 
traveler, she can lose herself anyway. But this unquiet life can not go on indefinitely, so 
when she reaches London, with its shades of steel, pewter, dove gray, and green, she 
decides to stay. 6. The first thing Augustine does when he arrives home is to reopen Perfect 
Fish Photography Studio.  
 
Here as well, since a few plausible interpretations are possible, the token was marked ‘?’. 
Under one interpretation, the FoA suggests a TSM-type construal due to both the clause final 
position (although a sentence-final adverb is present) and the presumption that the woman has 
psychologically ‘given up’ on fate and love and spends her time travelling (in order to delude 
herself into a sense of purpose or happiness?) This creates a psychological dualism, the outer 
Self traveling and working, while the deeper Self laments a loveless marriage. A different 
interpretation focuses on the continued travels of the woman, from the end of line two, along 
with the FoA. Throughout these travels, one can be anonymous amongst the new, stimulating 
surroundings, thus temporarily forgetting one’s troubles at home, a LIT (2)-type categorization. 
Lastly, an SA-type interpretation is also possible in which a paraphrase of the sentence would 
be, the woman loses herself in travelling, where travelling is the only thing in her immediate 
awareness. This does not set up a psychological dualism like the TSM construal above, but 
creates a conceptual scenario in which the point of focus is a singular awareness (the experience 
of travelling), and this concentrative singularity allows the woman to temporarily forget her 
despair.  
The conceptual resolution of these kinds of examples is theoretically possible, if one 
had the time and resources to locate and interview each of the writers/narrators and obtain 
complete texts in which further conceptual clues can be searched. Unfortunately, the amount 
of data being analyzed here is far too numerous to undertake such an in-depth analysis of each 
and every fuzzy predication. A compromise was made, however, by examining each of the 
expanded contexts to determine best construal based on contextual evidence. If no resolution 
was possible, it was marked as such. 
 
3.5 [n*][lose][ppx*]: Nouns as antecedents for lose x-self 
 
Because meaningful differences were found between pronoun and full noun antecedents for 
find x-self, a search was conducted here as well for lose x-self in which the antecedents were 
nouns (i.e., [n*][lose][ppx*]). Total frequency counts were comparatively low, yielding 65 and 
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11 hits in the COCA and BNC, respectively (reciprocals deleted). The items and frequencies 
are provided in Appendix 7. Due to the low frequency count, tokens were sorted by word with 
no minimum frequency imposed.  
A few token categorizations needed adjustment due to false experiencer-antecedents 
occurring in the data. For example, in the sentence below, the noun wolves immediately 
preceded the lose x-self construction, and thus emerged in the retrieved data as the preverbal 
noun, but this is not the experiencer-antecedent, only part of its relative clause. There were nine 
total cases in the COCA, all of which were amended. 
 
 3.25. She said that some who talked to wolves lost themselves, that what was  
human was swallowed up by wolf.  (COCA:1991.FIC.BkSF.DragonReborn) 
 
Total [n* + lose x-self] frequencies, according to conceptual category, are shown in Figure 7. 
All conceptual categories are congruent with [lose][ppx*], discussed previously in section 3.2. 
The high frequency of SA Events in the COCA and BNC again supports this type of conceptual 
categorization for the lose x-self construction. The literal use (LIT) was also frequent (n=15), 
followed by the TSM construal (n=10). There were two idiomatic examples (n=2) and one hit 
each of undetermined (?) and non-reflexive (X) categories.  
 
Figure 7. Frequencies of categories for [n*][lose][ppx*] in the COCA and BNC. 
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feminine names appeared (n=4) in the BNC data, whereas in the COCA there were a fairly 
equal number of each gender, with 10 feminine (45.5%) and 12 masculine (54.5%) names. 
Considering that 75% of the examples in the BNC are from the FICTION register (compared 
to the COCA with 47%, see Table 16), and all feminine names are of the [W_fict_prose] 
category (although from different source texts), plausible explanations for this discrepancy are: 
1) gender biasing within the overall fiction genre in Britain, or 2) the balance of text sources 
within the fiction register in the BNC. Due to the limited number of examples, however, the 
conviction for these explanations is weak; a more encompassing investigation along socio-
corpus linguistic lines would be needed to show either of these to be viable explanations.  
Shown in Table 16, FICTION was the most frequent register, instantiating 47% and 
75% in the COCA and BNC, respectively20. This was a higher FICTION ratio than find x-self 
(27.7%) in the COCA data. Register variation for lose x-self is fairly balanced when all other 
registers are placed in opposition to the FIC register, calculated as FIC vs. non-FIC (register 
amalgamation group, as for find x-self), yielding ratios of 47% vs. 48.5%, respectively. This is 
quite a different profile from the BNC, with ratios of 75% vs. 25%, respectively. Here as well, 
media-based gender bias could be proposed as one explanation, but due to the low total 
frequency count in the BNC data, any generalizations about these frequency ratios must be 
considered with discretion. 
 
Table 16. Frequency and Per Mil frequency of [n*][lose][ppx*] in the COCA and BNC. 
BNC FREQ PER MIL 
% of 
total 
COCA FREQ 
PER 
MIL 
% of 
total 
SPOKEN 0 0 0 SPOKEN 3 0.03 4.5 
FICTION 9 0.57 75 FICTION 31 0.3 47 
MAGAZINE 0 0 0 MAGAZINE 12 0.11 18.2 
NEWSPAPER 0 0 0 NEWSPAPER 9 0.08 13.6 
ACADEMIC 1 0.07 8.3 ACADEMIC 11 0.11 16.7 
NON-ACAD 0 0 0      
MISC 2 0.1 16.7     
TOTAL 12    TOTAL 66   
 
The nouns that are used as antecedents as well as their respective frequencies and 
accompanying verb tenses are shown in Table 17. It can be seen that when a noun is plural, it 
                                                
20 This data is from a CHART search for [n*][lose][ppx*] in each of the corpora and includes reciprocals and 
‘uncorrected’ false antecedents.  
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is slightly more likely to be in the present tense and vice versa for the singular/past distinction. 
However, this tendency is not significant (p-value = 0.1312 at p < .05, integers used as input 
values). 
At the risk of stating the obvious, when an event is construed as SA or TSM, the 
experiencer is likely to be human, at ratios of 92.6% and 100% respectively. In contrast, the 
LIT category yielded an experiencer-as-human ratio of 73.7%. This is significant (p=0 at p 
< .05). In other words, when lose x-self is construed metaphorically, the antecedent-experiencer 
is very likely to be a human. When only overall frequency is taken into account, this is only 
slightly less true for LIT examples as well, 73% being clearly above the majority. However, 
when compared to metaphorical cases, the human-experiencer factor is not instantiated nearly 
to the same degree and with the same amount of likelihood as the metaphorical cases. 
When metonymically-construed experiencer-antecedents are analyzed, there is no 
overlap with the find x-self data, although political parties and Arab community are similar to 
Democrats/Republicans and group/state/country, respectively.  
 
Table 17. COCA/BNC search [n*][find][ppx]; non-human nouns as antecedents. 
 singular plural present tense past tense 
fingers - 1 1 - 
buildings - 2 2 - 
road 1 - - 1 
planes 1 - - 1 
wind 1 - - 1 
voice 1 - 1 - 
tracks - 1 1 - 
sounds - 1 - 1 
song 1 - 1 - 
ships - 1 1 - 
ring 1 - 1 - 
political parties - 1 1 - 
mind 1 - - 1 
legs - 1 1 - 
Arab community 1 - 1 - 
ball 1 - - 1 
TOTAL 9 8 11 6 
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There was one metonymic experiencer-antecedent that instantiated the SA-type 
construal, shown below.  
 
3.26. From the moment he lost sight of his rude home in the midst of the Forest, his  
untutored mind lost itself in the myriad beauties and forces of nature.  
(COCA:2001.ACAD.AmerIndianQ) 
 
Other nouns instantiated cases of the LIT (1) category (n=2), and the LIT (2) category (n=13). 
All of these antecedent-experiencers can be categorized as the ‘virtual reflexive alternation’ 
(Levin, 1993); however, within this, some of the antecedents can be understood as 
metonymically construed, specifically as cases of synecdoche, where a part of something 
stands for its whole (see Fig. 24, cases in boldface). This metonymic use encourages the part 
to initiate some action as would the whole. The example above, along with the two examples 
below, exemplify this. 
  
3.27. "Did you come here for this? " the aunt's voice losing itself in the aunt's  
marred hand.     (COCA:2002.FIC.Bk:Carrying Body) 
 
3.28. …with the voice of the wind and murmuring in the leaves. My song loses itself in 
the ever moving sea. (COCA:1997.SPOK.ABC_Nightline) 
 
The fundamental conceptual question here is, “How can inherently nonconscious and/or inert 
objects initiate action?” In reality, they cannot. But they can be conceived of as having innate 
inertia and be construed and predicated as such, metonymically and metaphorically. Especially 
in cases of synecdoche, the sentient person (i.e., the whole) has conscious control of action, 
and each part of the whole may be conceived as taking part in that action initiation. In the 
examples above, a marred hand can cover a mouth and muffle a voice, but the voice can also 
be conceived of as imbued with its own force inertia and construed and predicated from that 
perspective, and so, the voice can lose itself in the hand. Similarly, the sound of the sea can 
drown out the sound of a song, but the song can be conceived of as having action inertia and 
get lost, so that the sound of the song does not reach the ear of the hearer. Interestingly, we 
understand these antecedents as metonymic, but the meaning of the main verb is literal, often 
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the LIT (2) category, i.e., to be unanimous amongst a group of people or objects. In other words, 
the relationship between the anaphoric pair and its verb (i.e., the predicate) is literally 
construed, while the reflexive pronouns themselves are metonymically construed. These kinds 
of examples are not found in the find x-self data. For find x-self, all of the non-sentient 
antecedent-experiencers are prototypically metonymic for this kind of construal, that is, the 
nouns are those such as: GROUPS STAND FOR PEOPLE IN THE GROUPS, e.g., company, 
government, church, etc.  
Although a few of the metonymically-construed nouns for lose x-self are directly part 
of the human whole, e.g., fingers, voice, etc., this is not necessarily the case, for example, 
buildings, road, wind, etc. In order for these nouns to be conceived as initiating action and to 
have these entities acting on themselves, some cross- or inter-domain mapping is necessary. 
For example, 
 
3.29. …and the poor buildings lose themselves in the dim sky…   
      (BNC:H0R.W_fict_prose) 
  
3.30. To look down along the tracks losing themselves in a wilderness of furze.  
(COCA:1997.FIC.LiteraryRev) 
 
In the examples above, buildings ARE buildings and tracks ARE tracks. When analyzing these 
antecedents individually, there seems to be no cross- or inter-domain mapping. Furthermore, 
the verb lose is literally (LIT 2) construed. So how do buildings and tracks literally lose 
themselves? The key to this is the proper construal of the antecedents. Since buildings and 
tracks cannot act of their own volition, a cognitive device is needed to transmit these volitional 
qualities onto non-sentient objects. One syntactic technique is the passive voice, where the 
buildings were lost in the dim sky, and the tracks were lost in the wilderness. Another technique 
is metaphoric and metonymic construal. Three steps are needed for these types of constructions, 
only the first of which is inherently metaphoric/metonymic: 1) sentience is mapped onto a non-
sentient object, 2) a sentient object is the source of action inertia, and 3) action is acted upon 
itself. Admittedly, buildings or tracks are usually not thought of as being sentient in the normal, 
natural sense, but the construction’s form-meaning suggests to the reader/hearer a hint of self-
initiated action. Buildings and tracks are thought of as if they lose themselves. Thus, for non-
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sentient experiencers in lose x-self constructions, metonymy and/or metaphor is hard at work, 
guiding nuances of meaning.  
When understanding and analyzing predications in this way, conceptually difficult data 
can be accounted for efficiently within the overall data set. As with most hypotheses, however, 
there are always exceptions. The section below discusses these anomalies.  
 
3.5.1. Fuzzy construals for [n*][lose][ppx*] 
 
The examples below exhibit just how subtle the construal of lose x-self can be. Although both 
tokens construe the general idea of sexual activity, the first specifically construes the loss of 
all awareness except for the sexual act (i.e., SA-type), while for the second, placing oneself 
physically (and/or emotionally) inside another person during sexual intercourse instantiates 
the IDI (1)-type. 
 
3.31. SA: Later he would spend the night losing himself in mindless sex.  
(COCA:2008.FIC.Bk:BlackSilk) 
 
 3.32. IDI (1): Nothing short of having her, of losing himself in her, would satisfy. He  
was afraid the touch of her lips…   (COCA:1994.FIC.Bk:Serendipity) 
 
Other types of ambiguity occurred in examples of media advertisements in which, when 
examining only the token, lose x-self was conceptually ‘fuzzy’ between SA and LIT (2). 
 
3.33. SA: Lose yourself on an island Seize the day. Grab some containers and  
head to Sauvie…     (COCA:2006.MAG.Sunset) 
 
3.34. LIT (2): Lose yourself in a tropical jungle on trails flanked by elephant's ear 
plants with leaves…     (COCA:2006.MAG. SouthernLiv) 
 
By examining only the tokens, it is difficult to determine to which of the appropriate construal 
types the expressions belong. However, examining the surrounding contexts reveals conceptual 
clues and the construal can be understood as likely intended. 
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Expanded contexts: (abridged) 
SA: Lose yourself on an island Seize the day. Grab some containers and head to Sauvie 
Island to pick a flat of luscious strawberries at Columbia Farms… or Kruger's Farm 
Market…The harvest usually peaks on Father's Day weekend... Stroll an island's island. 
Toss a towel and some snacks into a day pack and… 
 
LIT (2): McKee Botanical Garden. Lose yourself in a tropical jungle on trails flanked by 
elephant's ear plants with leaves almost as big as coffee tables. In clearings, dazzling 
aquatic flowers dance on the surface of ponds. " We had an explosion of water lilies when 
we lost some of the tree canopy in Hurricane Frances. 
 
In the first example, the double-underlined parts show the contextual support for the SA 
construal, i.e., that the tourists to the island should completely focus on the experiences of the 
island. In other words, they should get themselves in the zone, so to speak, so that they can 
totally absorb the island environment into their consciousness without distraction. In the 
second expanded context, the contextual support conveys a sense of wandering, where one 
might perhaps go astray, or let oneself go astray, encompassed by the densely-foliated 
environment, thus, the LIT (2) categorization. 
For all fuzzy cases, the expanded contexts were meticulously consulted. There was one 
instance in which a final determination could not be made and this was marked ‘? ’. Shown 
below, the context is a movie review, but insufficient contextual background makes it 
impossible to confidently determine a single construal.  
 
 3.35. Director Stephen Frears loses himself in the dazzling dresses.  
(COCA:2009.NEWS.Atlanta) 
Expanded context: 
 Based on a novel by the French writer Colette, " Cheri " is a sumptuous but only rarely 
romantic romance set in France before World War I. Michelle Pfeiffer plays Lea, a fading 
beauty in all her self-aware glory. Director Stephen Frears loses himself in the dazzling 
dresses. (Roger Moore, McClatchy/Tribune). Rated R (for some sexual content and brief 
drug use). At Regal Tara. 1 hour, 33 minutes. 
 
Under one interpretation, lose x-self conveys a TSM-type construal, in which case the Director 
is construed as losing his deeper Self (i.e., his innate ability as director). Because he puts so 
much of his Self into the outward spectacle of dazzling dresses, he strays from this deeper 
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“Self-as-director”. Another possible interpretation is the SA-type construal, where the Director 
is aware only of the dazzling dresses, to the detriment of the whole film’s intent or quality. Still 
another (albeit unlikely) scenario construes the LIT (2) sense, where the Director, for reasons 
amusing to imagine, decides to physically hide among Lea’s numerous dazzling dresses, 
perhaps in her dressing room closet or the movie’s costume repository. Due to these 
possibilities and the lack of concrete evidence, this was marked ‘indeterminate’. 
 
3.6 Complex metaphors: finding x-self and losing x-self 
 
There were a few examples that conveyed the peculiarity and uniqueness of SA Events, 
expressing both find and lose within the same overall conception. The first example construes 
to be aware of the failure to retain one’s composure. 
 
3.36. Slicing into the chest cavity of the specimen provided by the supply house, 
you find yourself losing it.    (COCA:1991.MAG.Omni)   
 
Notice the continuous tense of the FoA losing it. The experiencer has not yet lost it, and cannot 
be in the midst of being lost, but can only report on the loss of mental/emotional composure 
before or after the actual moment of being lost. Discussed in Module 2, this is the psychological 
nature of the phenomenon of losing oneself under the SA-type construal. Because of the total 
and complete immersion of the psyche within the object of awareness, no other awareness 
emerges, i.e., one cannot be reporting an event (in real time) in which there is no other 
consciousness other than that of the object of awareness, because this reporting necessitates 
some level of general or other type of conscious awareness. The writer uses the SA-type find 
x-self + FoAlose x-self construal to express the surprise and suddenness of the awareness of 
emotional composure slipping away (but not yet completely gone). 
The next example shows how both finding and losing oneself are contrasted within the 
same sentence for literary effect (note the Poetry sub-register).  
 
3.37. When I find myself abstracted or lose myself in abstraction, my self blurs at  
its boundaries but nonetheless retains a capacity, an enhanced capacity to  
accept whatever comes across.   (COCA:2015.ACAD.Poetry) 
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Expanded context: 
You want them to have that lovely feeling of being carried away by fame, if only for the 
first few years. After that, when the chauffeur-driven Mercedes and butlers carrying dry 
martinis have disappeared, when things become calm in that long inertia of mid-career, 
they can reap a more mediated harvest of desolately beautiful later poems. # 3707 Section: 
COMMENT # What is it to go into an abstracted state? When I find myself abstracted or 
lose myself in abstraction, my self blurs at its boundaries but nonetheless retains a capacity, 
an enhanced capacity to accept whatever comes across. Memories, freaks, phrases, and 
passing thoughts escape judgment as to whether they deserve retaining. Even if they hover 
and unravel trains of thought, they do not cancel or dislodge anything already contained or 
passing through this elastic " abstract scene."  Contradictions and other dissonance which 
would become jarring if sentience rose to active reaching, can coexist… 
 
The interplay of the two SA-type construals reveals the complexity and subtleness of the 
metaphors and metonymies. The meaning of find myself abstracted is interpreted as being 
aware of an abstracted ego. Similarly, for lose myself in abstraction, the meaning is construed 
as awareness which is completely absorbed in the abstracted ego. This is contrasted with the 
contextual support (double-underlined) in the expanded context in which the Conceptual 
Metaphor MIND IS A CONTAINER is construed. This sets up a TSM-type conception not 
present in the SA Event of the token. Those boundaries, delineated as an abstract scene, set up 
a dualistic, deeper Self, (one that can accept whatever comes across), and another-Self 
(Memories, freaks, phrases, etc..), a.k.a. the Subject and Self (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992; G. 
Lakoff, 1996), respectively. This creates multi-level metaphorical conceptions in which 
individual SA Events are working within a larger, discourse-oriented TSM-type construal.  
The following example also illustrates the find-lose x-self type where the SA-type and 
TSM-type work together to motivate the conception. 
 
 3.38. …the most rewarding period of his life, when to lose himself utterly in God and His 
Work was truly to find himself.     (BNC:FRJ.W_fict_prose)  
 
Expanded context: 
…relishing settling his mind on sacred thoughts and holy themes in an effort to make himself 
spiritually equal to the demands of his calling. But that had been all of thirty years ago, and 
very quickly these demands had multiplied, absorbing more and more time and energy, so 
that the moments of evening meditation were soon subsumed into the preoccupations and 
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stresses of an active Christianity. Yet the exchange had been all gain, for this became the 
happiest, the most rewarding period of his life, when to lose himself utterly in God and His 
Work was truly to find himself. This was a time of real communion, and it was not long 
before his parishioners began to think of him, as well as to address him, as Father Brendan 
rather than as Father McGiff, and he began to look on them as his family, and on Cork, their 
city, as his only home.  
 
The SA-type lose x-self assumes the meaning to be absolutely focused on the task at hand, 
supported by the FoA utterly in God and His Work, along with the double-underlined, 
supporting context showing the focus on preoccupation and stresses of such concentration and 
one-pointedness on His Work. At this point, the experiencer, due to this extreme focus on His 
Work, finds himself, i.e., he finds his True Self, supported by the adverb truly, along with the 
clause-final position of find x-self. Thus, within the same sentence, the author sets the SA Event 
construal as the impetus for the TSM-type construal. 
In another example, an SA Event-type losing oneself becomes the catalyst for a TSM-
type finding oneself. 
 
3.39. Emma ultimately creates a Leon who is able to fulfill her dreams, for a fleeting 
moment losing herself (yet finding herself) in the writing, much as Renee does… 
      (COCA:1994.ACAD.Symposium) 
Expanded context: 
…initially Emma writes to receive letters, to take pleasure in the communication forbidden, 
impossible on the speech plane, writing subsequently becomes the adjuvant of a waning 
passion' in the manner of aphrodisiac " (17 18). Here Emma's attitude toward writing 
resembles Renee's in Part III, when the latter persists in expressing her passion to Max even 
after he recognizes how little she needs him. For both, writing itself becomes more 
important than the relationship. Emma ultimately creates a Leon who is able to fulfill her 
dreams, for a fleeting moment losing herself (yet finding herself) in the writing, much as 
Renee does… 
 
In this example, the SA Event losing herself in writing and its resulting mental state provides 
the stimulus for the TSM-type event finding herself in writing; in other words, the total 
absorption of awareness in writing was the catalyst for a deeper self-realization, resulting in 
knowledge of her True Self. The syntax here complicates the matter, however, as the two 
predicates share a prepositional phrase. However, in the SA Event, the PP is not semantically 
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adjunctive (i.e., it is obligatory), whereas for the TSM construal, it is truly adjunctive and 
optional, (and timely use of the parenthesis confirms this). This can be tested by the following 
originally-created examples; 
 
 3.40. Emma……, for a fleeting moment losing herself (in the writing), much as  
Renee does… 
 
3.41. Emma……, for a fleeting moment finding herself (in the writing), much as  
Renee does… 
 
Proposed in Module 2, and evidenced here by numerous corpus examples, the semantic 
adjunctivity of the FoA is a major factor for the appropriate construal of metaphorically-
construed reflexive events. In the examples above, regarding the PP in parentheses (i.e., the 
FoA) as semantically adjunctive (or not) has ramifications for total conception of the discourse. 
Although including the FoAs yields either the SA or TSM construal, deleting the FoA yields 
only the TSM construal. Thus, the FoA is semantically optional for TSM, and the opposite 
holds for SA, where the FoA is obligatory for appropriate construal. 
 
3.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
For lose x-self, three LIT and three IDI categories were found. Although SA-type events were 
the most frequent for metaphorically construed data, there were no instances of the SA-UE 
type. TSM and LIT categories occurred more often for lose x-self than for find x-self. The FoA 
was seen as a requisite factor for the proper construal of metaphorically-construed lose x-self. 
When full noun antecedent-experiencers were investigated, only feminine names appeared in 
the BNC, compared to the COCA which yielded about the same number of masculine and 
feminine names. Although no concrete conclusions were drawn for this, regional idiosyncrasy 
was posited as a possible cause. 
Considering the often metonymous nature of the experiencer-subjects, it was proposed 
that the experiencers are conceived of as having innate inertia potential, especially in cases of 
synecdoche. Three steps were seen as needed to properly construe these cases, 1) sentience is 
mapped onto a non-sentient object, 2) a sentient object is the source of action inertia, and 3) 
action is acted upon itself. 
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The significance of the results from lose x-self suggest that the metaphorical situation 
is much more complex than had been previously described in the literature. Furthermore, the 
frequency of the SA-type is statistically significant and thus encourages a reevaluation of the 
primary meaning for lose when contained within the reflexive construction. If this scenario is 
earnestly considered by lexicographers, the consequence of this is to have a separate, 
prototypical meaning sense of Perceptual Self-Awareness for the verb lose when contained 
within the reflexive construction. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CATCH X-SELF 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 Chapters 2 and 3 explored semantic variation and collocations of the verbs find and lose when 
they occur within the reflexive construction. Continuing this line of inquiry, the construction 
catch x-self will now be discussed. It will be shown that catch x-self construes Self-Aware 
Events that are sudden, but with an added concept of interruption of one’s thought or 
internally-based action. This suddenness, occurring with find x-self as well, is more 
pronounced with catch x-self, likely due to an entailment from the ‘base’ meaning of catch, i.e., 
“to get hold of and stop an object…” (LDOCE, 2014). To stop an object implies that the object 
is in motion, and the exertion of force to cease that motion is often a sudden loss of the object’s 
momentum. In the case of catch x-self, the object is not external but internal, but the same 
principle applies (metaphorically) to one’s own thoughts, emotions, verbalizations and/or 
bodily functions, as seen in the examples below. 
 
4.1. He had been going to say the revulsion of the diners,' but had caught himself in 
time.      (COCA:1994.FIC.Bk:Recessional) 
 
4.2. Ari caught himself nodding again.  (COCA:2010.FIC.Analog) 
 
4.3. Lonie caught herself feeling sorry that this had to be so.  
(BNC:GUK.W_fict_prose) 
 
Catch x-self is shown to be complex and subtle in construal and collocation, and here as well, 
relevant context, predicated as the FoA along with support contexts, are the linchpins for 
resolving metaphoric meaning and conceptual ambiguity.  
 
4.2 Method 
 
The method used here follows that of Chapters 2, 3 and 4, namely, it begins with a preliminary 
corpus search using the parameter [catch][ppx*]. This preliminary search confirms semantic 
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variation and metaphoric use, prompting a more detailed investigation into antecedents that are 
pronouns (i.e., [p*][catch][ppx*]) and nouns (i.e., [n*][catch][ppx*]). The results of these 
investigations are presented below. 
 
4.2.1 Categorization Results 
 
Based on the results of the data for the corpus search [catch][ppx*] in the COCA and BNC (see 
Appendix 8), four semantic categories are proposed; Self-Aware Event (SA), Divided-Self 
Causative (DSC), Picture Noun Schema (PNS) and Literal use (LIT). Within the LIT category, 
four subcategories are proposed: 
 
1) LIT (1): to physically brace or support one’s body  
2) LIT (2): to get one's body or clothes ensnared on/in something 
3) LIT (3): idiom: to catch x-self up (in) smthg = to be in some trouble or troubling 
situation 
4) LIT (4): to be apprehended by some authority, e.g., the police 
 
Explanations and examples of each category are provided below. 
 
SA Event: being suddenly or immediately perceptually aware of one’s own action or thought.  
This is similar to find x-self, but with an intensified or strengthened temporal entailment  
(i.e., suddenness), as described in section 5.1.  
 
4.4. He caught himself scribbling frantically…  
(COCA:1992:NEWS.WashPost) 
4.5. Saba feels a tingle of pride each time she catches herself thinking in  
English.    (COCA: 2012.FIC.SouthernReview) 
 
DSC (Divided-Self Causative): one part of Self exerts force on another part of Self after self-
awareness of that action or thought emerges.  
4.6. After a while Carlos catches himself, laughing along with the tourists. When  
he catches himself he gets quiet and looks to the sea, and then down…  
(COCA:2005.FIC.KenyonRev) 
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In the example above, the first case of [catch x-self] is categorized as SA because only the 
awareness has emerged without any force to control it. In the second case (boldface), however, 
once this awareness has emerged, a mental force is activated to block or inhibit the action or 
thought (i.e. laughing), thus the DSC designation. Further support for this categorization are 
tokens in which some speech act is interrupted, (marked by a hyphen (-) in the corpus). For 
example, 
 
4.7. It's -"She caught herself on the edge of a shriek. " It's monstrous.”   
(COCA: 2010.FIC.Bk:OneMind) 
 
PNS (Picture Noun Schema): This refers to the physical manifestation of some duplication of 
the antecedent, prototypically predicated by examples such as: one catches oneself (i.e. sees 
oneself) in the reflection of a mirror, glass, water, etc.  
 
4.8. What a sour world Alfred lived in. When he caught himself in mirrors it  
shocked him how young he still looked.  
(COCA: 2003.FIC.LitCavalcade) 
Literal:  
LIT 1: to physically brace or support one’s body. 
4.9. He runs from the salon and down the back stairs, stumbling down  
them, catching himself, reaching the back door that's standing open.  
(COCA:2001.FIC.Mov:FromWhereWe) 
 
LIT 2: to get one's body or clothes ensnared on something. 
4.10. …in the fence with Stella sideway easing her way through the hole  
careful not to catch herself on that wire… (COCA:1992.FIC.AntiochRev) 
 
LIT 3: (idiom: to catch x-self up (in) smthg) to be in some trouble or troubling  
situation.  
4.11. Why lose that opportunity because you caught yourself up  
into something that you hadn't done anything wrong? 
(COCA: 2011.SPOK.NPR_TellMore) 
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LIT 4: to be apprehended by some authority, e.g., the police.  
 4.12. …there have been a number of cases in other cities –  
they catch themselves. Take too many risks, think they can play with the cops. 
      (COCA: 2004.FIC.Movie:Catwoman) 
 
Even though LIT 3 is actually an idiom and not literal in the strict sense, the choice to include 
it in the LIT category is based on an interpretation of this as a sense extension of LIT 2, where 
getting oneself or one’s clothing physically ensnared on something is metaphorically analogous 
to getting ensnared in some troubling situation. Admittedly, this could have been categorized 
as a separate idiomatic (IDI) category, but for the above reasoning along with the need for 
systematic economy, these types of examples were labeled LIT 3.  
Each of these categories is instantiated in the data at different frequencies, and appear 
along with the formerly described categories in Chapter 2, i.e., non-reflexive (X), indecisive 
(?), and duplicate (DUPL). 
 
4.2.2 Onset of Awareness 
 
It is notable that for catch x-self, SA-UE and TSM categories do not occur in the data.  
 
 4.13. SA-UE: ? I caught myself in a strange situation. 
    ? The politicians caught themselves in a war of words. 
 
 4.14. TSM:  ? I caught myself in a yoga ashram in India. 
? As the poet finished writing her book, she caught herself. 
 
Seen in the original (i.e., non-corpus) examples above, the meanings are dubious, 
except without extreme contextual backgrounding. Whether theoretically possible or not, SA-
UE and TSM do not instantiate in the data, and are therefore not considered for the purposes 
of this discussion.  
For SA, DSC, and PNS metaphorical categories, a sudden perceptual awareness is 
entailed, as discussed in the previous section. Even though these display subtle conceptual and 
collocational differences, they all have this sudden onset of self-perceptual awareness in 
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onset (point); identification with stimulus 
 
 
 
 
Perceptual       state of not identifying   state of identifying  
Subscene   with stimulus X  with stimulus X 
 
                   
TIME 
 
 
Cognitive    state of not being  state of being 
Subscene   aware of stimulus X  aware of stimulus X 
 
 
 
 
         
 
moment of change of Awareness 
common. This onset of awareness (J. Grady & C., 2003) was discussed in Module 2 (see 
Section 3.1.5), where Self-Awareness was proposed to be a ‘primary scene’ for find/lose x-self 
constructions. Although catch x-self was not included in that discussion, it is proposed here as 
additional evidence for the theoretical claim made there. The conceptual matrix in Figure 8, 
(first introduced in Module 2, section 3.1.5) for catch x-self is proposed to be similar to find x-
self (compared to lose x-self, in which the left-right matrix components are reversed), except 
that the Onset Point (ibid.) is of a more salient, sudden nature. SA Events and PNS both 
construe the sudden onset of the ‘Cognitive Subscene’ (i.e., awareness of a perception) as a 
single event, whereas for Divided-Self Causative-types of events, the construal is a two-step 
process; the first involves the awareness of the thought or action, and the second involves the 
force action necessary to impede or discontinue that action. Because the awareness and force 
action always occur in very close temporal proximity, the event is categorized here as a single 
event. 
 
     Figure 8.  Primary Scene: The onset of Self-Awareness (based on Grady and Johnson (2003))  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Causative-type Force 
 
Supplemental support for the DSC-type category are instances where double FoAs were 
predicated. In these cases, the first instance is always the awareness of some thought or action, 
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and the second construes some psychodynamic force (Gilquin, 2007; Talmy, 2000) that inhibits 
the thought or action. Three examples were instantiated in the data, and are shown below 
(perceptual awareness is underlined and psychodynamic force is double-underlined).  
 
 4.15. I'm defective. I'm not really a person." She caught herself saying the words  
aloud, and clamped her jaws shut.   (COCA:2004.FIC.Analog) 
 
4.16. …to stop and focus on one thing at a time. As soon as I catch myself spinning  
around the room, I pause. I breathe in deep and release…  
(COCA:2015.ACAD.PhysicalEduc) 
 
4.17. …girls with EBD, the young women in this group would often catch themselves 
in the act and self-correct inappropriate behavior independent of redirection from 
facilitators.            (COCA:2012.ACAD.EducTreatmen.Children) 
 
For each of the examples, and for all DSC-type construals, some internally-initiated thought or 
action occurs to which an Awareness emerges. This action or thought is deemed in need of 
being blocked or inhibited in some way, either mentally or physically. In the first example, the 
woman concluded that the words that she was saying were not appropriate, to which she then 
took action to prevent further similar words from being spoken by clamping her jaws shut. In 
the second example, spinning around the room is the action deemed in need of being inhibited, 
and so the action of pausing and breathing deeply achieves this. In the third and most explicit 
example, the inappropriate behavior of the young women was self-corrected, i.e., changed by 
themselves. Thus, both the initial thought or action and the counter thought or action are both 
internally based, the latter being the counter-force to the former. 
 Having defined and delineated the types of construal that occur with catch x-self, results 
of the corpus investigation will now be discussed. 
 
4.3 Results for catch x-self 
 
The search parameter [catch][ppx*], where the lemma catch is followed by a reflexive pronoun, 
yielded 1204 hits in the COCA (n≥10) and 59 in the BNC (n≥5) (reciprocals deleted). For the 
seven reflexive object pronoun data sets that had more than 100 tokens, a random sample of 
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100 was taken. The frequencies ratios for each of the categories in each corpus are shown in 
Table 18.  
The SA-type construal occurs most frequently in both corpora at a 36.5% ratio average, 
followed by the DSC category at a 20.5% ratio average. Metaphorical expressions (including 
the PNS category, yielding a 0.7% ratio average) thus make up more than half of the total data 
set. Frequencies for individual items, however, show incongruities. For example, in the COCA 
data, when comparing SA and DSC-type events, the frequency orders for third-person 
pronouns (i.e., he, she) are the inverse to the overall frequency average. In other words, for 
himself and herself, the DSC construal is more frequent (52% and 51%, respectively) than the 
SA construal (17% and 33%, respectively), which is incongruent with the results of total 
average, where the SA-type is the most frequent category. When these values are input into a 
Fisher Exact contingency table, however, the result is not significant (p=0.057284 at p < .05) 
and therefore only suggest a weak attraction of the third person pronoun to the DSC construal.  
The relatively common occurrence of the PNS category in the COCA (1.3%) is 
noteworthy. Upon further inspection, this is shown to be due to the conception of ‘seeing one’s 
image in a reflective surface’, expressed as ‘catching oneself in a mirror, pool of water, window, 
etc.’ The lack of instantiations in the BNC is interesting and tentatively leads to either regional 
variation or corpus data bias as a cause. Due to the low frequency, however, a more concrete 
statement cannot be made at this time. 
One result for which regional variation is determined to be a cause is the lack of tokens 
for the plural and impersonal pronouns in the BNC. Granted, the frequencies for these in the 
COCA are relatively low as well (themselves n=22, ourselves n=19, itself n=10), but the BNC 
null frequencies are striking. 
Detailed analyses will be discussed in the following subsections, but these preliminary 
results provide strong impetus for a more fine-grained inquiry in which the antecedent types 
(pronoun vs. noun) are distinguished. 
 
Table 18. Frequency ratios for [catch][ppx*] in the COCA & BNC according to semantic category and reflexive  
object pronoun. 
COCA  
himself        
(n=100) 
herself 
(n=100) 
myself 
(n=100) 
yourself 
(n=71) 
themselv
es (n=22) 
ourselves 
(n=19) 
itself 
(n=10) avg.  
SA 17 33 51 50.7 36.4 68.4 10 38.1 
DSC 52 51 30 15.5 27.3 15.8 0 26.4 
LIT 1 26 10 10 22.5 4.5 5.3 30 15.5 
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LIT 2 1 1 0 0 4.5 0 30 5.2 
LIT 3 0 0 0 2.8 4.5 5.3 10 3.2 
LIT 4 0 0 0 0 4.5 0 0 0.6 
PNS 1 2 3 2.8 0 0 0 1.3 
X 3 0 3 4.2 18.2 5.3 20 7.7 
? 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0.9 
DUPL 0 0 0 1.4 0 0 0 0.2 
         
BNC  
herself 
(n=21) 
himself 
(n=19) 
themselve
s (n=0) 
myself 
(n=10) 
yourself 
(n=9) 
itself       
(n=0) 
ourselve
s (n=0) avg. 
SA 47.6 57.9 0 60 77.8 0 0 34.8 
DSC 38 21 0 20 22.2 0 0 14.5 
LIT 1 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 
LIT 2 4.8 5.2 0 0 0 0 0 1.4 
LIT 3 0 5.2 0 10 0 0 0 2.2 
LIT 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PNS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
X 4.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 
? 0 10.5 0 10 0 0 0 2.9 
DUPL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
4.3.1 Results for [p*][catch][ppx*] 
  
In a query using the input search parameter [p*][catch][ppx*], there were 347 tokens in the 
COCA and 19 in the BNC (reciprocals deleted), seen in Table 19. Noticeable in the cross-
corpora results column (i.e., COCA+BNC) is the higher frequency of DSC compared to SA 
(49.5% and 35.5%, respectively), in contrast to the previously discussed higher frequency of 
SA when the antecedent was not taken into account (see Table 18). When the data is sorted by 
pronoun, seen in Figure 9, incongruent results appear for the first-person singular myself 
(SA=56, DSC=35) compared to himself and herself, (SA=23,30; DSC=63,59, respectively). A 
dependent relationship is found between first- and third-person pronouns when SA and DSC-
type construals are considered. Entering each of these frequencies (integers used as input 
values) into a contingency table (1st person: SA=61, DSC=38; 3rd person: SA=55, DSC=126), 
the result is significant (p=1E-06, at p < 0.5). In other words, when the antecedent is a first-
person pronoun, the construal is likely to be an SA-type construal, in contrast to the third-
person pronouns in which the DSC-type construal is more likely. These results show that 
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specifying the type of antecedent can provide unique insights into usage and collocational 
patterning.  
This is corroborated by the results of register type seen in Table 19. Considering the 
data only for non-fiction register frequencies 21 , there is a significant dependent relation 
(p= .002479 at p < .05) between SA events and the first-person pronoun antecedents (n=26) 
compared to DSC-type events (n=15), and vice versa for DSC and third-person pronoun 
antecedents (n=24) and SA events (n=9). In other words, for non-fiction registers, SA events 
are more likely with first person pronoun antecedents and DSC is more likely with third person 
pronoun antecedents. It is proposed again here that ‘naturalness’ of expressing SA events from 
a first-person point of view is the motivation for these results. That this is significant for the 
non-fiction register here strengthens this claim made previously for find and lose in Chapters 
2 and 3. Conversely, the propensity for DSC to be more likely for third person pronoun 
antecedents is likely due to the FoA being an action that is observable by the speaker/writer. 
These results contrast with tokens from the FICTION register in which the narrator/author is 
one and the same entity as the character, and can therefore describe internal perceptions from 
the intimate point of view (i.e., first person) even though the character is a third person entity 
and the syntax reflects this.  
 
   Table 19. Combined frequencies in the COCA and BNC for [p*][catch][ppx*]. 
COCA Freq.  BNC Freq. COCA+BNC Freq. (ratio %) 
SA 121 SA 9 SA 130 (35.5%) 
DSC 172 DSC 9 DSC 181 (49.5%) 
PNS 6 PNS 0 PNS 6 (1.6%) 
LIT 1 34 LIT 1 0 LIT 1 34 (9.2%) 
LIT 2 1 LIT 2 1 LIT 2 2 (0.5%) 
LIT 3 1 LIT 3 0 LIT 3 1 (0.3%) 
LIT 4 4 LIT 4 0 LIT 4 4 (1.1%) 
X 3 X 0 X 3 (0.8%) 
? 1 ? 0 ? 1 (0.3%) 
DUPL 4 DUPL 0 DUPL 4 (1.1%) 
TOTALS 347  19  366 
 
 
                                                
21 The fiction register was not included in order to analyze ‘real-world events’, so to speak. Integers were used 
as input values for the Fisher Exact contingency table. 
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    Figure 9. Frequencies of SA and DSC categories for each instantiated pronoun.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Frequencies of [p*][catch][ppx*] by register 
COCA FREQ PER MIL BNC FREQ PER MIL 
SPOKEN 25 0.2 SPOKEN 1 0.1 
FICTION 327 3.1 FICTION 14 0.9 
MAGAZINE 63 0.6 MAGAZINE 0 0 
NEWSPAPER 49 0.5 NEWSPAPER 0 0 
ACADEMIC 12 0.1 NON-ACAD 5 0.3 
TOTAL 476   ACADEMIC 2 0.1 
   MISC 2 0.1 
   TOTAL 24   
 
  Figure 10. Cross-corpora frequencies of past and present tense, by pronoun, for [p*][catch][ppx*]. 
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Another collocational trend concerns verb tense. Seen in Figure 10, the high frequency 
of past tense tokens for the three most common pronouns (i.e., himself, myself and herself) 
suggests that catch x-self is perhaps more ‘natural’ when the FoA action has already been 
completed. This can be corroborated by the total frequency counts for past (n=239) and present 
tense (n=126), a nearly two-fold difference. Upon reflection on the entailed meaning of 
suddenness discussed earlier for catch x-self (see section 5.3.2), the past tense is a logical 
consequence of that temporal constraint. Due to its speed, along with the entailment for the 
meaning of catch, (i.e., to get hold of and stop an object (LDOCE, 2014)), the generalized 
meaning can be construed as to suddenly hold and stop something. Ontologically, to hold 
something is a bipolar action, i.e., either an object is held or it isn’t. Once a non-held object is 
held, the action is complete. There is no time duration in which the object is in the process of 
being held. One can barely catch something, but the object is still considered caught; 
conversely, one can almost catch something, in which case the object is not caught. This 
entailment carries through into the metaphorical construal. Of course, Self-Awareness is not 
literally held, but the emergence of perceptual self-awareness can be conceived of as an object 
that is ‘held’ in the ‘container of the mind’ (i.e., the MIND IS A CONTAINER conceptual 
metaphor (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  
The past-present tense comparison data also reveal different aspects of the expressions. 
For example, the present tense is more frequent with the second person (i.e., you-yourself; past 
n=4, present n=29) and third person plural pronouns (i.e., they-themselves; past n=1, present 
n=7), contrary to the overall results above. In the COCA, the ratio for present to past tense for 
yourself is 6:1 and for themselves it is 7:1. Why should this be so? Upon closer investigation, 
shown in the prototypical examples below, it is not actually the present tense but the future and 
conditional tenses that are common, followed by interrogatives, and these together instantiate 
just over 74% of the cases.  
 
4.18. Have students begin listening to everything they say to themselves. When they 
catch themselves talking to themselves, whether it is negative or positive…  
      (COCA:1992.ACAD.InstrPsych) 
 
4.19. And if you catch yourself ordering a second cocktail within an hour, slow it 
down…        (COCA:2011.MAG.Shape) 
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Thus, for second person and 3rd person plural [p*][catch][ppx*], it is not a past-present 
distinction as much as a past-other distinction that should be delineated. Although this data can 
be analyzed in more detail as to which tense/aspect of the verb with specific antecedent pair is 
instantiated, due to the lack of applicability to the present topic, this analysis was not 
conducted. The inquiry would be an interesting one for future research endeavors. What is 
important for the present research is the overall higher ratio of the past tense, likely due to the 
temporal entailment of the meaning of catch.  
Other results show a high cross-corpora frequency for the second and third person 
plural pronoun antecedents as general referents (i.e., not specific people), instantiating at 84%. 
One motivating factor for this may be the pragmatic function (e.g., speech act) of the tokens. 
For second person tokens, 52% of the cases are ‘giving advice’ to the reader/audience, whereas 
17% of the third-person plural were of this type. This may be due to the type of data used in 
each corpus, a large amount coming from mainstream media containing articles and media 
programs that give advice to its readers/listeners. Only a more in-depth and detailed 
sociolinguistic corpus analysis can reveal to what extent this is instantiated, but for the present 
inquiry the above statement is evidentially supported. 
The points above all confirm the importance of analyzing metaphors according to type 
of antecedent as well as construal in context, where construal and collocation patterns reveal 
idiosyncrasies in use. The next section discusses examples where the antecedents of catch x-
self are full nouns. 
 
4.4 [n*][catch][ppx*] 
 
A search was conducted with the parameter [n*][catch][ppx*], where the antecedent is a full 
noun. Due to the limited number of tokens in both corpora, there was no minimum count set 
for the lemma search (n=95 in the COCA, n=8 in the BNC, reciprocals deleted). The 
frequencies for each semantic category (as described in 5.3.1.) are shown in Table 21.  
 
Table 21. Category frequencies for [n*][catch][ppx*] 
COCA Freq.  BNC Freq. 
SA 29  SA 4 
DSC 51  DSC 2 
PNS 2  LIT (2) 1 
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LIT (1) 8  ? 1 
LIT (2) 1  Total 8 
LIT (3) 1  
? 2  
X 1  
Total 95  
 
In the COCA, DSC was 1.7 times more frequent than the SA type, whereas in the BNC, 
SA was twice as frequent as DSC, although the low frequency warrants caution about positing 
generalizations. Proper names comprised 84 of the COCA tokens (88%) and six (75%) of the 
BNC. In the COCA, 48 were masculine and 36 were feminine names, while in the BNC, two 
were masculine and four were feminine. The high number of proper names corroborates the 
[p*][catch][ppx*] results in the previous section in which third person pronouns instantiated 
the DSC-type more frequently than the SA-type construal.  
In both corpora, there were six instances of metonymically-construed experiencer-
antecedents. 
 
4.20. Brokers catch themselves describing an $825,000 house as " sweet... 
         (COCA:1999.NEWS.NYTimes) 
 
4.21. Do I look like I deliver deliveries? # What you- The younger barber catches 
himself mid-question-a rush to judgment-now that he sees and realizes that Marty and 
Pop are…     (COCA:2005.FIC.Callaloo) 
 
In the above examples, the job title or action stands for the individual people who work as 
brokers. All six metonyms (e.g., barber, broker, patrolman, researcher, comic, epic poet) 
instantiate the ACTION FOR AGENT type (Radden & Kövecses, 1999). 
According to register, 83 (87%) of the COCA and six (75%) of the BNC tokens were 
of the FICTION register. This high number supports the claim made above about the 
author/narrator assuming the first-person point of view of the character (construing an internal 
perception) while predicating the third person experiencer-antecedent, proposed in Chapters 2 
and 3. 
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4.5 Fuzzy and other examples 
 
The data for catch x-self was not immune to cases that were conceptually difficult to resolve. 
For example, based on the token alone it was sometimes challenging to specify the difference 
between SA and DSC. In the example below, when only the token is considered, the continuous 
waving of the fork suggests an SA construal where Ken is perceptually aware of his fork waving. 
However, in the context of the next sentence, once this awareness emerges, Ken ceases this 
action, a DSC-type construal.  
 
4.22. Ken caught himself waving his fork around with a piece of steak still attached  
and shedding bits of batter. He set it on his plate.  
(COCA:2008.FIC.FantasySciFi) 
 
Another conceptually ‘fuzzy’ example (below) represents an indecisive (‘?’) case, which can 
potentially be construed as SA, PNS, or LIT (4).  
 
4.23. While President Richard M. Nixon caught himself on tape using epithets  
and ripping into homosexuality, President Obama and the chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff have called for gays to be allowed to serve openly in the  
military.      (COCA:2010.NEWS.WashPost) 
 
Expanded context (abridged) 
The boycott of segregated buses in Montgomery, Ala., began in 1955. California's Supreme 
Court struck down a ban on interracial marriage in 1948, 18 years before the U.S. Supreme 
Court did the same. " That all changed in increments, " he said. # Leonard Hirsch, a policy 
staffer at the Smithsonian Institution, said a symbolic shift has already occurred. While 
President Richard M. Nixon caught himself on tape using epithets and ripping into 
homosexuality, President Obama and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have called 
for gays to be allowed to serve openly in the military. Still, Obama said during his campaign 
that he opposed same-sex marriage.  
 
Under the SA construal, Nixon is aware of both his own attitude and the language he uses 
concerning the gay community. As such, the main FoA is marked as using epithets and ripping 
into homosexuality. However, if construed as a PNS category, on tape is the main FoA, where 
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Nixon literally hears an external, physical version of himself on tape, similar to if he were to 
see himself in a film. Finally, under the LIT (4) conception, the agency responsible for 
enforcing law arrested the president, due to his own carelessness, making it easy for the 
enforcers to catch Nixon. Although historically inaccurate, with enough context this is 
conceptually possible. All in all, due to the lack of definitive context, even having analyzed the 
expanded context, this example was marked indecisive ‘?’. 
The argument could be made that the difference between SA and DSC is that the DSC 
construal contains some negative action that requires cessation. However, positive and negative 
determinations aren’t as clear-cut as they seem and ethical and/or cultural attitudes towards 
actions are not the sole basis for inhibiting an action. For example, thinking is usually 
considered a positive action, but in the example below it is something to stop and take notice 
of and perhaps take action to control/inhibit.  
 
4.24. Whenever you catch yourself thinking, say to yourself, That's thinking. No matter 
how compelling or urgent your thought seems, simply label it and let it go.  
       (COCA:2005.MAG.Prevention) 
 
In contrast, greed is usually a negative personality trait, but not always, as in the following 
example. 
 
4.25. How does thrift differ from greed? Have you caught yourself ever acting in a 
greedy fashion? Maybe greed isn't so bad.  
         (COCA:2004.SPOK.NPR_TalkNation) 
  
Again, these cases show the importance of analyzing sufficient context for the proper 
delineation of metaphoric construal and the dangers of basing results only on the specific 
metaphoric construction and/or the individual token. 
 
4.6 Find and Catch x-self 
 
The following examples predicate both find x-self and catch x-self within the same sentence. 
In the first example, a complex SA+DSC-type is construed, where the awareness of reaching 
for the phone (i.e., SA) is in need of cessation (i.e., DSC).  
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4.26. He sometimes finds himself reaching for the phone to call his father and  
then catching himself before dialing, remembering that his father is gone.  
       (COCA: 1991.NEWS.NYTimes) 
 
The second example below is an SA+SA complex, where the experiencer is aware of being 
self-conscious (SA) and in that self-conscious state, awareness of subsequent thoughts occurs 
(SA). 
 
4.27. She found herself self-conscious under Carolyn's exhaustive scrutiny,  
and caught herself trying to measure and examine the things she said from  
the girl's point of view.    (BNC: HJH.W_fict_prose) 
 
The relational dynamics of the above conceptions are indeed complex. By delineating the 
semantic and collocational subtleties in systematic ways as discussed here, however, it is 
possible to describe much of the data and postulate cognitive and other motivations that support 
these results. 
 
4.7 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In conclusion to this chapter, the types of metaphoric construal for catch x-self that occur are 
similar to that of find x-self, except for the strengthened entailment of suddenness of action. 
One categorical difference is the addition of the Divided-Self Causative (DSC), where two 
internal actions occur in quick succession. The first action is an Awareness of the original 
action, and the second action is a force used to impede or block the original action. These 
sequential actions happen quickly and are thus sometimes difficult to identify. Corpus analyses 
and results for catch x-self suggest that conceptual and collocational patterns were able to be 
distinguished and evidenced by way of context. The contexts for the metaphoric instantiations 
were explained, and when necessary, unresolvable and ‘fuzzy’ examples were discussed in 
detail. Thus, the method of corpus analysis implemented in this investigation was able to 
identify and delineate subtle similarities and differences in metaphor construal in analogous 
and even perhaps misconstrued polysemous predications. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The constructions find/lose/catch + x-self have been shown to have much semantic variation, 
and within that variation lies collocations that include dependent components. It has been 
shown that these three verbs, when metaphorically-construed and contained within the 
reflexive construction, construe multiple types of Self-Aware conceptions depending on the 
intent, given form within particular contexts. These contexts cannot be ignored when analyzing 
constructions, and often the expanded context is the only recourse for accurate meaning 
retrieval (Sinclair, 1991).  
It was claimed in Modules 1 and 2, and again here, that Self-Awareness is an image 
schema, and as such, it can be utilized as a base conception for metaphoric construal and 
predication. If this hypothesis is analyzed logically, it stands to reason that the mind cannot be 
aware of something without an object for its awareness.22 “The idea that I know is not the same 
as the idea that I know I know” (Lewis, 2006, p. 21). SA Events report on this “knowing-I-
know” phenomenon, the latter knowing representing the Subject’s perceptions and the former 
knowing representing the Awareness of those perceptions.  Corpus data have been presented 
that support this claim.  
Five types of metaphorical events are construed and predicated through the three 
reflexive constructions, summarized in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Categories and frequency ratios for metaphorically-construed [find/catch/lose+ x-self]. 
Categories find x-self catch x-self lose x-self 
SA O (28.7%) O (40%) O (43.5%) 
SA-UE O (65.2%) X X 
TSM O (2.1%) X O (19.6%) 
PNS O (3.6%) O (1.1%) X 
DSC X O (26.1%) X 
 
                                                
22 In this case, ‘no object of awareness’ is equivalent to being ‘unaware’. This contrasts with the notion of being 
‘aware of nothingness’, practiced in some meditative traditions, where ‘nothingness’ may be considered as an 
object of awareness.  
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Summarizing prototypical examples from all metaphoric conceptions found in the data, 
differences in conception become more transparent. 
  
 SA (Self-Aware Events):  
5.1. Michael Stevinson found himself afraid to hold his newborn twins,  
Douglas and Michelle.    (COCA:1998.MAG.Parenting) 
 
5.2. Then, she caught herself smiling:' Feeling pleased with yourself,' she 
thought immediately…    (BNC:ACB.W_fict_prose) 
 
5.3. For a time he lost himself in the game, his whole self gathered up into the 
shapes the stones…     (BNC:GUG.W_fict_prose) 
 
SA-UE (Self-Aware Unexpected Event) 
5.4. Wherever you are and in whatever circumstances you find yourself, strive 
always to be a lover…     (BNC:B1F.W_religion) 
 
TSM (True-Self Metaphor):  
5.5. But we have a lot of good players that will find themselves. It just takes  
time.      (COCA:1995.NEWS.Houston) 
 
5.6. In a state of intoxication, an individual loses himself. This is the basis of 
the Dionysiac experience: the collapse of individuation…  
(BNC:H0N.W_ac_humanities_arts) 
 
PNS (Picture Noun Schema):  
5.7. Katie Kauffman really finds herself in the picture with the latest in  
high-tech animation. (Double entendre with TSM-type)   
       (COCA.1995.CBS_Morning) 
 
5.8. I catch myself sometimes in the mirror when I'm alone and there it is-my 
beautiful outside…     (COCA:1998.FIC.ParisRev) 
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DSC (Divided-Self Causative): 
5.9. I smile because I'm telling this story. And then I catch myself and go,     
“Wait a minute. That's not real.   (COCA:2015.SPOK.CBS) 
 
These different aspects of Self are but the tip of the larger philosophical, psychological and 
physiological iceberg of what constitutes the Self (Bodhi, 2012; Damasio, 2010; Nanamoli, 
1991; Parker, Mitchell, & Boccia, 2006; Satchidananda, 1984; Stiles, 2001). Whatever 
perspective on the definition of Self one entertains, humans have the linguistic capacity to 
express knowing what we know (i.e., find/catch + x-self) as well as not knowing what we had 
known (i.e., lose x-self), and because these SOURCE concepts of Self are ephemeral and 
dependent upon such factors such as biology, age, culture and religion, etc., a more concrete 
image (i.e., TARGET) is provided onto which to map the conception in predication.   
 
5.2 Verbs of Perception 
 
One question that has not yet been addressed is: Are there other reflexive constructions that 
construe Self-Awareness, and if so, are they candidates for SA Events? If we were to propose 
one category of verbs likely to utilize this image schema, it is most likely from the Perceptual 
category proposed in Chapter 1. The verbs in this category are: be, catch, check, feel, find, 
identify, immerse, lose, perceive, regard, see, watch. Catch, find, and lose were already shown 
to include Self-Aware events, and so a brief survey of the other verbs will follow below.  
 
  Table 23. Verbs from the metaphorical category ‘Perception’ and metaphorical construal frequencies    
   in the COCA corpus (random sample, n=100). 
verb Construal Type (frequency) Total Frequency 
be TSM (25); X (75) 5772 
check DSC (19); lit (37); idi (36); X (8) 446 
feel SA-UE (17) ; lit (77); idi (1); X (5) 2416 
identify lit (39); lit 2 (61) 2622 
immerse lit (5); lit 2 (85); SA (10) 808 
perceive lit (100) 619 
regard lit (78); lit 2 (2); X (20) 431 
see lit (18); met1 (35); met2 (17); X (30) 9049 
watch lit (39); met1 (16); met2 (20); X (22); ? (3) 806 
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A [v][ppx*] search in the COCA corpus (random sample, n=100) for each of the verbs 
in the category was performed and results are shown in Table 23. The list of verbs, including 
a corpus example of each metaphorically-construed type, is provided below. When necessary, 
explanations of abbreviated terms from Table 23 are provided. 
 
be: (TSM=True-Self Metaphor) 
5.10. TSM: "I wanted to feel good I wanted to be myself," writes Jenner, reflecting on  
the night…       (COCA:2015.MAG.People) 
 
check: (DSC= to inhibit oneself from doing something; IDI=check in/out of a hotel or clinic) 
 5.11. DSC: “Robotically chivalrous”, she almost said, but something made  
her check herself.      (COCA:1997.FIC.SouthwestRev) 
 
feel: (SA-UE=to think or know oneself to be in some situation; IDI=to touch one’s body, esp.  
sexually) 
5.12. SA-UE: Dr. Deeb can not picture Saddam acceding to such a term unless his  
army feels itself on the very brink of complete collapse.  
(COCA:1991.NEWS.CSMonitor) 
 
identify: (LIT 2: affiliate oneself with some group, i.e., “identify oneself as…”) 
5.13. Non-metaphoric: lit 2: in 1996, the first time a majority of voters -- 51 percent -
- identified themselves as Republicans in a state once solidly Democratic.  
     (COCA:1998.NEWS.Atlanta) 
 
immerse: (SA= visceral and total focus on some object or activity, similar to lose x-self; LIT  
2= to be very involved with some activity) 
5.14. SA: He loves information. He often deals with pain or challenges by immersing  
himself in study…    (COCA:2000.NEWS.USAToday) 
 
perceive: (LIT: to think, believe, or understand) 
5.15. Non-metaphoric: How an individual perceives himself or herself is key to the  
achievement of connected knowing.   (COCA:2000.ACAD.ReVision) 
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regard: (LIT= see (in reflective surface); LIT 2= think, believe, understand) 
5.16. LIT: As Lucy closes the door behind them, he regards himself sadly in the large 
silver-framed mirror…    (COCA:2008.FIC.Bk:MaryModern) 
 
5.17. LIT 2: The House of Lords has learned to regard itself as a chamber with 
influence, not with power.    (COCA:1999.NEWS.WashPost) 
 
see: (LIT=see; Metaphoric 1=understand, believe; Metaphoric 2=imagine, see in one’s mind) 
 5.18. Metaphoric 1: Women need to see themselves as full and active partners in the  
21st-century…     (COCA:2008.MAG.America) 
 
5.19. Metaphoric 2: …we'd both signed the lease. In a terrifying flash I saw myself back 
in my old bedroom…     (COCA:2007.FIC.LiteraryRev) 
 
watch: (LIT=watch; Metaphoric 1=imagine, see in mind; Metaphoric 2=be careful) 
5.20. Metaphoric 1: He watched himself as if from a distance as he opened the front 
panel of the chair…     (COCA:2006.FIC.Bk:BurningDreams) 
 
5.21. Metaphoric 2: It's so hard to get good help these days. " " Watch yourself, Simon 
Legree, " Priscilla said, " or I'll tell pop … (COCA:1992.FIC.Bk:McNallysLuck) 
 
In the search for perceptual verbs that construe the meaning of Self-Awareness and/or other 
metaphorical events, four have been identified as doing so. Interestingly, there is one 
construction each that construes SA, SA-UE, TSM, and DSC. PNS is absent from the data, but 
a more thorough investigation would likely uncover such instances. 
For the verb feel, SA-UE events account for 17% of the 100 random sample tokens. 
The conception of this metaphor is highly fluid, meaning that the demarcation between the 
literal and metaphorical meanings of feel is murky. In most cases such as that below, both 
physicality and mentality can be attributed to feel, due to the interconnectedness of thought, 
emotion, and sensation in human experience. In all of these metaphorical cases (except for the 
single idiomatic example), however, self-perceptual awareness of some externally-initiated 
situation is construed. Feeling persecuted can simultaneously be a physical, emotional and 
mental response sensation, all brought about by some external source, accounting for the 
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difficulty of pinpointing a concrete, compartmentalized conception. That notwithstanding, the 
focus of the reflexive event is on the awareness of that perception, thus, the attribution of the 
SA-UE categorization. 
 
5.22. The religious and traditional community feels itself persecuted by the 
government and by the Supreme Court's decisions.  (COCA:1996.ACAD.Church&State) 
 
For immerse x-self, shown in the example below, the SA-type event is construed at a 
frequency ratio of 10%. Under this construal, immerse x-self has a similar meaning to lose x-
self, where the focus of concentration is so intense that awareness of other perceptions fades 
into the background of the subconscious.  
 
5.23.  Antonio retrieved the model from the pool, laid it out on the grass and immersed 
himself in the task of arranging it in the logical position for a martyr.   
       (COCA:1994.FIC.LiteraryRev) 
 
For immerse x-self, the experiencer is aware of, and is doing nothing but the task at hand. The 
metaphor creates a conceptual cross-domain mapping of the SOURCE: being completely 
surrounded by liquid. Here, the surrounding element is the task, and being completely 
surrounded by it, there is no other consciousness except for the task, to the detriment of other 
kinds of awareness or activity, thus the SA event categorization. 
For the verb be, TSM accounts for 25% of the tokens. This high ratio was surprising, 
as was the simple dichotomy of this with the non-reflexive examples. However, upon further 
investigation, it is perfectly logical that this be the case. The copula be, followed by a reflexive 
pronoun, functions mainly as intensifier, not reflexive: 
 
5.24. Such facile nihilism is itself dehumanizing to the people who struggle to  
survive…      (COCA:2010.ACAD.AmerScholar) 
 
Concerning the metaphorical cases, all of them construe the True-Self Metaphor, to one degree 
or another. In other words, there is not one universal True-Self, but, depending on the situation, 
the quality and depth of the True-Self changes. 
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5.25. …his body language expressing his own self-confidence and the joy he took 
in being himself.     (COCA:2006.NEWS.WashPost) 
 
 5.26. Many students talked about freedom, the chance to be yourself.  
(COCA:1993.SPOK.ABC_20/20) 
 
 5.27. You can truly relax and be yourself, and not worry about where you have to be  
later…      (COCA:2007.MAG.Ebony) 
 
The True-Self is the confident-Self in the first example, the freedom of speech-Self in the second 
example, and the relaxed-Self in the third example. The True Self is context-dependent and 
ephemeral, and as such, reference to what this entails also changes with context. 
For check x-self, the DSC construal accounts for 19% of the data. Check x-self can be a 
more direct form of causation compared to catch x-self, meaning that the second, force-type 
action is more salient. In general, however, the two constructions are semantically comparable.  
 
5.28. Mona started to laugh, then checked herself and said Reid would be back in  
about an hour.     (COCA:1994.FIC.Commentary) 
 
5.29 Sometimes I have to check myself when I'm doing too much for everybody, 
including you.     (COCA:2013.MAG.Essence) 
 
 In conclusion, four perceptual verbs that were categorized in the preliminary corpus 
analysis were shown to yield the types of Self-Aware metaphorical construals delineated in 
this research. Specifically, SA, SA-UE, TSM, and DSC are instantiated for the verbs feel, 
immerse, be, and check, respectively. Other verbs in the original Perceive category, although 
sometimes construed metaphorically, yielded no instantiations of the Self-Aware Event 
conception. 
 
5.3 The verb perceive 
 
Although verbs that do not instantiate metaphorical instances described thus far are not 
discussed at length, a brief comment will be made on one verb’s conception that has been vital 
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to this research, namely perceive. Self-Aware Events, as stated numerous times in Modules 1, 
2 and here, construe perceptual self-awareness. This perception can be extended to include the 
True-Self Metaphor, the Divided-Self Causative, and the Picture Noun Schema, where some 
form of self-perceiving is necessary for each type of event to be conceived; for the TSM-type, 
perception of some deeper Self, perception of two competing selves for the DSC-type, and 
perception of one’s external representation is necessary for the PNS construal. That being said, 
interestingly, the verb perceive does not metaphorically instantiate at all in the data, i.e., it 
yields 100% literal instantiation. However, it is essential that perceive be delineated carefully. 
Two examples will bear this out. 
 
5.36. Even when young girls receive high grades, they may perceive themselves as  
being incompetent in math.    (COCA:1993.ACAD.Bioscience) 
 
5.37. Here again, a greater proportion of non-athletes perceived themselves as  
overweight when, in fact, no significant differences exist between the two…  
(COCA:1991.ACAD.SportBehavior) 
 
According to the LDOCE, perceive has the meaning, “to understand or think of something or 
someone in a particular way” (2014) and this covers both examples. However, if the second 
example is understood as a more visceral, physiological type of perception, i.e., of the non-
athletes’ physical heaviness, then the following meaning, also considered literal, is appropriate, 
1. to become aware of (something) through the senses, esp. the sight; recognize or observe 
(Collins Dictionary Online). In an analysis of the expanded contexts of the two examples above, 
there is no evidence as to which interpretation is more appropriate. Due to this, therefore, both 
of these ‘base’ meanings were included under the literal category for the verb perceive.  
A comparison of these dictionary definitions helps to reveal the overall difficulties and 
subtleness of analyzing construal and predication. For example, even though both definitions 
are not marked metaphoric, should the first definition be considered slightly metaphorical 
given that the second definition is more physiologically based? In order to address this question 
and achieve consensus on a large scale, various dictionaries would need to communicate and 
collaborate on definitions and methodological parameters for each entry. For various reasons, 
this is not likely in the near future, but it is an important issue that needs to be kept in mind for 
researchers who deal with metaphor and collocation.  
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5.4 Comparative analysis of SA verbs + x-self 
 
In this section, SA-type constructions were compared (see Table 24) in order to uncover further 
collocational patterns and/or idiosyncrasies. The verbs were paired by similarity of meaning: 
[find ppx : catch ppx], [lose ppx : immerse ppx] and [catch ppx : check ppx]. For each pair, 
collocations were allowed of up to four places to the right so that nuances in the FoA could be 
retrieved and analyzed.  
The first comparison shows the frequency ratios of Word 1 to Word 2. There are 22.16 
tokens of the construction find ppx* for every token of catch ppx*, and so on. [find ppx*- catch 
ppx*] has the largest discrepancy, while [lose ppx* - immerse ppx*] has the smallest, 
suggesting that lose x-self and immerse x-self contain more similarity in meaning compared to 
the other two constructions. Interestingly, when the verbs are compared without the reflexive 
construction, the yielded rates are very different, as shown in Table 25.  
 
        Table 24. Comparisons of reflexive find-catch, lose-immerse, and catch-check. 
Word 1 Word 2 
find ppx* (22.16) catch ppx* (0.05) 
lose ppx* (1.25) immerse ppx* (0.80) 
catch ppx* (2.43) check ppx* (0.41) 
 
        Table 25. Comparisons of find-catch, lose-immerse, and catch-check. 
Word 1 Word 2 
find (5.37) catch (0.19) 
lose (61.11) immerse (0.02) 
catch (0.66) check (1.53) 
 
Although the complexity of statistically and semantically comparing the intricate 
contexts for the verbs in Table 25 with their reflexive counterparts in Table 24 is daunting, it 
can be stated, tentatively and in general terms, that these results represent functional differences 
between the sets. In other words, each of these verbs acts differently when embedded within 
the reflexive construction and when not. Comparing the first 20 collocations of [find ppx*] and 
[catch ppx*], seen in Table 26, the FoA profiles are very different. Whereas find x-self 
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collocates with adverbs denoting relatively passive, uncontrollable states and verbs of little 
action (i.e., stative, (Ebeling & Ebeling, 2013)) such as unable, standing, facing, drawn, 
surrounded, alone, etc., catch x-self collocates with more active verbs such as look, stop, 
admonish, bargain, etc. This supports the claims made above that find ppx* mainly construes 
SA-UE events whereas catch ppx* mainly construes the DSC-type construal.  
 
Table 26. Ratio comparisons of reflexive find ppx* and catch ppx* (4 places to the right). 
WORD 1 (W1): FIND PPX* (22.16) WORD 2 (W2): CATCH PPX* (0.05) 
    WORD W1 
W
2 
W1/W
2 SCORE     WORD W2 
W
1 
W2/W
1 SCORE 
1   UNABLE 284 0 568 25.6 1   LOOKS 4 0 8 177.2 
2   STANDING 266 0 532 24 2   STOPS 4 0 8 177.2 
3   FACING 233 0 466 21 3   ) 29 7 4.1 91.8 
4   POSITION 178 0 356 16.1 4   REALIZED 4 1 4 88.6 
5   WITHOUT 174 0 348 15.7 5 
  ADMONISHIN
G 2 0 4 88.6 
6   DRAWN 166 0 332 15 6   BARRELING 2 0 4 88.6 
7   BETWEEN 160 0 320 14.4 7   BARGAINING 2 0 4 88.6 
8   SURROUNDED 143 0 286 12.9 8   EXPLAINED 2 0 4 88.6 
9   ALONE 278 1 278 12.5 9   FROWNED 2 0 4 88.6 
10   WORKING 130 0 260 11.7 10   ID 2 0 4 88.6 
11   NEW 129 0 258 11.6 11   LAUGHS 2 0 4 88.6 
12   LIVING 128 0 256 11.6 12 
  MIDSENTENC
E 2 0 4 88.6 
13   THEMSELVES 5703 23 248 11.2 13   PICKS 2 0 4 88.6 
14   SUDDENLY 116 0 232 10.5 14   SMILED 2 0 4 88.6 
15   FRONT 114 0 228 10.3 15   STEPPED 2 0 4 88.6 
16 
  INCREASINGL
Y 109 0 218 9.8 16   STRODE 2 0 4 88.6 
17   BEING 211 1 211 9.5 17   TAKES 2 0 4 88.6 
18   ONLY 102 0 204 9.2 18   TAPE 2 0 4 88.6 
19   UNDER 203 1 203 9.2 19   UNAWARES 2 0 4 88.6 
20   TRAPPED 99 0 198 8.9 20   WAITED 2 0 4 88.6 
 
The same kind of comparison was done for lose x-self and immerse x-self, although the 
results are not as clear. Shown in Table 27, there is a tendency for lose x-self to collocate with 
mental states (i.e., thought) as well as with relations between things, as accounted for by the 
number of prepositions (i.e., to, at, among, etc.) Contrastively, immerse x-self collocates with 
slightly more concrete things (i.e., culture, study, work, etc.). Congruent with the claim made 
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for lose x-self in Chapter 3, a question mark, period, and comma collocate fairly often (as well 
as the conjunction and, the conditional if, etc., but these are less definitive without context), 
showing the clause-final tendency of TSM described there. The words world and work 
collocate with immerse x-self and hold the number 8 and 9 positions in the chart, respectively. 
They also collocate with lose x-self, although in spots 38, (0.4) and 39 (0.4), respectively (not 
shown). Because they share collocations that are part of the FoA, they also likely construe 
similar metaphorical meanings. This is borne out in the data. The following all construe the SA 
Event (i.e., SA and/or SA-UE): [immerse][ppx*]in work (n=10), [lose][ppx*]in work (n=5), 
[lose][ppx*]in[_at*]world (n=8), and [immerse][ppx*]in[_at*]world (n=9).  
 
Table 27. Ratio comparisons of reflexive lose ppx* and immerse ppx* (4 places to the right). 
WORD 1 (W1): LOSE PPX* (1.25) WORD 2 (W2): IMMERSE PPX* (0.80) 
    WORD W1 W2 W1/W2 SCORE     WORD W2 W1 W2/W1 SCORE 
1   I 32 1 32 25.6 1   CULTURE 20 0 40 50 
2   ? 10 0 20 16 2   INTO 15 1 15 18.8 
3   OTHER 49 3 16.3 13.1 3   STUDY 12 1 12 15 
4   YOU 16 1 16 12.8 4   WATER 10 1 10 12.5 
5   EACH 45 3 15 12 5   MORE 12 4 3 3.8 
6   TO 42 3 14 11.2 6   THEIR 14 6 2.3 2.9 
7   AT 13 1 13 10.4 7   'S 15 7 2.1 2.7 
8   " 70 6 11.7 9.3 8   WORK 23 12 1.9 2.4 
9   AMONG 11 1 11 8.8 9   WORLD 18 10 1.8 2.3 
10   THOUGHT 10 1 10 8 10   ALL 10 6 1.7 2.1 
11   IF 10 1 10 8 11   THEMSELVES 173 125 1.4 1.7 
12   HE 17 3 5.7 4.5 12   IN 772 621 1.2 1.6 
13   FOR 28 5 5.6 4.5 13   HIMSELF 285 247 1.2 1.4 
14   ITSELF 50 9 5.6 4.4 14   HIS 21 19 1.1 1.4 
15   ON 10 2 5 4 15   THIS 17 18 0.9 1.2 
16   . 202 44 4.6 3.7 16   THE 294 315 0.9 1.2 
17   , 117 52 2.3 1.8 17   HER 16 21 0.8 1 
18   AND 65 32 2 1.6 18   THAT 15 20 0.8 0.9 
19   OF 18 9 2 1.6 19   YOURSELF 117 163 0.7 0.9 
20   OR 10 5 2 1.6 20   IT 17 24 0.7 0.9 
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These results, provisionally, suggest that lose x-self and immerse x-self, although they 
share similar meaning in terms of SA Event construal, each maintains mostly independent 
collocational profiles. 
The final comparison, shown in Table 28, juxtaposes catch x-self and check x-self. The 
differences between these collocational profiles are also considerable. Whereas catch x-self 
collocates with mental verbs (i.e., thinking, wondering) and action verbs (saying, staring, doing, 
etc.), supporting the DSC-type analysis for catch x-self in Chapter 5, check x-self often 
construes the idiomatic meaning of checking into or out of a hospital or rehab clinic. It also 
construes the DSC-type at a ratio of 19%, as shown above in Table 23, denoting the conceptual 
similarities with catch x-self as described previously. 
 
Table 28. Ratio comparisons of reflexive catch ppx* and check ppx* (4 places to the right). 
WORD 1 (W1): CATCH PPX* (2.43) WORD 2 (W2): CHECK PPX* (0.41) 
    WORD W1 W2 W1/W2 SCORE     WORD W2 W1 W2/W1 SCORE 
1   THINKING 40 0 80 32.9 1   HOSPITAL 27 0 54 131.1 
2   SAYING 22 0 44 18.1 2   REHAB 16 0 32 77.7 
3   STARING 18 0 36 14.8 3   INTO 104 13 8 19.4 
4   WONDERING 18 0 36 14.8 4   OUT 101 13 7.8 18.9 
5   EYE 13 0 26 10.7 5   MIRROR 21 6 3.5 8.5 
6   UP 20 1 20 8.2 6   EACH 46 39 1.2 2.9 
7   HANDS 10 0 20 8.2 7   THEMSELVES 26 23 1.1 2.7 
8   ' 10 0 20 8.2 8   OTHER 46 41 1.1 2.7 
9   OH 10 0 20 8.2 9   ITSELF 11 10 1.1 2.7 
10   MY 18 1 18 7.4 10   WHEN 10 10 1 2.4 
11   ABOUT 18 1 18 7.4 11   FOR 28 29 1 2.3 
12   LOOKING 17 1 17 7 12   OF 11 12 0.9 2.2 
13   WHAT 16 1 16 6.6 13   IN 108 121 0.9 2.2 
14   AGAINST 15 1 15 6.2 14   YOURSELF 61 71 0.9 2.1 
15   DOING 15 1 15 6.2 15   A 68 87 0.8 1.9 
16   ) 29 2 14.5 6 16   'S 23 32 0.7 1.7 
17   JUST 28 2 14 5.8 17   THE 112 167 0.7 1.6 
18   HIS 37 3 12.3 5.1 18   I 22 45 0.5 1.2 
19   ON 71 6 11.8 4.9 19   AS 10 21 0.5 1.2 
20   TIME 29 3 9.7 4 20   TO 15 41 0.4 0.9 
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 These comparisons, although far from exhaustive, reveal various collocational details 
of Self-Aware Events, and help to show that conceptual (including metaphor and metonymy) 
and collocational details can be duly uncovered by way of a corpus analysis. 
 
5.5 find x-self and lose x-self, opposites or not? 
 
This section discusses a point made by Lakoff, who writes, “Given that lose and find are 
opposites, why isn’t I found myself in writing the opposite of I lost myself in writing?” (1996, 
p. 100). To answer this question, he discusses at length the Divided Person conceptual 
metaphor (1993, 1996), which was proposed to account for a great number of metaphors in 
English. This has been discussed theoretically in detail in Module 2, and therefore will not be 
dealt with again here; however, pragmatic issues related to this will be discussed below.  
The first of these issues deals directly with the question proposed by Lakoff above. 
Discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, find x-self and lose x-self are now known to have various 
meanings. Knowing this, we need to ask, “Do any of these meanings directly oppose each other, 
so that, for example, I found myself in writing does mean the opposite of I lost myself in 
writing?”  
The first case is taken from the TSM category, originally based on Lakoff’s research 
on the Divided Person Metaphor. The FoA in parentheses emphasize their semantically 
optional role.  
 
 TSM:  5.30. I found myself (in writing) =  
I was writing, and this was the impetus for the awareness of my deeper Self. 
   
5.31. I lost myself (in writing) =  
I was writing, and this was the impetus for being temporarily unaware of my 
deeper Self. 
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, each of these types were shown to be instantiated in the corpora. 
Furthermore, it was seen that the FoAs for TSM-type examples are semantically adjunctive in 
that they are not necessary for appropriate construal. Therefore, if we do not include the FoA 
in the main metaphoric construal and we understand both tokens to be construing the TSM-
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type, then two opposing meanings can be easily construed, one in which a deeper Self is present, 
and one in which it is not.  
Looking at the SA-type construal like those below, meaning opposition occurs here as 
well. (The syntax of the semantically mandatory FoAs were adjusted to align with prototypical 
usage for SA-types of construal.) 
 
 SA:  5.32. I found myself writing letters... =  
I was (suddenly) aware that I was writing letters. 
 
5.33. I lost myself in letter writing … =  
I had no general perceptual awareness because I was so concentrated on writing 
letters. 
 
In the first example, the experiencer is imbued with Self-Awareness, while in the second 
example, Self-Awareness is not immediately present. So, the presence or absence of Self-
Awareness sets these conceptions against each other to form opposing pairs.  
This kind of comparison can be done with the PNS category as well, although there is 
little corpus evidence to support this. The category PNS (Picture Noun Schema) describes a 
construal in which some form of the self is physically present, i.e., a picture, video, statue, 
mannequin, etc. Original (i.e., non-corpus) examples showing this opposition are the following: 
 
 PNS:  5.34. I found myself in the cluttered basement. =  
I found some representation of myself (a picture, doll, etc.) in the cluttered 
basement. 
 
5.35. I lost myself in the cluttered basement. = 
I lost some representation of myself in the cluttered basement. 
 
These examples are not metaphoric in the same sense as previous examples in that the verbs 
find and lose are literally construed, but the antecedents are metonymic, i.e., they refer to a 
physical representation of the antecedent and not the antecedent itself (i.e., representation 
stands for antecedent.) Admittedly, their low frequency in the corpora constitutes perhaps, an 
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armchair rebuttal, but even so, PNS can be construed to instantiate meaning opposition for find 
x-self and lose x-self. 
 It must be stated here that this evidence is not meant to refute Lakoff’s claim that find 
myself and lose myself are not opposites in the same way as non-reflexive uses of find and lose. 
However, when analyses have their foundations built upon results of corpus data, conceptions 
may emerge that intuition alone may not have anticipated.  
 
5.6 Other reflexive constructions  
 
One line of research that was not included here (but is teeming with possibilities) is the 
following collocation: [v*]_nn* _i* [ppx*], i.e., verb lemma, noun, preposition, reflexive 
pronoun. For example, 
 
5.38. When do you find time for yourself except when other people are  
sleeping?     (COCA:1998.NEWS.CSMonitor) 
 
A list of the most frequent 100 entries is shown below (COCA: n=3130, (≥5, reciprocals 
deleted): 
 
take care of ppx  (n= 2,224, ratio = 67.7%)  lost track of ppx   (n=19, ratio = 0.06%) 
draw attention to ppx (n= 157, ratio = 5%)  caught sight of ppx   (n=31, ratio = 0.1%) 
find time for ppx   (n=15, ratio =0.05%) lost control of ppx   (n=28, ratio =0.09%) 
 
[make] _nn* _i* [ppx] (n=224, ratio = 7.2%) 
make fools of ppx (n=37) make fun of ppx (n=71)  make copy of ppx (n=19) 
make time for ppx (n=7) make name for ppx (n=18) make money for ppx (n=11) 
make room for ppx (n=6) make lives for ppx (n=5) make decisions for ppx (n=5) 
 
From the list above, the three main constructions discussed here, i.e., find, lose, and catch x-
self, are listed below. 
 
[find]_nn* _i* [ppx*], n=16 (reciprocals deleted): 
find time for ppx    find peace with ppx   find spirituality for ppx  
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find photographs of ppx  find fault with ppx  find qualities in pps   
find similarity between ppx  find room for ppx   find part of ppx 
find others like ppx    find strength in ppx  find food for ppx  
find pictures on ppx   find confidence in ppx  find places on ppx 
 
[lose]_nn* _i* [ppx*], n=23 (reciprocals deleted): 
lose touch with ppx   lose control of ppx  lose faith in ppx  
lost sight of ppx   lose part of ppx  lose belief in ppx 
lose confidence in ppx   lose reality within ppx  
lose power over ppx   lose respect for ppx   
lose consciousness of ppx   lose track of ppx 
  
[catch]_nn* _i* [ppx*], n= 18 (reciprocals deleted): 
catch sight of ppx (n=17)  catch hold of ppx (n=1) 
  
These types of collocations need to be explored and analyzed at length, and there is 
undoubtedly much to be uncovered. Without analyzing specific contexts, meaningful semantic 
patterning cannot be formally proposed, but at first glance, the results show a wide range of 
both literal and metaphorical conceptions for the first general set of collocations as well as the 
three verbs, [find], [lose], and [catch]. Some of them probably instantiate SA Events, Divided 
Self Phenomena and Picture Noun Schema, such as find peace with ppx, find part of ppx, lose 
touch with ppx, lose power over ppx, catch sight of ppx and catch hold of ppx, etc. Without 
analyzing each of the tokens and their contexts, however, any statement will be an 
overgeneralization and perhaps even incorrect.  
There seem to be recurrent themes within the overarching search parameter [v*]_nn* 
_i* [ppx*], one example being [make] _nn* _i* [ppx], in which there are nine noun variations 
and two preposition variations. For this data, along with that for find, lose, and catch, it seems 
that collocations (find time for x-self, lose touch with x-self, etc.) can be grouped together to 
form larger, more schematic categories, called collostructions (Stefanowitsch & Gries, 2003). 
Collostructions can be thought of as schematic templates onto which lexemes are inserted. 
Meaning is not only retrievable at the lexeme level, however. There is meaning at both the 
abstract schema level and the specific phraseme level, although the nature of that meaning is 
different. A very abstract collostruction will allow numerous lexemes into its slots and the 
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structure will be more loose or flexible. Its meaning will also be more abstract. At the other 
end of the spectrum, a very specific idiom will have a very limited number of lexemes possible 
(without changing the meaning) and have a more rigid collostructure. Collocation schemata 
are thus a scalable phenomenon, from very abstract (i.e., [v*]_nn* _i* [ppx*]) to more specific 
(i.e., [p*] found [ppx*] in [n*]), to idiomatic (i.e., [n*] caught sight of [n*]). In other words, 
depending on the level of schematicity, the flexibility of specific slots of the collocation change 
(ibid.) 
Even in this brief discussion, insights into a type of independence-dependence cline, as 
it were, can now be gleaned. This cline refers to the level of abstractness of an analysis, i.e., 
the level of analytical granularity of one’s research viewpoint (Sinclair, 1991). And depending 
on this viewpoint, the type of analysis will change, because what the researcher is looking for 
changes. Looking through a simple magnifying glass will reveal different data than an 
electromagnetic microscope or the Hubble telescope, even if they are all looking in the same 
direction.  
 
5.7 Implications 
 
The implications of the results of this investigation for metaphor studies are far-reaching. 
Specifically, for a number of verbs that occur within the narrow confines of the reflexive 
construction, it has been shown here that Self-Awareness of perceptions and situational 
experiences are commonly implemented SOURCES for various metaphoric expressions. This 
does not mean that ‘anything one thinks or feels’ can be used as an image schema, but it does 
seem to require an expanded sense of the original definition. The most likely is that perceptual 
and experiential Self-Awareness be considered along more concrete terms, even though it 
might be cognitively ‘one step removed’ from the physical sensations and situational 
experiences constructed in the mind and body.  
Furthermore, and perhaps more important for future research, is that use of the term 
Self-Awareness be understood as semantically complex. In other words, Self-Awareness 
should not be considered one abstract, gestalt cognitive function, but a function that has 
multiple, discernible aspects that can be individually, conceptually identified and linguistically 
manifested. This will undoubtedly create problems for those interested in issuing broad 
statements on metaphoric conception as well as those wanting to uncouple general cognitive 
and linguistic functioning. If one expression such as [NP + find x-self] can construe and 
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predicate different and subtle aspects of Self-Awareness, as has been proposed and evidenced 
here, then what is to be done with metaphorical expressions that refer to other cognitive 
capacities and ensuing conceptions such as memory, attention and forethought that may have 
been discounted as too abstract for image schema status?  
This line of inquiry is completely consistent with the main tenets of Cognitive 
Linguistics in that general cognition is the foundation for linguistic functioning, but it does 
challenge certain methodologies that rely solely on linguistic intuition as evidence for 
theoretical claims and conclusions. Intuitive notions about language are not to be discounted 
by any means, but the amount and diversity of data necessary to objectively flesh out nuances 
in construal are usually beyond any one person’s knowledge base. That being the case, the 
Cognitive Linguistic models discussed in Module 2 may need reexamination. In particular, the 
notion of subjectification from Cognitive Grammar, where the subject appears as part of the 
construal, may need to include Self-Awareness as a bona fide sub-category. The prototypical 
(original) examples 5.39~5.42 below are all examples of subjectification, but each refers to 
different parts of the Self that are either onstage or offstage, depending upon their construal. 
Thus, a reevaluation of each construal type and the subjective relationship of the experiencer 
to the scene is necessary for proper construal. Having shown the ubiquity of find x-self as well 
as the other metaphorical reflexive constructions, this kind of detail for can now be seen as 
necessarily incorporated into that theory.  
 
5.39. I found myself in a strange bar with strange people. (SA-UE) 
5.40. I found myself anxious during the exam. (SA) 
5.41. After 40 days of deep meditation, I found myself. (TSM) 
5.42. I bought a newspaper and found myself on the front page. (PNS) 
 
 Broader implications of the results of the research presented here along with those of 
the first two Modules point to a multifaceted methodological approach to metaphor analysis. 
The general Linguistic approach in Module 1 dealt with the notion of transitivity as well as 
semantic analyses of reflexive constructions. It provided theoretical support for proposing Self-
Aware Events as a viable account of certain metaphorical meanings. In Module 2, Self-Aware 
Events were analyzed and shown to be plausible descriptions of those events within the 
Cognitive Linguistics paradigm. And here in Module 3, quasi-corpus-driven analyses 
evidenced Self-Aware Events as not only frequent but statistically significant, supported by 
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token and broader contextual data. Thus, the multi-pronged methodology for delineating and 
analyzing metaphoric construal as presented strongly suggests that Self-Awareness is indeed 
the conceptual SOURCE for many types of metaphors that occur within the reflexive 
construction.  
 
5.8 Chapter Conclusion 
 
In conclusion to this chapter, four perceptual verbs that were categorized in the preliminary 
corpus analysis were shown to yield the types of Self-Aware metaphorical construals 
delineated in this research. Specifically, SA, SA-UE, TSM, and DSC are instantiated for the 
verbs feel, immerse, be, and check, respectively. Other verbs in the metaphorical Perceive 
category, although sometimes construed metaphorically, yielded no instantiations of the Self-
Aware Event. In contrast to this, the verb ‘perceive’ itself was found to be non-metaphorical, 
however, it might construe different senses depending on the granularity of the definition of 
perception.	
Section 5.4 compared the SA Event construals, find x-self vs. catch x-self, lose x-self vs. 
immerse x-self and catch x-self vs. check x-self. Each of these pairs were found to have unique 
as well as shared collocations, concluding that when collocations are shared, construal are more 
semantically congruent than when collocations differ. 
A pivotal issue was also addressed which has ramifications further within and across 
the field of metaphor studies. This was the claim that the meanings of find x-self and lose x-self 
were not in opposition to each other. However, the results found here strongly indicate that, 
when analyzed according to the present investigation, lose x-self and find x-self do construe 
opposing meanings for three types of metaphorical events, SA, TSM and PNS. From a broader 
perspective, these results point to the efficiency and accuracy of implementing the kind of 
quasi-corpus-driven method for SOURCE domain retrieval and analysis presented here. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
  
In Chapter One, a quasi-corpus-driven methodology was designed and then implemented using 
the COCA and BNC corpora.  Focusing attention on the verb slot of the reflexive construction, 
four metaphoric and six non-metaphoric semantic categories of verbs were found to instantiate 
therein. The metaphoric categories consisted of Self-Perception, Self-Causation, Societal 
Interaction and Self-Maintenance (total n=64). There were 1.5 times the number of 
metaphorically construed verbs compared to non-metaphoric, suggesting that metaphoric 
construal within the reflexive construction is prototypical, or at least, very common. Within 
the Self-Perception category, three verbs in particular were investigated thoroughly; find, lose 
and catch. Self-Aware Events, consisting of the Self-Aware and Self-Aware Unexpected Event 
subtypes, were the most frequent metaphoric conceptions for those verbs. Three other verbs in 
the Perception category were also examined; check, immerse and feel, and these were also seen 
to construe these Self-Aware Events as well. Contextual support for this was seen by way of 
the Focus of Awareness (aka FoA), defined as collocations that are an inherent semantic part 
of the metaphor that cannot be ignored or separated without consequences to the intended 
meaning.  
Metonymy was also found for subject-experiencers that were predicated as full nouns. 
By analyzing these metonyms individually, semantic and collocational details were uncovered 
that might have been otherwise missed if not specifically investigated. The main issue 
regarding these metonymic instances was, “How can inherently nonconscious and/or inert 
objects (i.e., metonymic experiencers) initiate action?” The analysis here proposed that these 
subject-experiencers have innate inertia. Especially in cases of synecdoche, each part of the 
whole is conceived of as taking part in the action initiation. Three steps were proposed as 
necessary for these types of constructions; sentience is mapped onto a non-sentient object, 2) 
a sentient object is the source of action inertia, and 3) action is acted upon itself. 
Specific results for find x-self strongly point to the mental state of Self-Awareness as 
the fundamental conception for the majority of find x-self data. Self-Awareness is thus 
proposed as likely functioning as an image schema. Four metaphorical senses were uncovered, 
1) Self-Aware Events, 2) Self-Aware Unexpected Events, 3) True-Self Metaphors, and 4) 
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Picture Noun Schemas, as well as literal meanings. Each of these had mostly idiosyncratic 
collocational patterning and meanings that could be confirmed by contextual analysis. 
Results for lose x-self included three Literal and three Idiomatic subcategories. For 
metaphorical instances, the SA-type was the most frequent, but there were no instances of the 
SA-UE-type. The meaning sense of SA for lose x-self, however, differed slightly from find x-
self, and was defined as the total awareness on the object of concentration to the point that 
general self-awareness was no longer available to the conscious mind. In the data, TSM and 
LIT types occurred more often here than for the find x-self data, supporting the idiosyncratic 
nature of even similarly construed collocations. 
For catch x-self, results suggested that this predication construes Self-Aware Events 
that are sudden, but with an added concept of interruption of one’s thought or internally-based 
action. Four semantic categories were proposed; the Self-Aware Event, the Divided-Self 
Causative, the Picture Noun Schema and the Literal. SA-UE and TSM categories did not occur 
in the data. Contextual support for the DSC-type category are instances where double FoAs 
were predicated, the first instance being the awareness of some thought or action and the 
second being some psychodynamic force relating to that first action. The SA-type was the most 
frequent construal, followed by the DSC-type. Metaphorical cases made up more than half the 
data set. For the catch x-self construction, PNS was uncharacteristically frequent due to the 
common conception of catching one’s image in a reflective surface. 
In Chapter 5, other metaphorically-construed Perception verbs that were categorized in 
the preliminary corpus analysis were shown to yield the types of Self-Aware metaphorical 
construals delineated in this research. Specifically, SA, SA-UE, TSM, and DSC are instantiated 
for the verbs feel, immerse, be, and check, respectively. Other verbs in the original Perceive 
category, although sometimes construed metaphorically, yielded no instantiations of the Self-
Aware Event conception. The verb perceive itself was not metaphorically construed, but the 
preliminary investigation into its definitions suggested that it might construe different senses 
based on the subtleties inherent in the construal and predication of sense perceptions. 
When three semantically similar sets of SA Event construals were compared, (i.e., find 
x-self / catch x-self, lose x-self / immerse x-self and catch x-self / check x-self), collocational 
patterning comparisons show similarities and differences inherent in all sets, suggesting that in 
some instances the items in each set have congruent meanings but in other instances their 
meanings are incongruent. 
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Lastly, the issue of find x-self and lose x-self as construing opposite meanings or not 
was examined. Conclusive evidence was found that SA, TSM and PNS examples indeed 
construed direct meaning opposition, contradicting previous claims made on the subject. 
 
6.2 Applications of the Research 
 
This research benefits not only theoretical discourse but more empirical inquiry as well. One 
practical application of this investigation is based on the revised MIPVU method, as described 
in this research, which can be utilized for any number of slots within and/or related to the 
reflexive construction. In order to apply this method to cover the widest range of collocations, 
however, a more comprehensive version is necessary, as proposed below: 
 
1. Input parameters are entered into the corpus search field, with one (or more) slots 
‘open’ or ‘filled’ as necessary and sufficient so that the results are limited only to 
the collocation under investigation. 
2. Check the retrieved data for syntactic, semantic and functional consistency of the 
samples of the collocation under investigation. 
3. Check individual data for possible metaphoric/metonymic use (i.e., cross- or intra-
domain mappings) by comparing/contrasting ‘base’ meanings with intended 
meanings of the nodes/tokens in a corpus-based dictionary.  
4. If a word’s use is considered metaphorical, analyze TARGET à SOURCE mappings.  
5. Locate and document all collocational/contextual evidence which corroborates or 
refutes the mapping in #4 above. 
6. Analyze data and confirm results.  
 
Implementing this new version, coined here the Metaphor Identification Procedure for 
Collocations (MIPC), a researcher should be able to objectively identify, analyze and provide 
evidence for metaphors in context. Although relatively time-consuming, I believe it to be 
objectively superior to investigative methods of metaphor which rely on intuition alone or that 
utilize SOURCE domain items as their input parameters, for this inherently skews the 
objectivity of the data by beginning the investigation with a preconception. Furthermore, the 
MIPC should provide accurate qualitative and quantitative insights to the data that do not need 
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nearly as much explanatory post-revision being that the data is quasi-corpus-driven and 
therefore much more likely to be statistically accurate in the first place.  
 Another application of this research deals with native English variation and 
generalization. Both British and American English data were utilized here in order to ‘smooth 
out’ possible regional variations indubitably inherent in any single-region corpus. This had a 
two-fold effect. The first is that allowed regional idiosyncrasies in the data to be uncovered, to 
which regional variation in the data could be posited. The second is that it allowed for a more 
regionally-balanced data set. Ideally, all native English varieties would be accounted for, but 
space and time for the present research was limited. Methodologically, however, the procedure 
should be reliable and relatively easily executed (although time consuming) for any corpus 
study that deals with native English data. 
 Empirical gender-based studies can also implement the methods used here to examine 
sociocultural language idiosyncrasies and patterns. Precursory results were found here that 
suggests that the subtype of Self-Aware Event is fairly dependent upon the gender of the 
subject-experiencer. In other words, it was seen that when an experiencer is female, SA-type 
events were more frequent but when experiencers were male, SA-UE type events were more 
frequent. Initial justification for this was gender-bias in the media, but a more thorough 
investigation would not only support or refute this claim, but will also likely uncover much 
more detail and nuances in the differences and similarities that gender makes in Self-Aware 
construal. 
 
6.3 Future Directions 
 
This research grounds and delineates SA Events in embodied, experiential terms, thus avoiding 
some of the pitfalls of linguistic-only reasoning often found in Cognitive Linguistics, especially 
when dealing with conceptual metaphor (Gibbs, 2016). Further, because SA Events are based 
on embodied phenomenon, they should be psychologically, if not physiologically, verifiable.  
Psycholinguistic tests could be devised to examine this hypothesis. For example, test subjects 
could read or hear a series of random statements that included Self-Aware Events, TSM, DSC 
and others and asked to rate each on some sort of Awareness scale. If, in fact, the results of that 
test shows that Self-Aware Events rated significantly higher overall, this might suggest that an 
Awareness conception is indeed being activated. Another possibility is to show test subjects a 
short video clip of a scene in which a character verbalized one of the SA Events, at which point 
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the video is paused and the participant is asked the meaning of the expression. The responses 
would be analyzed and if a significant percentile of participants expressed Self-Awareness as 
the underlying conception, it also would lend evidence to the conclusions presented here. 
It would also be very interesting if Cognition and Neurolinguistic studies could 
corroborate the findings presented here. That would certainly help bridge the gap between 
linguistic and cognitive reality, or at least, provide hard facts to support some theory. One 
possible experiment to determine if Self-Awareness is in fact being conceptualized in the mind 
is for test subjects to read/say/write/hear various SA, SA-UE, TSM, DSC and PNS sentences 
while connected to brain imaging apparatus that show moment-by-moment areas of increased 
or decreased brain function. This could be compared to other brain imaging results and/or other 
control tests. One of these control comparisons could be brain scans taken of meditation 
practitioners. In some meditation traditions such as Insight Meditation, because Perceptual 
Self-Awareness is the focus of and is heightened during initial meditative states (personal 
experience), the idiosyncratic brain activity that occurs can be compared to the test subject’s 
scans. Results (positive correlation or not) could lend scientific validity to the theory of 
embodied image schemas and metaphor of SA Events by providing evidence from independent 
fields of research Gibbs (2007, 2016).  
Another avenue that is likely in the near future is the interaction of brain and computer 
on the neuronal scale, so that the mapping of pre-linguistic ideas onto linguistic structure can 
be traced all the way from concept to predication. Lastly, it is only a matter of time until 
Artificial Intelligence is added to corpus programming. At that time, semantic, syntactic and 
perhaps even pragmatic analyses can be independently mined by the algorithm, and the 
researcher can focus on more theoretical and/or practical use of that data.  
These advancements as well as those that haven’t even been thought of yet are soon on 
their way. The rapid advancements in technology across the spectrum of society will only 
create new opportunities for researchers willing to embrace them. I look forward to this new 
era in linguistic research where theories can be tested quickly and efficiently by diverse 
experimental procedures from related and perhaps not-so related fields. The next twenty years 
will see huge advancements in all these areas as well as some that have not yet been imagined.  
 
 
 
 
	 138	
6.4 Conclusion 
 
This research began with three questions, the first of which was “How can metaphoric events 
be identified and delineated within the reflexive construction?” A unique methodology was 
implemented for the objective identification of metaphor, based on the foundations of the 
MIPVU. It demonstrated how specific elements within a construction can be selected and 
compared to ‘base’ definitions as well as with other mined corpus data themselves in order to 
confirm or deny the possibility of metaphoric construal. Due to the restricted nature of the 
reflexive syntax, this method of metaphor identification proved fairly straightforward to 
employ and results were conclusive for a variety of contexts. It proved to be a relatively 
objective method for identifying metaphoric use while at the same time allowing for the 
flexibility of polysemy and collocational diversification within that limited framework. Thus, 
this method is evaluated positively for the purpose for which it was intended. 
 
Intuitively, we feel that some instances of a word are quite independently chosen, while 
in other cases we feel that the word combines with others to deliver a single multi-word 
unit of meaning. We shall call word-meaning independent, and phrase-meaning 
dependent. In between these two fixed points is collocation, where we see a tendency for 
words to occur together though they remain largely independent choices. 
(J. Sinclair, 1991, p. 71) 
 
The quotation above sums up the overall methodological intent of the present research, 
although more generally stated. This corpus analysis has shown that the collocation [NP + V 
+ x-self] contains a variety of meanings, both literal and metaphorical, depending upon the 
verb and the contexts in which they are irrevocably immersed. Within this construction in 
context, the variation of components seems free and independent, but this is only partly so. This 
analysis has shown that a limited number of meanings are construed for each of these 
constructions, some of them literal and some of them metaphorical. Seen in this light, polysemy 
within the reflexive construction is not as haphazard as it first may have appeared. The 
collocations display syntactic, semantic and pragmatic patterning, many of which were 
revealed and described at length, summarized in Table 29 for the metaphorically-construed 
semantic category of ‘Perception’. 
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Table 29. Summary of conceptual variation for perceptually-related verbs when occurring within the 
reflexive construction; combined totals for the COCA and BNC (excluding categories ‘X’ and ‘?’). 
verb Construal Type 
find SA ; SA-UE ; TSM ; PNS ; LIT 
lose SA; TSM; IDI (1~3); LIT (1~3) 
catch SA; DSC; PNS; LIT (1~4)  
be TSM  
check DSC; LIT; IDI 
feel SA-UE; LIT; IDI 
identify LIT (1, 2) 
immerse SA; LIT (1,2) 
perceive LIT 
regard LIT (1,2) 
see LIT; MET (1,2) 
watch LIT; MET (1,2) 
  
The second question raised at the beginning of this research asked, “Do Self-Aware 
Events (and other identified Events) display unique collocational patterning?” Examined by 
way of a corpus analysis along various parameters, the answer to this question is undeniably 
affirmative, with a caveat. This condition is that there will always be some ambiguity when 
language in use is concerned. Even the most well-formed intentions can be misconstrued. This 
inevitably leads to some ‘fuzzy’ data, making 100% irrefutable claims unlikely and unrealistic. 
That being the case, this research has employed metaphor analysis coupled with frequency and 
likelihood data showing that Self-Aware and other metaphorical Events do display 
collocational patterning. The analysis revealed two types of Self-Aware Event (i.e., SA and 
SA-UE), two types of True-Self Metaphor (slightly different senses for find x-self and lose x-
self), and one type each of the Divided-Self Causative (DSC) and Picture Noun Schema (PNS). 
The third question posed in the Introduction was “Do the results corroborate or refute 
the theoretical claims made in Modules 1 and 2?” This question is a little more difficult to 
answer concretely due to the different nature of those research aims and methods. As an overall 
theoretical claim that Self-Aware Events are a predicated reality, then the results here surely 
evidence that claim. Many examples, supported by contextual data, were analyzed, and 
construal and predication of SA Events were shown to be frequently instantiated. However, 
specific theoretical points are more difficult to corroborate. For example, it can only be 
suggested that the results of the present data analysis confirm the Cognitive Grammar model 
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of the SA Events proposed in Module 2. Corpus evidence was found that verifies the existence 
of SA Events, and SA Events were shown in Module 2 to be theoretically plausible from a CG 
point of view, but whether there is a single, direct connection between these is hard to prove. 
More generally, what this means is that theoretical models can be supported by data, but until 
there is enough independently verifiable data analyzed and tested across the research field, 
concrete and unwavering theoretical claims are difficult to make (Gibbs, 2007, 2016). What 
can be claimed with certainty here is that corpus evidence supports the existence of Self-Aware 
Events which have been theoretically demonstrated (in Modules 1 and 2) to be congruent with 
Metonymy within Metaphor, Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Cognitive Grammar, the 
Awareness Onset Model, as well as a semantically-defined, gradient view of transitivity and 
reflexivity. 
This last point addresses the initial question posed in the introduction, i.e., “do the 
corpus results analyzed here support the view of perceptual Self-Awareness as an image 
schema?” A review of the overall results of the research may help to answer this. Chapter 2 
examined the find x-self construction and concluded that there are four types of metaphorical 
construal for this construction, two of which display Perceptual Self-Awareness. In Chapter 3, 
the results of the lose x-self construction were shown to display two types of metaphorical 
construal, one of which construed Perceptual Self-Awareness, and in Chapter 4, the catch x-
self construction was found to be metaphorically construed in three ways, two of which 
construed Perceptual Self-Awareness. Do these results substantiate Self-Awareness as an 
image schema? Perceptual Self-Awareness is an embodied and experiential concept evidenced 
in the FoAs and supporting contexts. It is not based on any other abstract notion, and it can be 
used as a building block for metaphorical conception, construal, and predication. Because the 
fundamental definition of image schema is based on these conditions, the answer to the 
question above must be in the affirmative. This affirmation has the additional consequence of 
supporting the answer to question three from the previous paragraph in that the theories of CG, 
Conceptual Metaphor, and indirectly, Metonymy within Metaphor, use the concept of image 
schema (or basic domain) for their theoretical infrastructure. Thus, Self-Awareness is 
concluded to be an image schema which is employed in a number of metaphorical conceptions 
predicated mainly by find, lose, and catch when appearing in the verb slot of the reflexive 
construction.  
The overall results from Modules 1, 2 and 3 provide convincing evidence that Self-
Awareness is acting as the base conception for many metaphoric reflexive events from a multi-
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faceted methodology. Metaphor studies would benefit from this kind of multi-faceted approach 
rather than relying on traditional inquiry that is based on a single, narrowly defined theory or 
method. By utilizing analytical methods and tools that are both inside and outside its own 
domain, the field of Cognitive Linguistics would profit greatly. If evidence is found that 
contradicts a theoretical claim, then that claim needs refinement. But if empirical results 
reinforce the hypothesis, then the theory is much more objective and able to stand up to 
scientific scrutiny.  
It is my sincere hope that this investigation has helped to bridge the gap between 
empirical and theoretical research in the field of Linguistics. Furthermore, by providing 
quantitative and qualitative evidence that the construal of Self-Awareness is much more 
common in everyday use than previously understood, it is my heartfelt desire that this 
information be used to bring about a peaceful and harmonious society.  
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Appendix 1 
 
   Verbs appearing in both the COCA and BNC, search parameter [v*][ppx*]. 
align allow ask assert attach avail be behave 
believe blame brace bring busy buy call calm 
catch check commit compose concern consider control convince 
correct cover cross cut declare defend define describe 
devote distance distinguish do drag draw drive ease 
enjoy establish excuse expose express extricate fancy feed 
feel find fling force get give hang hate 
haul have heal hear heave help hold hug 
hurl identify imagine immerse introduce involve keep kill 
know launch lend let lock lose love lower 
make manifest may organize perceive place position pour 
prepare present press pride promise protect prove pull 
push put raise regard remind repeat resign resolve 
reveal rid save say seat see sell set 
settle shake shoot show sit steady steel stop 
suit support surround take teach tell think throw 
transform treat trust turn watch will work wrap 
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Appendix 2 
 
             Register and frequency for [find][ppx*] in the COCA and BNC.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Frequencies for [Npro + find x-self] by register in the COCA corpus. 
 
 
 
Frequencies for [Npro + find x-self] by register in the BNC corpus. 
 
 
 
 
 
COCA 
[p*][find][ppx*] FREQ 
PER 
MIL 
SPOKEN 1,427 13.04 
FICTION 4,049 38.6 
MAGAZINE 2,526 22.94 
NEWSPAPER 1,376 12.99 
ACADEMIC 1,041 10.07 
      
1990-1994 1,928 18.54 
1995-1999 2,027 19.59 
2000-2004 2,036 19.78 
2005-2009 1,924 18.86 
2010-2015 2,504 20.6 
TOTAL 20,838   
BNC             
[p*][find][ppx*] FREQ 
PER 
MIL 
SPOKEN 73 7.33 
FICTION 805 50.6 
MAGAZINE 113 15.56 
NEWSPAPER 131 12.52 
NON-ACAD 232 14.06 
ACADEMIC 121 7.89 
MISC 394 18.91 
TOTAL 1,869   
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
BNC:	[p*][find][ppx*]
PER	MIL
	 149	
Appendix 4 
 
1) BNC: [n*][find][ppx*] frequencies 2) BNC: [n*][find][ppx*] sorted by register 
BNC 
[n*][find][ppx*]; sort by lemma; 
min=5 
  
    FREQ 
1 
 [PEOPLE] [FIND] 
[THEMSELVES] 
22 
2  [LINDSEY] [FIND] [HERSELF] 12 
3  [MAGGIE] [FIND] [HERSELF] 9 
4  [ISABEL] [FIND] [HERSELF] 7 
5  [COUNCIL] [FIND] [ITSELF] 6 
6  [MEREDITH] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
7 
 [WOMAN] [FIND] 
[THEMSELVES] 
5 
8 
 [TEACHER] [FIND] 
[THEMSELVES] 
5 
9  [RUTH] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
10  [RONNI] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
11  [RACHEL] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
12  [LUCY] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
13  [LAURA] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
14  [JESSAMY] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
15  [CASSIE] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
16  [CAROLINE] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5 
   TOTAL 111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  FREQ 
SIZE 
(M) 
PER 
MIL 
SPOKEN 16 10 1.61 
FICTION 323 15.9 20.3 
MAGAZINE 49 7.3 6.75 
NEWSPAPER 80 10.5 7.64 
NON-ACAD 127 16.5 7.7 
ACADEMIC 76 15.3 4.96 
MISC 152 20.8 7.3 
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3) COCA: [n*][find][ppx*] frequencies   4) COCA search: [n*][find][ppx*], by register
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHART FREQ 
SIZE 
(M) 
PER 
MIL 
        
SPOKEN 575 109.4 5.26 
FICTION 1479 104.9 14.1 
MAGAZINE 1225 110.1 11.13 
NEWSPAPER 1166 106 11 
ACADEMIC 976 103.4 9.44 
        
1990-1994 1125 104 10.82 
1995-1999 1108 103.4 10.71 
2000-2004 1134 102.9 11.02 
2005-2009 1005 102 9.85 
2010-2015 1049 121.6 8.63 
TOTAL 10842     
Rank [n*][find][ppx*] Freq. 
1  [PEOPLE] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 81 
2  [WOMAN] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 44 
3  [STATE] [FIND] [ITSELF] 40 
4  [GOVERNMENT] [FIND] [ITSELF] 25 
5  [MAN] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 23 
6  [TEACHER] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 21 
7  [ADMINISTRATION] [FIND] [ITSELF] 21 
8  [AMERICAN] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 21 
9  [FAMILY] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 20 
10  [BUSH] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 19 
11  [CHILD] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 18 
12  [CHURCH] [FIND] [ITSELF] 18 
13  [PRESIDENT] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 18 
14  [MAN] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 17 
15  [PARENT] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 16 
16  [COUPLE] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 16 
17  [STUDENT] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 15 
18  [COMPANY] [FIND] [ITSELF] 15 
19  [MEMBER] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 15 
20  [INDUSTRY] [FIND] [ITSELF] 15 
 21  [BOY] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 14 
22  [LEADER] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 14 
23  [OFFICIAL] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 14 
24  [WORKER] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 13 
25 [REPUBLICAN][FIND][THEMSELVES] 13 
26  [WOMAN] [FIND] [HERSELF] 13 
27  [MARY] [FIND] [HERSELF] 12 
28  [US] [FIND] [ITSELF] 12 
29  [CLINTON] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 12 
30  [COUNTRY] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 11 
31  [COUNTRY] [FIND] [ITSELF] 11 
32  [FRIEND] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 11 
33  [SCROOGE] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 10 
34  [KID] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 10 
35 
 [INDIVIDUAL] [FIND] 
[THEMSELVES] 10 
37  [FORCE] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 10 
37  [FATHER] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 10 
   TOTAL 678 
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Appendix 5 
 
Rank and frequency for [n*][find][ppx*] in the COCA & BNC (alphabetical order). 
rank [n*][find][ppx*] COCA freq  rank [n*][find][ppx*] BNC freq 
  TOTAL 837   TOTAL 305 
11  ADMINISTRATION FINDS ITSELF 13  51  ACE FOUND HERSELF 2 
29  ADMINISTRATION FOUND ITSELF 8  23 
 ADVENTURERS FIND 
THEMSELVES 3 
77 
 ADMINISTRATORS FIND 
THEMSELVES 5  46  AJAYI FOUND HERSELF 2 
79  ALAN FOUND HIMSELF 5  24  ALEXANDER FOUND HIMSELF 3 
78  ALEX FOUND HIMSELF 5  45  ANNE FINDS HERSELF 2 
76  ALLIES FOUND THEMSELVES 5  44  ANNE FOUND HERSELF 2 
55  AMERICA FINDS ITSELF 6  47  ASHI FOUND HERSELF 2 
12  AMERICANS FIND THEMSELVES 13  48  BALDWIN FOUND HIMSELF 2 
30  AMERICANS FOUND THEMSELVES 8  49  BBC FOUND ITSELF 2 
80  BETH FOUND HERSELF 5  100  BECKENHAM FOUND HIMSELF 1 
81  BILL FOUND HIMSELF 5  99  BEESLEY FOUND HIMSELF 1 
82  BILLY FOUND HIMSELF 5  52  BENNY FOUND HERSELF 2 
31  BOY FINDS HIMSELF 8  50  BRITAIN FOUND ITSELF 2 
39  BOY FOUND HIMSELF 7  6  CAROLINE FOUND HERSELF 5 
56  BROWN FOUND HIMSELF 6  98  CARRUTHERS FOUND HIMSELF 1 
15  BUSH FINDS HIMSELF 11  97 
 CASE-STUDY FIND 
THEMSELVES 1 
32  BUSH FOUND HIMSELF 8  96  CASEY FOUND HIMSELF 1 
83  CARA FOUND HERSELF 5  7  CASSIE FOUND HERSELF 5 
84  CATHOLICS FIND THEMSELVES 5  16  CHARLES FOUND HIMSELF 4 
57  CHARACTERS FIND THEMSELVES 6  25  CHARLIE FOUND HIMSELF 3 
14  CHILDREN FIND THEMSELVES 12  53  CHARLOTTE FOUND HERSELF 2 
22  CHILDREN FOUND THEMSELVES 9  54  CHRISTINA FOUND HERSELF 2 
19  CHURCH FINDS ITSELF 10  55  CLARE FOUND HERSELF 2 
40  CHURCH FOUND ITSELF 7  56  CORNELIUS FOUND HIMSELF 2 
85  CITY FINDS ITSELF 5  5  COUNCIL FINDS ITSELF 6 
33  CLINTON FOUND HIMSELF 8  57  COUPLE FIND THEMSELVES 2 
58  COMPANY FINDS ITSELF 6  58  CRAWFORD FOUND HIMSELF 2 
23  COMPANY FOUND ITSELF 9  59  DALGLIESH FOUND HIMSELF 2 
41  COUNTRIES FIND THEMSELVES 7  60 
 ELIZABETH FOUND 
THEMSELVES 2 
42  COUNTRIES FOUND THEMSELVES 7  26  ERIKA FOUND HERSELF 3 
24  COUNTRY FINDS ITSELF 9  61  EVA FOUND HERSELF 2 
86  COUPLE FIND THEMSELVES 5  62  FAMILY FIND THEMSELVES 2 
87  COUPLE FOUND THEMSELVES 5  63  FISH FINDS ITSELF 2 
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59  COUPLES FIND THEMSELVES 6  64  FRANKIE FOUND HIMSELF 2 
88  CREW FOUND THEMSELVES 5  65  GEORGE FOUND HIMSELF 2 
89  DAVID FOUND HIMSELF 5  66  GERMANY FOUND ITSELF 2 
60  DEMOCRATS FIND THEMSELVES 6  67  HARI FOUND HERSELF 2 
61  EDWARD FOUND HIMSELF 6  27  HARRY FOUND HIMSELF 3 
43  EMMA FOUND HERSELF 7  68  HELEN FOUND HERSELF 2 
90  ERIC FOUND HIMSELF 5  17  HENRY FOUND HIMSELF 4 
91  FAMILIES FIND THEMSELVES 5  69  HOUSE FINDS ITSELF 2 
92  FAMILIES FOUND THEMSELVES 5  28  HUY FOUND HIMSELF 3 
34  FAMILY FOUND THEMSELVES 8  70  IANTHE FOUND HERSELF 2 
35  FATHER FOUND HIMSELF 8  29 
 INDIVIDUALS FIND 
THEMSELVES 3 
93  FORCES FOUND THEMSELVES 5  71 
 INSTITUTIONS FIND 
THEMSELVES 2 
44  FRIENDS FIND THEMSELVES 7  4  ISABEL FOUND HERSELF 7 
94  GIRLS FOUND THEMSELVES 5  30  JACK FOUND HIMSELF 3 
16  GOVERNMENT FINDS ITSELF 11  31  JAMES FOUND HIMSELF 3 
9  GOVERNMENT FOUND ITSELF 14  18  JENNA FOUND HERSELF 4 
95  GROUPS FIND THEMSELVES 5  72  JENNIFER FOUND HERSELF 2 
25  INDIVIDUALS FIND THEMSELVES 9  73  JENNY FOUND HERSELF 2 
17  INDUSTRY FOUND ITSELF 11  8  JESSAMY FOUND HERSELF 5 
96  IRAQ FINDS ITSELF 5  74  JOSEPH FOUND HIMSELF 2 
97  JOHN FOUND HIMSELF 5  32  JULIA FOUND HERSELF 3 
45  KIDS FIND THEMSELVES 7  75  JULIE FOUND HERSELF 2 
98  LAWYERS FIND THEMSELVES 5  76  JULIET FOUND HERSELF 2 
26  LEADERS FOUND THEMSELVES 9  33  KATE FOUND HERSELF 3 
46  LUCY FOUND HERSELF 7  77  KATHERINE FOUND HERSELF 2 
99  MAGGIE FOUND HERSELF 5  34  KELLY FOUND HERSELF 3 
10  MAN FINDS HIMSELF 14  78  KOREA FOUND ITSELF 2 
36  MAN FOUND HIMSELF 8  9  LAURA FOUND HERSELF 5 
100  MANAGERS FOUND THEMSELVES 5  79  LEE FOUND HERSELF 2 
62  MARCUS FOUND HIMSELF 6  19  LEWIS FOUND HIMSELF 4 
18  MARY FOUND HERSELF 11  2  LINDSEY FOUND HERSELF 12 
20  MEMBERS FOUND THEMSELVES 10  35  LISA FOUND HERSELF 3 
47  MEN FIND THEMSELVES 7  80  LOUISA FOUND HERSELF 2 
37  MEN FOUND THEMSELVES 8  10  LUCY FOUND HERSELF 5 
27  OFFICIALS FOUND THEMSELVES 9  3  MAGGIE FOUND HERSELF 9 
63  OTHERS FIND THEMSELVES 6  81  MARIA FOUND HERSELF 2 
48  OTHERS FOUND THEMSELVES 7  36  MCLEISH FOUND HIMSELF 3 
13  PARENTS FIND THEMSELVES 13  82  MELISSA FOUND HERSELF 2 
1 PEOPLE FIND THEMSELVES 63  83  MEN FIND THEMSELVES 2 
3  PEOPLE FOUND THEMSELVES 17  11  MEREDITH FOUND HERSELF 5 
65  PEREGRINE FOUND HIMSELF 6  84  MERRILL FOUND HERSELF 2 
66  PLAYERS FIND THEMSELVES 6  37  MUNGO FOUND HIMSELF 3 
67  POLICE FOUND THEMSELVES 6  20  PAIGE FOUND HERSELF 4 
21  PRESIDENT FINDS HIMSELF 10  85  PARENTS FIND THEMSELVES 2 
49  PRESIDENT FOUND HIMSELF 7  1  PEOPLE FIND THEMSELVES 21 
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68  READERS FIND THEMSELVES 6  86  POLICE FIND THEMSELVES 2 
38  REPUBLICANS FIND THEMSELVES 8  12  RACHEL FOUND HERSELF 5 
69  RESIDENTS FIND THEMSELVES 6  38  REX FOUND HIMSELF 3 
70  ROGER FOUND HIMSELF 6  39  ROBBIE FOUND HERSELF 3 
71  SCROOGE FINDS HIMSELF 6  21  ROBYN FOUND HERSELF 4 
5  STATES FINDS ITSELF 15  13  RONNI FOUND HERSELF 5 
6  STATES FOUND ITSELF 15  14  RUTH FOUND HERSELF 5 
7  STUDENTS FIND THEMSELVES 15  87  SAM FOUND HIMSELF 2 
72  SUSAN FOUND HERSELF 6  40  SCHOOLS FIND THEMSELVES 3 
4  TEACHERS FIND THEMSELVES 17  88  SHAMLOU FOUND HIMSELF 2 
50  U.S. FINDS ITSELF 7  89  SMITH FOUND HIMSELF 2 
51  UNIVERSITIES FIND THEMSELVES 7  90  STUDENTS FIND THEMSELVES 2 
52  VENERA FOUND HERSELF 7  91  SUFFERERS FIND THEMSELVES 2 
73  VISITORS FIND THEMSELVES 6  15  TEACHERS FIND THEMSELVES 5 
74  WILLIAMS FOUND HIMSELF 6  92  THATCHER FOUND HERSELF 2 
75  WOMAN FINDS HERSELF 6  93  THOMAS FOUND HIMSELF 2 
53  WOMAN FOUND HERSELF 7  94  TWOFLOWER FOUND HIMSELF 2 
2  WOMEN FIND THEMSELVES 27  95  TYSON FOUND HIMSELF 2 
8  WOMEN FOUND THEMSELVES 15  41  VIRGINIA FOUND HERSELF 3 
28  WORKERS FOUND THEMSELVES 9  42  WILLIE FOUND HIMSELF 3 
54  WORLD FINDS ITSELF 7  22  WOMEN FIND THEMSELVES 4 
    43  WORKERS FIND THEMSELVES 3 
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Appendix 6 
 
 Frequencies of modal verbs occurring before find + x-self (i.e., _vm* [find] [ppx*]); BNC & COCA. 
BNC modals :  _vm* [find] [ppx*]  FREQ   COCA modals :  _vm* [find] [ppx*]  FREQ 
1  [MAY] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 53   1  [MAY] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 211 
2  [MAY] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 52   2  [WILL] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 187 
3  [WILL] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 48   3  [WILL] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 164 
4  [WILL] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 48   4  [MAY] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 139 
5  [COULD] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 43   5  [COULD] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 80 
6  [MAY] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 25   6  [WOULD] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 74 
7  [COULD] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 25   7  [WOULD] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 74 
8  [WOULD] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 20   8  [CAN] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 73 
9  [WILL] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 19   9  [MIGHT] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 66 
10  [MIGHT] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 19   10  [WOULD] [FIND] [MYSELF] 63 
11  [MAY] [FIND] [ITSELF] 18   11  [MAY] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 59 
12  [COULD] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 18   12  [MIGHT] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 57 
13  [CAN] [FIND] [THEMSELVES] 14   13  [WILL] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 52 
14  [WILL] [FIND] [ITSELF] 13   14  [WILL] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 52 
15  [MIGHT] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 13   15  [COULD] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 45 
16  [WOULD] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 13   16  [WILL] [FIND] [ITSELF] 41 
17  [MAY] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 11   17  [HAVE] [FIND] [MYSELF] 39 
18  [WOULD] [FIND] [HERSELF] 10   18  [WOULD] [FIND] [HERSELF] 36 
19  [WOULD] [FIND] [MYSELF] 10   19  [MIGHT] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 34 
20  [COULD] [FIND] [ITSELF] 10   20  [COULD] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 34 
21  [MIGHT] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 10   21  [MAY] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 33 
22  [MIGHT] [FIND] [HERSELF] 9   22  [WILL] [FIND] [MYSELF] 32 
23  [MIGHT] [FIND] [ITSELF] 7   23  [COULD] [FIND] [ITSELF] 32 
24  [CAN] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 6   24  [MAY] [FIND] [ITSELF] 29 
25  [WOULD] [FIND] [ITSELF] 6   25  [CAN] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 28 
26  [WILL] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 5   26  [WOULD] [FIND] [ITSELF] 24 
27  [MAY] [FIND] [HERSELF] 5   27  [WOULD] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 23 
28  [CAN] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 5   28  [MIGHT] [FIND] [ITSELF] 20 
   TOTAL 535   29  [COULD] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 16 
        30  [HAVE] [FIND] [HIMSELF] 16 
        31  [MIGHT] [FIND] [HERSELF] 16 
        32  [MIGHT] [FIND] [OURSELVES] 15 
        33  [MAY] [FIND] [HERSELF] 14 
        34  [HAVE] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 14 
        35  [HAVE] [FIND] [HERSELF] 14 
        36  [WOULD] [FIND] [YOURSELF] 12 
        37  [COULD] [FIND] [HERSELF] 12 
        38  [WILL] [FIND] [HERSELF] 12 
        39  [WILL] [FIND] [EACH] 10 
        40  [CAN] [FIND] [EACH] 10 
           TOTAL 1962 
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Appendix 7 
 
    Rank and frequencies of [n*][lose][ppx*]; BNC & COCA. 
BNC   FREQ 
1  FINGERS LOSING THEMSELVES 2 
2  BUILDINGS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
3  SMYSLOV LOST HERSELF 1 
4  ROAD LOST ITSELF 1 
5  RACHAELA LOST HERSELF 1 
6  PLANES LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
7  PEOPLE LOSE EACH 1 
8  MEREDITH LOST HERSELF 1 
9  LOVER LOSES HIMSELF 1 
10  INDIVIDUAL LOSES HIMSELF 1 
11  HELEN LOST HERSELF 1 
   Sub-TOTAL 12 
  TOTAL (minus reciprocals) 11 
   
COCA   FREQ 
1  TIME LOSING HIMSELF 2 
2  WREN LOST HERSELF 1 
3  WOMEN LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
4  SOME LOST THEMSELVES 1 
5  WIND LOST ITSELF 1 
6  WILLIAMS LOST HIMSELF 1 
7  VOICE LOSING ITSELF 1 
8  VICKERY LOSES HIMSELF 1 
9  TRACKS LOSING THEMSELVES 1 
10  TIM LOST HIMSELF 1 
11  TELL LOSE YOURSELF 1 
12  SUFFERER LOSING HIMSELF 1 
13  SPIRITS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
14  SOUNDS LOST THEMSELVES 1 
15  SONG LOSES ITSELF 1 
16  SONG LOSE YOURSELF 1 
17  SHIPS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
18  SELF LOSING ITSELF 1 
19  SARGIS LOST HIMSELF 1 
20  SARAH LOST HERSELF 1 
21  CHILDREN LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
22  RING LOSES ITSELF 1 
23  READER LOSES HIMSELF 1 
24  PORTLAND LOSE YOURSELF 1 
25  POET LOSES HIMSELF 1 
26  PEOPLE LOST THEMSELVES 1 
27  PEOPLE LOSE EACH 1 
28  POLITICAL PARTIES LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
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29  NIGHT LOSING HIMSELF 1 
30  MOMENT LOSING HERSELF 1 
31  MINUTES LOST HIMSELF 1 
32  MIND LOST ITSELF 1 
33  MEETS LOSES HIMSELF 1 
34  MEANS LOSING HIMSELF 1 
35  LUCY LOSING HERSELF 1 
36  LUCINDA LOST HERSELF 1 
37  LEVINE LOSES HIMSELF 1 
38  LEGS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
39  LARKEN LOST HIMSELF 1 
40  JULIAN LOST HIMSELF 1 
41  INDIAN SCOUT LOSING HIMSELF 1 
42  OTHERS LOSING THEMSELVES 1 
43  GRETA LOSES HERSELF 1 
44  GIRL LOSES HERSELF 1 
45  GEORGE LOST HIMSELF 1 
46  GARDEN LOSE YOURSELF 1 
47  FRIENDS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
48  FREARS LOSES HIMSELF 1 
49  FATHER LOST HIMSELF 1 
50  EUROPE LOST EACH 1 
51  DANIEL LOSES HIMSELF 1 
52  ARAB COMMUNITY LOSES ITSELF 1 
53  CLIENTS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
54  CINNABAR LOSES HERSELF 1 
55  CHARACTERS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
56  CAT LOSE YOURSELF 1 
57  BUILDINGS LOSE THEMSELVES 1 
58  BOY LOSES HIMSELF 1 
59  BOBBY LOSES HIMSELF 1 
60  BARRIS LOSES HIMSELF 1 
61  BALL LOST ITSELF 1 
62  ANITA LOST HERSELF 1 
63  AGNES LOST HERSELF 1 
64  ADAMS LOST HERSELF 1 
65  AD LOST HERSELF 1 
66  ABIGAIL LOSE HERSELF 1 
   Sub-TOTAL 67 
  TOTAL (minus reciprocals & false antecedents) 53 
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Appendix 8 
 
 Rank and frequencies of [catch][ppx*]; BNC & COCA. 
BNC: [catch] [ppx*]     
    FREQ 
1  [CATCH] [HERSELF] 21 
2  [CATCH] [HIMSELF] 19 
3  [CATCH] [MYSELF] 10 
4  [CATCH] [YOURSELF] 9 
   TOTAL 59 
    
COCA: [catch] [ppx*]     
    FREQ 
1  [CATCH] [HIMSELF] 465 
2  [CATCH] [HERSELF] 337 
3  [CATCH] [MYSELF] 280 
4  [CATCH] [YOURSELF] 71 
6  [CATCH] [THEMSELVES] 22 
7  [CATCH] [OURSELVES] 19 
8  [CATCH] [ITSELF] 10 
   TOTAL 1204 
 
 
